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INTRODUCTION

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in his address to
the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974, stated:
The profound promise of our era is that for the first time we may
have the technical capacity to free mankind from the scourge of
hunger. Therefore, today we must proclaim a bold objective - that
within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will
fear for its next day's bread, and that no human being's future and
capacities will be stunted by malnutrition.'
One decade later, the ongoing drought and famine in Ethiopia,
Chad, Mozambique and other African countries cruelly portray
the failure of that promise. Each year, millions of dollars worth of
aid, much of it in the form of food, funnels through the international relief system - a network of individuals, corporations, voluntary organizations, governments, and intergovernmental organizations, which disburses relief throughout the world.2 During
the past year, the United States alone has supplied more than 1.5
million tons of agricultural commodities,- approximately one-half
of the total amount of food given to Africa.3
For those facing starvation, the provision of food meets an immediate need. But the donation of emergency aid without considering long-term food production requirements of the recipient nation is often an inappropriate response. Starvation in Africa is
attritutable to conditions that are both natural and man-made,
deeply rooted and complex; emergency assistance alone will not
remedy a disaster such as this one, engendered not only by
drought but by politics and civil strife. To combat the results of
such conditions, donors should supplement emergency relief with
long-term development assistance. Many donors are taking this
1. Talbot, Implications of the World Food Conference Resolutions: U.S.
Government Policy, With SpecialReference to the InternationalGrain Reserve
Issue, in THE ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE IN FOREIGN POLICY 110 (R. Fraenkel,
Hadwiger & Browne eds. 1979) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE].
2. See infra notes 17-171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the international relief system.
3. See Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986: HearingsBefore a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985) (statement of Melvin E. Sims, General
Sales Manager, USDA) [hereinafter Rural Development].
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step.4 Yet emergency assistance will continue to be necessary,
whether in response to natural disasters, man-made catastrophes
or other conditions, and thus should be examined and
understood.
The famine relief system links donors5 to disaster relief recipients. Donors and intervenors6 constitute the relief system. The
"'international relief system' can be divided into five tiers: the
first three represent the international level, the fourth the regional or country level, and the fifth the project level."'7 The firsttier consists of individuals and corporations, called primary donors, who donate funds or supplies. Primary donors are unable to
deliver directly to disaster relief recipients and therefore contribute to community organizations. 8 The second tier includes
churches, governments, and foundations and also represents the
organizations that receive the contributions of primary donors.'
To distribute, second tier organizations can (1) move donations to
the voluntary organizations that comprise the third level of the
distribution system; (2) furnish donations to intergovernmental
organizations; 10 or (3) donate directly to local government and
private voluntary organizations (PVOs) constituting the fourth
tier.1 Customarily, churches give to voluntary organizations instead of to lower level network organizations. Foundations seldom
donate to local governments; rather, they donate to international
organizations, voluntary organizations, and occasionally to local

4. See generally, e.g., Food Aid and th.e Role of the Private Voluntary Organizations: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Hunger, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
87-96 (1985) (prepared statement of Colleen Westbrook, Public Policy and Research Coordinator, Oxfam America) [hereinafter Food Aid and the Role of the

PVOs].
Donors gather and funnel resources to field workers. F. CUNY, DISASTERS
107 (1983).
6. The organizations that implement the projects and operations in affected
5.

AND DEVELOPMENT

countries are called intervenors. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 107-08.
9. Id. at 108.
10. The United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the World Bank are
some of the various intergovernmental organizations that collect and channel
funds to relief operations worldwide through World Food Program (WFP),
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the U.N. Disaster Response Office (UNDRO).
11. See F. CUNy, supra note" 5, at 108.
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PVOs. 12 The third tier consists of voluntary organizations such as
Cooperatives for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS)."3 The fourth tier is comprised of the
"host government, local nongovernmental organizations, and the
offices or field representatives of the foreign [voluntary agencies]."1 The fifth tier is the project level, the ultimate level
through which relief passes prior to reaching those persons facing
famine.1 5
As the world's largest producer of food, 6 the United States
plays a major role in the international relief system. The United
States not only donates aid directly through the federal government; it also funds and assists the relief endeavors of private voluntary organizations and is a member of the United Nations, the
most extensively involved of all multilateral organizations in funnelling aid to relief operations around the globe. This Special
Project examines the participation of the United States in the operation of the international relief system, using the provision of
food aid to Africa during the past few years as its framework. The
Project's second section discusses the enactment and utilization
of United States laws, regulations, and agencies as well as United
Nations relationships to facilitate the existence and operation of
relief activities. Section Three focuses upon the administration of
aid through various bodies, detailing the response of the United
States government, private voluntary organizations and intergovernmental organizations to past and present catastrophes. This
section also traces the development of private governmental organizations, noting their unique role in the disaster relief system.
Section Four not only analyzes the political, legal, and logistical
problems inherent in the disaster relief system but also presents
recommendations for reform. Section Five examines the legal recourse available to parties which have disputes over aid agree-

12.

Id.

13. Other voluntary agencies include: (1) Church World Service (CWS); (2)
Lutheran World Relief (LWR); (3) American Joint Distribution Committee
(AJDC); (4) World Vision (WV); (5) Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
(OXFAM); (6) Seventh Day Adventist Welfare Service (SAWS); and (7) Save
The Children.
14. F. CUNY, supra note 5, at 108.
15. Id. at 110.
16. In the 1970s, the United States provided 80% of the world's food aid.
Hopkins, Lessons of Food Diplomacy, in THE ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE, supra
note 1, at 145.
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ments, suggesting that the currently available arenas for dispute
resolution, along with the privileges and immunities afforded to
some parties, render satisfactory resolution unattainable. The final section considers the question of increased amounts of United
States food donations and concludes that the abolition of suffering requires removal of aid from the political context as well as a
linkage of emergency aid with developmental assistance.
II.

ESTABLISHMENT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES TO FACILITATE
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF SYSTEM

The major donors in the international relief system, the United
States and the United Nations, have established legal structures
such as laws and agencies to foster the execution of international
relief operations. Through its Public Law 480 and section 416
programs, as well as through other laws, the United States Government authorizes the giving of aid to needy nations. The
United States Government has enacted further provisions to encourage the creation of private voluntary relief organizations. The
Agency for International Development (AID) administers government aid programs as well as cooperates with the private organizations. The United Nations also has offered its assistance and
resources to private voluntary organizations; in 1985, it created
the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA), a widelywelcomed mechanism to coordinate the current relief operations
of governmental, intergovernmental, and private voluntary organizations. This section discusses the role of these structures in the
international relief system.
A.

United States Legislative and Regulatory Structures

1. Primary Laws which Authorize Aid
a. Agricultural Trade and Adjustment Act of 1954
The agricultural price support programs of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, coupled with rapid technological advancement in the agricultural production industry, caused farm
production to outgrow consumption substantially, thereby resulting in large surpluses of agricultural commodities. Thus, United
States officials sought a means to relieve political and economic
pressures caused by the accumulating stockpiles of unmarketable
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commodities.17 This was the historical backdrop to the passage of
the Agricultural Trade and Adjustment Act of 195418 ("Public
Law 480").
Public Law 480 has been the primary food aid instrument of
the United States since its passage 32 years ago.1 Under the law's
four titles, 20 approximately 35 billion dollars in concessional and
donative aid has been provided to more than one hundred countries throughout the world.21 The United States has contributed
more food aid under Public Law 480 than have all other nations
22
combined.

17.

M. WALLERSTEIN, FOOD FOR WAR

ter FOOD

-

FOOD FOR PEACE 4-6 (1980) [hereinaf-

FOR WAR].

18. 68 Stat. 469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982
& Supp. 1985)). "As the title of the PL 480 [A]ct suggests, the promotion of
agricultural trade (and the disposal of existing surpluses) was the dominant motivation, overwhelming other humanitarian and... developmental purposes in
the legislation." FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 6.
19. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 54 (prepared statement of Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA).
20. Title I authorizes the sale of United States commodities to developing
countries on a concessional loan basis. Recipients must agree to execute self-help
measures intended to improve their own food production capabilities and to decrease their dependency on food assistance. Currencies earned through the sale
of these commodities support self-help measures and other development-oriented efforts. 7 U.S.C.. §§ 1701-1712 (1982).
Title III, known as the Food for Development Program, utilizes resources generated under Title I sales to strengthen food production, storage and distribution activities in countries receiving food aid. Participating coutries are offered
multiyear food commitments and "loan forgiveness" on Title I repayments to
the extent that the food, or its dollar equivalent in local currencies, is programmed for agreed-upon development activities. Title IV contains miscellaneous administrative and reporting requirements.
21. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 54 (prepared statement of Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA). Public Law 480 aid reached its greatest volume in
fiscal year 1962, when 18,778,000 tons of commodities worth $1,495,498,000 were
distributed under Titles I and II. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 53-54. The
USDA budget request for fiscal year 1986 was $1.68 billion (1.3 billion under
Title I and 650 million under Title II) or about seven million tons of commodities. Rural Development, supra note 3, at 47 (statement of Melvin E. Sims, General Sales Manager, USDA).
22. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 54 (prepared statement of Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA). Grains have comprised approximately 90% of the
food aid provided under Public Law 480. HousE SELECT COMM. ON HUNGER, SPE-
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i. Title I
Under Title I of Public Law 480,3 the United States provides
food assistance through concessional long-term financing for the
purchase of United States agricultural commodities. 24 Public Law
480 directs the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 25 to finance

Title I activities, 26 but recipient countries actually use CCC concessional loans to purchase agricultural commodities in United
States commercial markets. Title I concessional aid may be
made in two ways, either by credit for dollars, with a twenty-year
repayment plan,28 or by credit for convertible foreign currency,
with a maximum maturity period of forty years.29 Public Law 480

CIAL REPORT ON APPLYING UNITED STATES FOOD SURPLUSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF

HUNGER, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT].

23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1712 (1982). The total cumulative Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) outlays for Title I through September 30, 1984, was
$13,177,222,000. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND OPERATIONS OF THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION 23

after

(1985) [herein-

FINANCIAL CONDITION].

24. See 7 U.S.C. § 1701. The concessional rate of interest charged in Title I
agreements has been approximately 3%. See id., § 1706(a); 22 U.S.C. § 2151t
(1982). See also Rural Development, supra note 3, at 62.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982). The CCC is an agency of the United States within
the Department of Agriculture. Its purpose is to stabilize and support farm
prices, to help maintain a balanced supply of agricultural commodities, and to
facilitate their distribution. Id.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 1702. Title I commodities are subject to the Cargo Preference
Act of 1954, 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (Supp. 1985). The Act requires that at least
50% of any government-generated cargo be transported on United States flag
ships. Under most Title I agreements the corporation will pay the differential
between U.S.-flag and foreign-flag rates. See 7 C.F.R. § 17.9(h)(1985).
27. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD FOR PEACE: 1983
ANNUAL REPORT ON PUBLIC LAW 480 at 7 [hereinafter 1983 ANNUAL REPORT].

Because Title I uses commercial markets to send food overseas, Title I concessional sales reach the hungry at a faster rate than Title II donations, which are
delivered by the CCC directly. See supra notes 43-66 and accompanying text,
requiring increased administrative supervision. Effective Uses of Agricultural
Abundance for Hunger Relief: Hearing before the House Select Comm. on Effective Hunger, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1984) [hereinafter Uses of Agricultural
Abundance]. Compare Appendix A. P.L. 480 - Title I/III Program Flowchart,
infra, with Appendix B, Title II Program Development and Implementation,

infra.
28. 7 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(1) (Supp. 1985).
29. See 7 U.S.C. §ol1Q0"2 AStEpp. 1985); 1983 ANNUAL REI
27, at 7.
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requires a five percent down payment on concessional aid, 30 but
this requirement may be relaxed depending on a recipient country's financial condition.3 1
Before any commodity is furnished through Public Law 480,
the Secretary of Agriculture must consider the United States' agricultural capacity, domestic demand, consumer price levels, adequacy of carryover stocks, and anticipated exports.32 Additionally,
the extent to which a recipient imports commodities through
traditional commercial channels ("usual marketing requirements") must be considered before the United States gives food
assistance, so as not to displace those commercial sales.33
To receive Title I aid a foreign country must submit a request
to the United States embassy located in that country.3 4 The embassy sends this request to Washington with a recommendation
and comments.3 5 The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) then makes an allocation based on "[United States] commodity availability, country needs, market development potential,
foreign policy considerations and economic development criteria. .. ."s The USDA drafts negotiating instructions for a proposed agreement which are forwarded to the interagency "Working Group" of the Food Aid Subcommittee for comments and
approval.3 7 The plan is then sent to the United States embassy
for negotiations with the foreign nation and consummation of the
agreement.3 8

30. 7 U.S.C. § 1703(k) (1982).
31. See Rural Development, supra note 3, at 62. In fiscal year 1984, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Yemen, Zaire, and Zambia all entered into Title I agreements with the
United States without rendering any initial downpayment. Id. at 64.
32. 7 U.S.C. § 1731(a) (Supp. 1985).
33.

7 U.S.C.

§ 1703(c) (1982). See HousE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at

46.
34. Rural Development, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Melvin E. Sims,
General Sales Manager, USDA).
35. Id.

36. Id.
37. Id. The "Working Group" is comprised of the Agency for International
Development (AID), Department of State, Department of Treasury, Department
of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Management and
Budget. Id.
38. Id. For a schematic of the Title I approval process, see Appendix A, P.L.
480 - Title I/Ill Program Flowchart.
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Title I concessional aid is administered only to "friendly" countries, 39 and at least seventy-five percent of the countries receiving
Title I assistance must be determined to be "poverty-stricken" by
the Agency for International Development. 40 Further, Title I
agreements may not be entered into with countries engaging in "a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights .... 141 Every country receiving aid under Title I is
required to
take certain 'self-help' measures to increase [its] food
42
security.

ii. Title II
Title I143 of Public Law 480 authorizes the President:

to determine requirements and furnish agricultural commodities,
on behalf of the people of the United States of America; to meet
famine or other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements; to
combat malnutrition, especially in children; to promote economic
and community development in friendly developing areas; and for
needy persons and nonprofit school44lunch and preschool feeding
programs outside the United States.

The Commodity Credit Corporation supplies the food donated
under Title

45

11.

The CCC acquires stockpiles of agricultural corn-

39. 7 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
40. 7 U.S.C. § 1711 (Supp. 1985).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. 1985).
42. 7 U.S.C. § 1709 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
43. 7 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The amount of food provided under
Title II is negligible in comparison to Title I shipments. Accord FOOD FOR WAR,
supra note 17, at 55. Between 1955 and 1976, Title II donated 44,654 millions of

tons of grain, while Title I concessional aid facilitated the shipment of 214,930
millions of tons of grain. Id. at 54.
44. 7 U.S.C. § 1721(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). Wallerstein distinguishes "program" food aid from "project" food aid. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 7, at 25.
Title I aid is program aid, or food aid sold on a concessional basis. Id. The recipient sells the food to support development programs. Id. Title II aid is project
aid and is provided on a grant basis; thus repayment is not required. Id. The
recipient may not sell the food but must use it directly as a supplement to other
available food supplies, except in exceptional circumstances. Id. The purpose of
project aid is to get the food to those who need it while also facilitating some
development project, id. at 25-26, and to respond to concerns about agricultural
disincentive. Id. at 26.
45. Section 203 of Title II, 7 U.S.C. § 1723, allows the CCC to pay nonacquisition costs as well, including costs for packaging, enrichment, preservation,
fortification, processing, handling, ocean freight to designated points of entry
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modities through the price support program of the Agricultural
Act of 1949.46 Under the program, the CCC is empowered to make
loans to producers of various commodities through its borrowing
authority. 47 Producers can repay the loan with interest or forfeit a
commodity which had been placed as collateral for the loan. 41
49
The forfeited commodities become assets of the Corporation.
The CCC stocks can either be sold in the commercial market 0 or
used for donative purposes. 51 In fiscal year 1984 the CCC donated
$460,913,000 worth of commodities under Title I1.52 Including
transportation costs, CCC expenditures under the program totalled $655,782,000. 53 Through September 30, 1984, cumulative

total allocations by the CCC under the Title II program exceeded
54
$10 billion.

and overland transport to landlocked countries. Originally, only ocean transportation costs were covered by the Act, but it was amended in 1977 by Public Law
95-88 because food was being sold to pay for overland transport costs.
46. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1425. As of September 30, 1985, the total value of the
CCC commodity inventory equalled $7,358,172,000. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORAT

ION 5 (1985). Some of the CCC stock at that time included: two billion pounds
of dairy products, 71 million pounds of honey, 325 million bushels of wheat, 200
million bushels of corn, 90 million bushels of sorghum, and 19 million hundredweights of rice. HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at iii.
47. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 16 (testimony
of Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity
Programs, USDA.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 7 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982).
51. 7 U.S.C. § 1721. When the CCC donates a commodity, the Corporation
sustains a loss equal to the cost of acquisition, packaging, fortifying, and transporting the good. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 1617 (statements by Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, USDA and by Cooper
Evans, Congressman from the State of Iowa).
Losses also accrue to the CCC for storage when the food is stockpiled. Id. at
17. The cost of storage, however, is minimal as compared to the expense of donating. Id. at 12. For example, one ton of grain costs the CCC approximately $13
per year to store. To ship one ton of grain to Africa costs the CCC from $49 to
$123. Id.
52. FINANCIAL CONDITION, supra note 23, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Id. In fiscal year 1985, $650 million was allocated for Title H, which was
increased by supplemental appropriations totaling $585 million. Rural Development, supra note 3, at 94. For fiscal year 1986, the Reagan administration requested only $650 million for Title II programming. Id.

346

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19.333

Title II authorizes the President to distribute these commodities "through. .. friendly governments and. . . agencies, private
or public, including intergovernmental organizations . . .. 55 In-

tergovernmental organizations include the World Food Program,
under the auspices of the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).56 The President is required
to utilize nonprofit voluntary agencies registered with and approved by the Agency for International Development or, if no
such agencies are available, foreign nonprofit voluntary agency
registered with and approved by AID.5 7 Private voluntary agencies include Catholic Relief Services, Cooperative for American
Relief Everywhere, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Seventh Day
Adventist World Service, and the Cooperative League for the
USA. 58 Furthermore, the President must take "reasonable precaution" that donations under this title will not "displace or interfere with sales which might otherwise be made," although an
exception is made for emergency cases.59
The minimum quantity of commodities that the Act makes
available for distribution is 1,700,000 metric tons. Of this amount,
not less than 1,200,000 metric tons is targeted for nonemergency
programs, distributed through nonprofit voluntary agencies and
the World Food Program. The unprogrammed reserve of a minimum of 500,000 metric tons allows the United States to respond
to emergency requests and to supplement regular programs.6 1
Grains held by the CCC as well as dairy products used directly or
as a component in blended foods are the major surplus commodi55. 7 U.S.C. § 1722(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
56. See infra note 330 and accompanying text for a discussion of intergovernmental organizations and their relief efforts.
57. 7 U.S.C. § 1722(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
58. See infra notes 248-419 and accompanying text for a discussion of private voluntary organizations and their relief efforts.

59. The Act does not specify the meaning of "emergency."
60. 7 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982 & Supp. 1985). These program primarily support

maternal child health projects, school feeding programs, and food -for work programs. See HousE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 48-50.
61. HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 48. Resources for § 206 of Title
II are currently taken from this unallocated reserve. Id. Section 206 permits

sales of Title II aid under certain conditions set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 1725 (1982 &
Supp. 1985).
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ties used in Title II of Public Law 480.62 Special marketing and
surplus conditions have occasionally resulted in the use of Title II
funds to purchase raisins, instant potatoes, beans and other "unusual" commodities.6 Title II donations received an increased
share of overall Public Law 480 funding during the 1974-84 decade. 4 In 1984, the United States provided an additional $150 million in Public Law 480 funds in response to the international appeal for emergency food relief for Africa following a noticeable
BBC broadcast 5 in October of that year. 6
iii. Titles III& IV
Title 111,67 known as the Food for Development Program,

utilizes resources generated under Title I sales to strengthen food
production, storage, and distribution activities in countries receiving food aid. Participating countries are offered multiyear food
commitments and "loan forgiveness" on Title I repayments to the
extent that the food or its dollar equivalent in local currencies is
programmed for agreed-upon development activities. Title IV
contains miscellaneous administrative and reporting
requirements. 8
62. HOUSE SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 16.
63. Id. These commodities have not come from CCC stock, but the Secretary
of Agriculture has determined them to be eligible for purchase with Public Law
480 funds. Such docket determinations are usually the result of high supply/low
price conditions in the United States and tend to follow strong expressions of
concern by affected trade interests and their congressional representation. Id. at
16-17.
64. Feeding the World's Population:Developments in the Decade Following
the World Food Conference of 1974: Foreign Affairs and NationalDefense Div.
of Cong. Research Service 345 [hereinafter Feeding the World's Population].
65. NBC, October 23, 1984 (a copy of this broadcast is available in the Vanderbilt University Television News Archives).
66. Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64, at 346. In 1966, Public
Law 480 was amended to place an emphasis on nutrition in the program. 80
Stat. 1526 (1966) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691, 1721 (1982)).
The CCC was given the authority to fortify raw agricultural commodities to be
donated under Title II. 7 U.S.C. § 1721. Fortified commodities not only have a
higher nutritional value than raw commodities, but also require only minimal
preparation by the recipient. Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at
37. The percentage of processed foods donated under Title H has declined. Id. at
34. In fiscal year 1982, 67% of commodities donated under Title H were
processed, as compared to 49% in fiscal year 1984. Id.
67. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1727g (1982).
68. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1731-1736n (1982).
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b. Section 416 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949
Section 416 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 194969 (section 416), as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1982,70 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture and the CCC to
donate commodities to needy nations. The Agricultural Programs
Adjustment Act of 198471 further amended section 416 to provide
that the Secretary could supply CCC-owned dairy products and
wheat to effectuate Title II of Public Law 480:72

In order to prevent the waste of commodities ...

acquired

through price-support operations by the [CCC] before they can be
disposed of in normal domestic channels without impairment of
the price-support program or sold abroad at competitive world
prices, the [CCC] is authorized ... to donate such [food] commodities ... to such State, Federal, or private agency ... for use in
...the assistance of needy persons .... 73

69. Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1058 (1949) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.

§ 1431 (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
70. -Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 763 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1982 &

Supp. 1985)).
71.

Pub. L. No. 98-258, 98 Stat. 130 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982 &

Supp. 1985)).
72. Originally, section 416 regulated only food commodities. In 1954, it was

amended to include other nonfood commodities by section 302 of Public Law
480, 7 U.S.C. § 1431 (1982). In 1966, section 416 again was amended to remove
the international disposal of commodities because lawmakers believed that Title
II of Public Law 480 adequately covered international food donations. Feeding
the World's Population, supra note 64, at 347. When surplus dairy stocks increased significantly in the early 1980s, however, Congress once again amended
section 416 to permit foreign as well as domestic donation. Id. The Agricultural
Programs Adjustment Act of 1984, supra note 71, authorizes section 416 to include surplus wheat, as well as dairy products, for foreign donation, sale or barter. The provision for donation, however, applies only to. food commodities. Disposal of other types of commodities to prevent waste is achieved by making
them available to any federal agency as payment for commodities not produced
in the United States or "to barter or exchange such commodities for strategic or
other materials as authorized by law." 7 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
73. 7 U.S.C. § 1431 (1982 & Supp. 1985). See Food Aid and the Role of the
PVOs, supra note 4, at 55; HousE SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 22. The
Secretary must be satisfied that recipients "will not diminish their normal expenditures for food by reason of such donation." 7 U.S.C. § 1431(a). This market
precaution is probably less applicable to a situation such as the African famine
than to situations such as donations to charitable institutions, nonprofit school
lunch programs or nonprofit summer camps,. which are also authorized by this
section.
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To qualify for participation in the section 416 foreign donation
program, a private organization, except under special circumstances, must be registered with the Agency for International Development; any organization already receiving dairy products for
overseas distribution prior to this registration requirement, how74
ever, is still eligible to continue in the program.
The Agency for International Development, with the assistance
of the CCC, carries out the administration of section 416.75 Because commodities donated under section 416 come directly from
CCC stocks, 6 specific appropriations are not required for their
donation.7 Although the quantity of dairy products donated
overseas under section 416 has been increasing, thus far no wheat
has been donated under the program. 8
In fiscal year 1983, the section 416 program provided 89,600
tons of dairy products, whereas in fiscal year 1984, 171,000 tons
were donated.7 9 The 1984 donations had a market value of

$150,000,000.80 The countries receiving the largest shares of this
74. 22 C.F.R. § 210.3(a)-(d) (1985).
75. 22 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-.15 (1985).
76. 22 C.F.R. § 210.1(b) (1985).
77. HousE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at iii. Although section 416 commodities do not require a budget allocation before releasing food from CCC
stocks, this program does affect the federal budget. The dairy products are assets of the CCC and when donated become "net realized losses" to the Corporation. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of
Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA). Under 7 U.S.C. § 1431, the CCC is required to pay for reprocessing, packaging and transportation of commodities donated under section 416,
which are also losses to the CCC. These net realized losses must be reduced by a
subsequent congressional appropriation to the Corporation. Id.
78. The USDA has been hesitant to donate wheat through section 416 because current wheat surplus is potentially marketable at a future date, while
dairy is a surplus commodity which is difficult to sell at a future date. See Uses
of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 23. Some interest in donating
wheat nevertheless exists. For example, the National Association of Wheat
Growers urged that section 416 be amended to require the Secretary of Agriculture to "make available to needy nations no less than 5% of CCC-owned commodities," including wheat. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4,
at 85 (prepared statement of Henry Hesham, President, National Assoc. of.
Wheat Growers).
79. Rural Development, supra note 3, at 47 (statement of Melvin E. Sims,.
General Sales Manager, USDA).
80. See Uses of AgriculturalAbundance, supra note 27, at 10-11 (statement
of Richard Goldberg, Deputy Under Secretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA). Goldberg based his estimate on 165,000 tons of dona-
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aid were Mexico, Brazil, and Poland."1 Agricultural products
donated under section 416 are for direct aid purposes only and
may not be monetized 2 unless the commodities are damaged. "
The reluctance to allow monetization of section 416 donations results from a concern over displacement of United States export
markets by commodities which were originally donated. 4
c. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
The Foreign Assistance Act of 19615 authorizes the use of public funds to supplement the development efforts of private agencies and to pay transportation charges on shipments by the American National Red Cross and United States voluntary agencies
registered with the Agency for International Development. 6 After
affirming that private and voluntary organizations embody "the
American spirit of self-help and assistance to others. . .," Congress declared that "in the interest of the United States. . . such
organizations [should]. . . expand their overseas development ef-

forts without compromising their private and independent nature. 18 7 Under the Act, Congress also empowers the President to

provide aid for international disaster relief and rehabilitation to
any international organization or private voluntary organization. 8
d. Food Security Wheat Reserve
Congress established the Food Security Wheat Reserve in the
Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980.89 The Act authorizes
four million metric tons of government-owned wheat to provide,
on a donation or sale basis, emergency food assistance to developing countries 0 The Reserve may be drawn upon under either of
two conditions: (1) when "the domestic supply of wheat is so limtions. See id. Compare id. with supra note 79, at 47.
81. See Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 11.

82. 22 C.F.R. 8 210.6(b)(6) (1985).
83. 22 C.F.R. § 210.9 (1985).
84. See HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 24. For a discussion of
monetization, see infra notes 655-61 and accompanying text.
85. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1982) (amended 1981).
86. 22 U.S.C. § 2151u(b). For a discussion of these registration procedures,
see infra 134-51 notes and accompanying text.

87.
88.
89.
90..

22 U.S.C. § 2151u(a).
22 U.S.C. § 2292(b).
Title III, 7 U.S.C. § 1736(f)-i (Supp. 1985).
Id., § 1736(f)-l(a).

19861

DISASTER RELIEF

ited that quantities cannot be made available for disposition
under [Public Law 480]"; 9" or (2) when any developing country
suffers a major disaster, in which case 300,000 metric tons may be
released, without regard to the domestic supply, for use under Title II of Public Law 480.92 The latter provision allows for the immediate release of food when the emergency is unanticipated and
when regular Public Law 480 procedures, such as the appropriations process required by the Act, might preclude a quick
93
response.

The Secretary of Agriculture is required to use CCC funds and
facilities to carry out the Reserve's purposes, 9 4 and the CCC is
reimbursed from Public Law 480 funds. 5 President Reagan authorized the release of 300,000 tons of wheat from the Reserve for
the first time in November 1984.1" The President's action was in
response to exceptional food needs in the developing countries of
Africa and South Asia.9 7

e. The President's Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1984
After noting that "acute food crises continue to cause loss of
life, severe malnutrition, and general human suffering in many areas of the Third World, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,"9 8 the
President's Emergency Food Assistant Act of 198499 establishes a
fund of $50 million each year for fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year
1986 to provide assistance utilizing private voluntary organizations (PVOs), public agencies or governments designated by the
President. 100

91. Id., § 1736(f)-1(c).
92. Id. While authority for the Reserve is continuing, HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 21, authority to replace wheat stocks expires September
30, 1990. 7 U.S.C. § 1736(f)-l(i)(Supp. 1985).
93. " HOUSE SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 21.
94. 7 U.S.C. § 1736(f)-l(g)(1)(Supp. 1985).
95. Id., § 1736(f)-i.

96. President's Statement, WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. (Dec. 5, 1984), reDEP'T ST. BULL. 26-27 (Jan. 1985).
97. Id.

printed in 85

98. 7 U.S.C. § 1728(1) (Supp. 1985).

99. 7 U.S.C. § 1728.
100. Id., § 1728(a), (c).
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Other Laws and Regulations which Facilitate Origin and
Operation of PVOs

In addition to financing programs of and furnishing commodities to private voluntary groups, the United States has established a framework of statutes and regulations which assist the
organization and operation of these PVOs.
a.

Federal Tax Liability of PVOs

Whether or not a PVO participates in United States. government donation programs, it will be eligible for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. 1 1 A voluntary organization can assure its tax-exempt status by organizing as either a
private foundation or a public charity under section 501(c)(3). 102
This section creates an exemption' 0 3 for "[c]orporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes. ..,,o4 provided that (1)
the organization does not substantially engage in dissemination of
propaganda, attempt to influence legislation, .or participate in a
political campaign on behalf of any candidate; and that (2) no
part of the organization's net earnings inure to the benefit of an
individual, 10 5 except as an object of charity. 10 6
To apply for section 501(c)(3) status, an organization must submit an Application for Recognition of Exemption within fifteen
10 7
months from the end of the month in which it was organized. If
the organization chooses to incorporate, it must include a copy of
its state charter and bylaws. The organization formed as a fund or
foundation must include a copy of the appropriate organizational

101.
102.
103.

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
See infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
Section 501(c)(3) status not only provides a substantial tax exemption

to the organization, but allows individual donors to deduct the value of their
contributions or gifts, within certain limitations, on their individual income tax
forms. 7 U.S.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 2522 (Supp. 1986). See supra notes 113-15 and
accompanying text for a discussion of limitations on individual deductions.
104. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

105. Id.
106.

Id.

107. I.R.S. Form 1023, p.1 (Rev. 1981). If the organization files the Application within this period, the exemption, upon approval, will be recognized retroactively to the date of its first organizational meeting.
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papers. A trust is a fund or foundation and may qualify for exemption. An individual or a partnership, however, cannot qualify.
An organization subordinate to a central organization may already be covered under a group exemption letter. If so, the new
chapter need not file a separate application for exemption.
The organizing instrument, either expressly or by operation of
state law, must limit the organization's activities to those permitted under section 501(c)(3) and must contain a proper dissolution
clause.10 8 This clause must permanently dedicate the organization's assets to some other exempt purpose in the event of dissolution. Therefore, a section 501(c)(3) organization may not dissolve itself and simply divide the remaining assets among its
members or employees. Sufficient financial data must also accompany the application, indicating the means of financing the
organization.
Section 501(c)(3) effectively divides eligible organizations into
two classes: private foundations and public charities. A private
foundation is generally established by a large donation from an
individual or a family. Earnings from this investment fund are
then used to award grants and to finance humanitarian causes.
Every organization qualifying for tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) is considered a private foundation unless it falls into
one of four categories specifically excluded from the definition. 09
Thus, organizations such as churches, educational groups, and
hospitals, 110 as well as those receiving more than one-third of
their annual support from members and the general public,1 1 are
public charities. Nonetheless, even if an organization falls within
one of the categories excluded from the definition of private foundation, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) presumes that it is a

108. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1985).
109. The four excluded categories are listed in 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(1)-(4)
(1982).
110. The first category excluded from the definition includes churches, educational organizations, hospitals, governmental units, and publicly-supported organizations. 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(1).
111. Category two consists of organizations normally receiving more than
one-third of their annual support from members and the general public and not
more than one-third from investment income. Organizations in category three
are those operated for the benefit of or in common with an organization listed in
category one or two. The fourth category comprises organizations operated exclusively for public safety testing. Id., § 509(a)(2).
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private foundation, with limited exceptions, 12 unless it gives the
IRS timely notice 113 to the contrary.
There are significant differences between the tax status of a
private foundation and that of a public charity. Contributions to
a private foundation are deductible until they exceed thirty percent of an individual's adjusted gross income. 114 By contrast, an
individual may deduct donations to a public charity so long as
they do not exceed 50 percent of his adjusted gross income.1 5 A
domestic private foundation also must pay a two percent excise
tax annually on its net investment income. 16
In addition, a private foundation is not tax-exempt nor are contributions to it deductible as charitable contributions unless its
governing instrument contains special provisions in addition to
those applicable to all organizations described in section
501(c)(3). 117 The rationale underlying these special provisions is

to insure that the foundation utilizes its resources for charitable
purposes.118 The IRS may assess taxes and penalties for any violation of these provisions. A private foundation's governing instrument meets these charter requirements if valid provisions of
state law: (1) require it to act or refrain from acting so as not to
subject the foundation to taxes imposed on prohibited transactions, or (2) treat the required provisions as contained in the
foundation's governing instrument." 9
112. See 26 U.S.C. § 508(b)-(c) (1982).
113. Id., § 508(a). An organization can give timely notice by filing a Form
1023. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114. 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 1985).
115. Id., § 170(b)(1)(A). Special rules for calculating this percentage apply to
individuals making donations to both types of organizations in a single year. Id.,

§ 170(b)(1)(B)(ii).
116. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAx-ExEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, Publication 557, at 15 (Rev. Feb. 1984).
117. These provisions include: (1) restrictions on self-dealing between the

private foundation and its substantial contributors which would benefit an individual at the expense of the organization's goals; (2) requirements that the foun-

dation annually distribute income for charitable purposes; (3) limitations on
foundation holdings in private business; (4) provisions that the foundation's in-

vestments do not conflict with its exempt purposes; and (5) provisions to assure
that the foundation's expenditures actually further its exempt purposes. Id.
118. Id. For a detailed discussion of restrictions, definitions, excise taxes,
and other items relating to private foundations, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
TAx INFORMATION FOR PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND FOUNDATION MANAGERS,

cation 578 (Rev. Oct. 1984).

119. I.R.S. Pub. 557, supra note 115, at 15.

Publi-
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b. Postal Privileges
Several statutory and regulatory postal privileges exist which
facilitate appeals for donations through the mail. Regular bulk
mailing privileges are available to all mailers, nonprofit or otherwise, or third-class material, including advertising, circulars, flyers, announcements, and general newsletter&120 Mailers must file

a separate application for these privileges at each post office from
which bulk mailings will be made. Each mailing must contain at
least 200 pieces and all pieces must be identical in size, weight,
number of enclosures, and wording.12
In addition to regular bulk rates, the Postal Service offers special reduced rates to nonprofit groups. For mailings which are
similar in every other respect, eligible nonprofit organizations pay
approximately one-half the rate charged to holders of a regular
bulk mail permit, and for a one-ounce mailing, approximately
one-quarter the rate charged for a first-class mailing. This advantage over first-class rates becomes even greater as the size of the
individual mailing increases (up to one pound). 22
The Postal Service also offers Business Reply Mail (BRM) service,1 23 enabling participants to receive first-class mail replies
from customers or donors by paying postage only on actual returns from any given distribution of materials. 12 Unlike the bulk
120. Completion of PS Form 3624 (1980) constitutes an application for
privileges.
121. No postscripts or notes are allowed, although the Postal Service does
permit individualized references to each recipient's name, so long as such references are made within an otherwise standardized message or form letter.
122. To send mail at special bulk third-class rates, an organization must submit Postal Service (PS) Form 3624 and pay a $50 annual bulk mailing fee. The
application must include copies of documents, such as a charter, articles of incorporation, bylaws, or bulletins, which describe the purpose of the corporation.
It must also include an attachment, if possible, which summarizes the activities
of the organization over the previous 12 months.
Although an organization may receive a regular bulk mail permit on the day of
application, processing PS Form 3624 takes longer. After an organization submits this application for special rates it may mail temporarily at regular bulk
rates. Upon approval of the application, however, it is entitled to a refund for
the difference between the regular and special bulk rates for all mailings made
while the application was pending.
123. Postal Bulletin 21489, Dec. 13, 1984, contains a description of this service and further includes PS Form 3614, the application for BRM privileges.
124. A business or nonprofit organization typically distributes a return card
or envelope bearing the familiar words in the upper right hand corner, "No
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mail program, BRM does not provide a special rate for nonprofit
organizations; however, it is particularly well-suited to mass appeals for support which may generate only a five or ten percent
response.1 25 Another statutory postal privilege for charitable
groups creates two exceptions to the general prohibition against
the mailing of unordered merchandise: (1) free samples clearly
and conspicuously marked as such, and (2) merchandise mailed
126
by a charitable organization soliciting contributions.
B. Agencies and Agency Relationships with Relief
Organizations
1.

Agency for International Development

a.

Role in United States Foreign Assistance

All foreign assistance programs of the United States are administered by the Agency for International Development (AID).127
Established during the Kennedy Administration as a part of the
State Department by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,128 the
policy of AID is "to concentrate assistance on the poorest countries; prevent and combat disease and help provide health services for the great majority in health, disease prevention, and environmental sanitation; reduce human malnutrition and to
increase opportunities and motivation for family planning and reduce the rate of population growth."1 2 Along with the Department of State, field missions or representatives located in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Near East execute AID programs. 130
AID, in conjunction with the USDA, administers Public Law 480

Postage Necessary If Mailed In The United States." The permit holder guarantees payment of the appropriate first-class postage plus a handling charge per
piece on all returned BRM cards or envelopes. To qualify, an organization must
submit a PS Form 3614 and an annual permit fee of $50 to the post office issuing the permit.
125. The Postal Service has also established a BRM program for international mail.
126. 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1982) (such mailings violate 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1982)).
127. Field, Nutrition Programs for Children in Developing Countries, Report to the Presidental Comm. on World Hunger, Feb. 1980, at 4.
128. Exec. Order No. 10,973, 26 Fed. Reg. 10,469 (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1340, 1340-41.
129.

Field, supra note 127, at 4.

130. Id.
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programs. The USDA informs AID field representatives of the
availability of and arranges for the transportation of surplus commodities for Title II programs.'
b.

AID/PVO Cooperation

Although the AID partnership with PVOs dates back to the
Agency's founding, Congress specified a minimum support level
for the first time in 1981, when AID was instructed to make available to PVOs between twelve and sixteen percent of its development and disaster assistance funding. 13 2 AID defines a PVO as a
nonprofit organization which receives some portion of its revenue
from the private sector and which receives voluntary contributions of money, staff time, or in-kind support from the general
1 33
public.
The Agency primarily interacts with PVOs in two ways. First,
PVOs serve as intermediaries in carrying out programs developed
by the United States government. Private agencies wishing to
participate in any of the Acts listed above must register, except
under special circumstances,"3 with AID headquarters pursuant
to the procedure described below. AID also supports programs initiated by PVOs. AID missions may approve Operational Program
Grants (OPGs) in response to certain private efforts. 3 5 These
provide federal funding of up to seventy-five percent of a privately initiated relief or development project. Financial support is
also available under a matching grant program for PVOs of recognized standing, which provides AID funds for up to fifty percent
of program costs in a private initiative.' 3 6 Again, registration is a
prerequisite to participation in this AID-administered PVO Grant
Program. 13

131.

TOMA, THE POLITICS OF FOOD FOR PEACE 45, 47-48 (1976). See supra

notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
132. 22 U.S.C. § 2151u(f) (1982).
133. U.SAI.D. OFFICE OF PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY DEVELOPMENT, THE AIDPVO PARTNERSHIP 2 (1984) [hereinafter THE AID-PVO PARTNERSHIP].
134. Unregistered PVOs which do not meet the AID conditions of registration may apply to The Office of Food for Peace for participation in the Section
416 program. In emergency situations, local PVOs may be sponsors when no

U.S. PVO is available to assist.
135. THE AID-PVO

PARTNERSHIP,

supra note 133, at 3-4.

136. Id.
137. Id. Although registration is a condition of eligibility for assistance under
the PVO grant program, it is only one of several such requirements. Others in-
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AID maintains two registries of PVOs engaged in, or intending
to engage in, voluntary foreign aid operations - one for United
States organizations and one for foreign organizations. 1 38 As of
December 31, 1984, 161 PVOs were registered with AID, reporting
a total of $1.2 billion in private contributions received for the previous fiscal year. During fiscal year 1984, the United States Government provided PVOs with an additional $687 million in
grants, contracts, excess government property, ocean freight subsidies, and donated food. 39 The expenditures of registered PVOs
for this period equalled 99.6 percent of their income, over ninety
percent of which went directly into program costs, six percent
into administrative/management costs, and three percent for pub140
licity and fund raising costs.
Registration provides the information necessary to determine
whether a PVO meets the funding requirements of the Foreign
Assistance Act: a PVO participating in the AID Grant Program
must obtain at least twenty percent of its total annual financial
support for its international activities from private (nongovernmental) sources. 14 1 This information is also used to confer a preference ranking for assistance under section 202 of P.L. 480.142
Within AID, the twenty percent requirement applies only to programs which support PVOs as independent entities. Those programs which deal with PVOs as intermediaries are excluded from
14 3
the twenty percent nongovernmental funding requirement.

clude program review and a pre-grant award review. 22 C.F.R. 203.1 (1985). The
purpose of the latter is to evaluate the financial management systems of grant
applicants according to requirements established by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). Applicable OMB circulars are A-110, "Uniform Administra-

tive Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals and other Non-profit Organizations"; Attachment F, "Standards for Financial Management Systems"; and by reference, OMB circular A122, "Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations."
138. 22 C.F.R. §§ 203.1(a), 203.6 (1985).
139. U.S.A.I.D. BUREAU FOR FOOD FOR PEACE AND VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE,
VOLUNTARY AID PROGRAMS

3 (1984) [hereinafter

VOLUNTARY Ai

PROGRAMS].

140. These are independent calculations based on data provided by AID. See
id. at 22, 29.
141. 22 U.S.C. § 2151u(g) (1981). Known as the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981, this statute established January 1, 1985
as the date by which compliance with the 20% standard would be required.
142. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
143.

VOLUNTARY FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS,

supra note 139, at 35.
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. The conditions of registration for domestic PVOs 14 require
that the applicant: (1) be a private nongovernmental structure organized under United States law; (2) maintain its principal place
of business in the United States; and (3) not be a university, college, accredited degree-granting institution of education, private
foundation, organization engaged exclusively in research or scientific activities, church or organization engaged exclusively in religious activities. It must also receive funds from private sources
145
and have a tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code.
Foreign PVOs are registered in accordance with guidelines similar to those for domestic PVOs, but these guidelines are adjusted
to reflect differing legal, business or cultural practices. Four categories of foreign PVOs are recognized by AID: (1) indigenous
PVOs, which conduct operations in the country under whose laws
they are organized; (2) regional PVOs, which are organized under
the laws of one country and conduct operations in more than one
country, but not in more than one AID geographic region; (3)
third-country PVOs, which are not organized under the laws of
any country in the AID geographic region in which they operate;
and (4) international PVOs, which receive funds from two or
more countries, have an international governing body, and conduct operations in one or more AID geographic regions. 6
For a variety of reasons, some PVOs choose to operate independently of AID and statutory donative provisions. The complex reporting mechanisms, both.prior to and during a project, can prove
too burdensome and time-consuming for groups which value
highly the freedom to choose their own projects and move
144. These registration requirements are listed at 22 C.F.R. § 203.2 (1985).
145. The PVO must be tax-exempt under any one of the following provisions: (1) I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. 1985), except private foundations under
I.R.C. § 509(a)(2); (2) as a social welfare organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4);
(3) as a labor, agricultural and horticultural organization under I.R.C. §
501(c)(5); or (4) as a business league, chamber of commerce, real estate board,
board of trade or professional football league, if not organized for profit, under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). In addition, AID may require the applicant to submit its articles of incorporation, bylaws, documents establishing legal status, a statement of
location, a statement. of tax exemption, tax forms, annual reports, and an audited financial statement.
146. THE AID-PVO PARTNERSHIP, supra note 133, at 13. Registration guidelines for non-United States PVOs were approved by the Deputy Administrator
of AID on March 15, 1978 and are subject to AID policies, regulations and procedures as amended or supplemented from time to time. 22 C.F.R. § 203.6
(1985).
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swiftly.1 41 Other groups such as Oxfam America have policy objections both to bulk aid, which is sold locally on the open market,
and to project aid, which is distributed directly to select recipients.148 In a recent statement to the House Select Committee on
Hunger, 149 an Oxfam America representative explained her
group's decision not to accept government funds or food offered
under the provisions of P.L. 480. While acknowledging that food
aid is effective in an emergency relief situation, Oxfam argues
that the "false sense of food security" and the disincentive to local agricultural production which food aid may induce often become obstacles to the long-term goal of eliminating poverty
through the promotion of local agricultural self-reliance. 50 In
short, "[1]ack of food is not the real problem, poverty is." 51
2.

United Nations

a.

United Nations - Private Voluntary Organizations

The United Nations maintains official relationships with private voluntary organizations in two capacities. PVOs may qualify
for official listing with the U.N. Department of Public Information (DPI),5 which includes them in the vast U.N. information147. Cooper, InternationalRelief Agencies, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP., Jan.
25, 1985, at 72.
148. Dawson, In Defence of Food Aid, INT'L LAm. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 1819.
149. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 87-96.
150. Id. at 88.
151. Id. at 90-91. This statement is echoed in a status report issued in September 1985, by the U.N. Office for Emergency Operations in Africa: "[I]t must
be remembered, [however,] that emergency relief is not a cure but merely a temporary palliative. The disease is poverty. Drought does not produce famine when
the affected population is affluent." U.N. Report No. OEOA/3/3, p. 3 (Sept. 1,
1985).
152. Since its creation in 1946, the Public Information division of the U.N.
has been known as both an "Office" (OPI) and a "Department" (DPI). It is
officially a department, but both terms are still in use. See P. CHIANG, NONGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE AND

FUNCTION 146-47 (1981).
NGO relations with the DPI are regulated by the DPI/NGO Section, "principally for the purposes of re-disseminating information about the United Nations
and to promote the widest possible public understanding of the United Nations'
aims and activities." Id. at 153 (quoting from U.N. OPI/NGO Section, Explanation and Requirements for Listing NGOs with the Office of Public Information
at United Nations Headquarters (74-47611), at 1, n.d.).
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sharing network. PVOs listed solely with the DPI do not participate in U.N. deliberations. The U.N. also may grant select PVOs
consultative status 5 s with the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), which allows them to participate in Council
proceedings.
Only those PVOs of "recognized national or international
standing," which conduct "active information program[s] in the
field of international affairs, part of which they are willing to
devote to their interest in the United Nations," may list with the
DPI.15 4 Although they do not have the privilege of presenting
written or oral statements to U.N. bodies, DPI-listed PVOs do
have access to the U.N. buildings where, in addition to attending
meetings and collecting documents, they have the opportunity to
confer with delegates and officials of the Secretariat. 15 5 PVO applications for DPI listing may be made directly to the DPI/PVO
section, where they receive staff review.
In contrast to DPI listing, PVO consultative status creates an
official two-way relationship between the PVO and the
157
ECOSOC. 5 6 As authorized by Article 71 of the U.N. Charter,
Resolution No. 1296158 defines this relationship:
[C]onsultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for
the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure
expert information or advice from organizations having special
competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements
are made, and, on the other hand, to enable organizations which
represent important elements of public opinion in a large number
of countries to express their views.1 59

153. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
154. P. CHIANG, supra note 152, at 153 (quoting from U.N. Press Release
NGO/16, pp. 2-3).
155. Id. at 157. This allows a degree of informal but direct communication
between NGO representatives and U.N. delegates.
156. NGO applications for Consultative Status with ECOSOC are considered
by the Council Committee on NGOs. This committee consists of representatives
from member governments, and its recommendations must receive final approval from the full council.
157. "The Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence." U.N. CHARTER art. 71, para. 1.
158. ECOSOC adopted the Resolution in 1968.
159. U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1296 (XLIV) at para. 14 (1968), reprinted in P.
CHIANG, supra note 152, at 295, 298.
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PVOs with consultative status fall into one of three categories:
(1) those groups with "general" consultative status; 160 (2) those
groups with "special" consultative status; 1 ' and (3) those groups
which can make occasional and useful contributions to the work
of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.6 2 The Council may call
upon groups in this third category at times it deems
appropriate. 163
The privileges afforded PVOs with consultative status vary according to each group's categorization. Organizations in category I
may make agenda proposals for ECOSOC meetings and may address the Council directly if such proposals are accepted or upon
recommendation of an appropriate Council committee. 6 4 Category II organizations may occasionally address the Council, although their opportunities to make direct contributions is generally limited to meetings of commissions and other subsidiary
bodies of ECOSOC. Representatives from category I and II organizations may observe public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, whereas category III groups may send representatives only to meetings which concern their particular fields of
competence.1 6 5 Category I and II organizations may also submit
written statements to Council members. L66
i.

Office for Emergency Operations in Africa

Against the diverse backdrop of private and intergovernmental
humanitarian relief agencies, in 1985 a single U.N. office emerged
which has managed to coordinate effectively and to focus the net160.

Category I organizations have "general" consultative status based upon:

(1) concern with most of the activities of the Council; (2) demonstrated contributions to the objectives of the U.N.; (3) close involvement with the economic
and social life of the areas they represent; and (4) broad representation of major

segments of population in a large number of countries. Id. at para. 16(a), reprinted at 298-99. See also, P. CHIANG at 91.
161. Category II organizations have "special" consultative status based upon:
(1) their special competence and specific concern with only a few of the fields of
activity covered by ECOSOC; and (2) their international reputation within those

fields for which they have or seek consultative status. U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1296
(XLIV) at para. 16(b) (1968), reprinted in P. CHIANG, supra note 152, at 295,
299.
162. Id. at para. 19, reprinted at 299.
163. Id.

164. Id. at para. 21, reprinted at 300.
165. Id. at para. 22, reprinted at 300.
166. Id. at para. 23, reprinted at 300.
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work of PVO, IGO, and even governmental efforts responding to
the African emergency. On December 17, 1984, faced with what
he described as a challenge "without precedent in history, ' 167 and
following the U.N. General Assembly's adoption by consensus of
the "Critical Economic Situation in Africa,"' 6 Secretary General
Javier Perez de Cuellar announced the establishment of the Office
for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA). The scope of the
OEOA mandate was massive:
to ensure that all elements of the United Nations collaborate with
maximum coherence, harmony and effectiveness, in close cooperation with the African countries affected, the specialized agencies of
the United Nations system, donor Governments and organizations
and non-governmental organizations, to help to ensure that the external assistance required to meet the emergency needs of the afin the most timely, holistic and effecfected countries is provided
169
tive manner possible.
To head this new office the Secretary General chose Bradford
Morse, Administrator of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), who immediately concurred with Javier de Cuellar's assessment by describing the African drought as "the greatest human disaster in history."' 0
Though vested with broad responsibilities, the OEOA was
designed as a temporary office, limited to the duration and recovery stages of the African crisis. It is staffed by representatives
from virtually every major U.N. humanitarian agency and simultaneously works in close cooperation with any private organizations having the capacity to deliver immediate and effective r~iief
aid in Africa. Its PVO relations range from emerging groups such
as Live Aid and USA For Africa, to umbrella groups such as Interaction, which represents 110 United States PVOs. Its funding
comes from private donations, governments, industry and independent relief agencies. On a daily basis, it has taken over the job
of coordinating the field efforts of PVOs, donor governments, and

167. Lone, Generous World Response to Challenge in Africa, AFRICA EMERGENCY REPORT 1 (Apr.-May 1985).
168. G.A. Res. 39/29, U.N. Press Release GA/7095, at 22 (Jan. 21, 1985).
169. United Nations Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa at 2, U.N.
Doc. SG/CONF.2/1 (1985).
170. Lone, Famine Continues Unabated,AFRICA EMERGENCY REPORT 3 (June
1985).
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recipient African governments.1"'
III. ADMINISTRATION OF AID THROUGH VARIOUS BODIES
This section examines some of the operations of the international relief system by focusing on the response of the United
States Government, private voluntary organizations and intergovernmental organizations to past and present crises. It also discusses the attempts of recipient countries to assist these donors in
the execution of their activities.
A.

United States Government

1. Beginnings of United States Activities
Due to the recent African drought, famine and food aid have
captured the attention of the media and consequently thrust foreign assistance to the forefront of the political arena. But American overseas food assistance has not been a recent government
undertaking. For example, as long ago as 1812, Congress provided
about $50,000 in food aid to earthquake victims in Venezuela.172.
The following discussion details two major'relief operations initiated earlier this century.
a.

American Relief Administration

The first major disaster relief operations of the United States
government began after World War I. After signing the Armistice,
President Woodrow Wilson directed Herbert Hoover to form the
American Relief Administration (ARA) to coordinate official
United States postwar aid to Europe.17 3 Congressional appropriations' 74 and United States Treasury loans to newly established
171.

Telephone interview with Keith Walton, Chief of the OEOA (Oct. 20,

1985).
172.

FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 26.

173: F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, AMERICAN FOOD IN THE WORLD WAR AND RE-.
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD 3-4 (1931). Prior to his ARA appointment, Hoover served
in Europe as Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, an organization
which purchased and shipped relief supplies to German-occupied Belgium and
Northern France. Id. at 5. In 1917, Hoover returned to the United States to
serve as United States Food Administrator, a position created by Executive Order of President Wilson under authority of the Food Control Act of August 10,
1917. Id. The Food Administrator coordinated conservation and distribution of
the United States food supply. Id. at 15.
174. See Act of Feb. 25, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-274, 40 Stat. 1161. Congress
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governments funded the ARA, 176 and the President's National Security and Defense Fund provided additional supplies. During the
nine months after Armistice and until the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles on June 28, 1919, Hoover directed the delivery of over
four million tons of food to Europe. 176 After the Armistice period,
official distribution of relief from the United States ceased and
the ARA began liquidation.1 7
The ARA, however, continued to facilitate relief efforts. Using
the money remaining in its relief fund, Hoover established the
American Relief Administration European Children's Fund
(ECF), a private charitable organization. Though not part of the
official ARA of the Armistice period,1 78 the ECF from 1919179to
1921 facilitated the feeding of millions of European children.
In early 1921, a severe drought afflicted the Volga region of
Russia. Not until July, however, did the Soviet government permit Maxim Gorky to appeal for foreign aid,180 whereupon Hoover
immediately offered the assistance of the ARA European Children's Fund. 81 The ARA, however, had insufficient funds and
many prior commitments in other countries, so Hoover asked
President Harding to provide federal aid.18 2 In response to Har-

appropriated $100 million for relief in Europe.
175. See Act of April 24, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-3, 40 Stat. 35; Act of September 24, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-45, 40 Stat. 258; Act of April 4, 1918, Pub. L. No.
65-120, 40 Stat. 502; and Act of July 9, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-192, 40 Stat. 844.
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia received such loans. The loans totaled
over $87 million. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 34.
176. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 4. Also, the American Red
Cross contributed $200 million to European relief during the Armistice period.
See generally THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS ANNUAL REPORT (1919-1923).
Other United States charitable organizations which donated food and money inchide American Friends Service Committee; American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee; American Committee for Relief of the Near East; and the Commission for Relief in Belgium. British charities also contributed: Friends' Emergency Relief Committee in Vienna; Friends' War Victims Relief Committee in
Poland; the British Red Cross; Lady Muriel Paget's Mission in Czechoslovakia;
"Save the Children" Fund; Scottish Women's Hospitals; and the Vienna Emergency Relief Fund in London. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 35.
177. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 244. See B. WEISSMAN, HERBERT HOOVER AND FAMINE RELIEF TO
SovIET RusSIA: 1921-23 46-47 (1974).

181. F. SURFACE & R.

BLAND,

supra note 173, at 244-45.

182. See B. WEISSMAN, supra note 180, at 46-47.
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ding's recommendation, Congress passed a bill'83 that authorized
the expenditure of $20 million for corn, seed grain and milk 8 4 by
the United States Grain Corporation. 8 5 In return, the Russian

Government gave the ARA $10 million, chiefly in gold rubles, to
purchase food for the Russian people. 86 Russia and the United
States finalized their agreement
on August 20, 1921, by signing a
87
formal treaty at Riga.

The ARA operations in Russia continued from August 1921 until 1923. During this period, the ARA delivered a total of
741,572.7 metric tons of relief supplies to Russia. 88 The total
value of aid, including contributions by other European governments, exceeded $63 million. 189 On May 14, 1923, the United
183. Act of December 22, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-116, 42 Stat. 351.
184. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 245. Other relief organizations which worked in cooperation with the ARA were the Volga Relief Society,
National Lutheran Council, American Mennonite Relief, Southern Baptist Convention, the American Friends Service Committee, American Red Cross, Federal
Council of Churches, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, National
Catholic Welfare Association, Knights of Columbus,.Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. Id.
at 246.
185. The United States Grain Corporation was established during World
War I to coordinate the conservation and distribution of grain in the United
States and Allied Countries.
186. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 246. The Soviet government
had several million dollars in gold coins in reserve in their treasury.
187. See Agreement between the American Relief Administration and the
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, Aug. 20, 1921, United StatesU.S.S.R., reprinted in F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 926-27. Maxim
Litvinov signed on behalf of Russia and Walter Lyman Brown signed on behalf
of the American Relief Administration. In general, the agreement provided that
[T]he Soviet authorities agreed to fully protect supplies imported by the
A.R.A. and affiliated organizations and to replace or pay for any supplies
lost or stolen; to permit full control by the A.R.A. of distribution up to the
time of consumption; to bear the entire cost of unloading, storage, and
inland transportation of commodities, as well as the overhead expenses... ; to furnish necessary office space and living quarters for American personnel; to allow full freedom of movement to the American personnel in Russia, as well as freedom from search ....

[T]he A.R.A. agreed to

feed chldren and adults in the famine area to the extent of their capability
and gave formal assurances regarding the nonparticipation of American
personnel in political questions.
F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 245.
188. F. SURFACE & R. BLAND, supra note 173, at 247.
189. Id. The ARA/ECF delivered medical and hospital supplies, as well as
foodstuffs. Russia received 8,291.9 metric tons of medical supplies worth
$8,072,256.03. Id. at 252.
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States determined that Russia would realize a surplus of grain
and other foods after the next harvest. Thus, on June 15, 1923,
ARA officials and Russian officials agreed to terminate the ARA
relief efforts in Russia. By July 4, 1923, the ARA's last district
headquarters closed. 190 The ARA totally ceased operations in
1924. A final report showed that the United States had supplied
33,841,307 metric tons of food, clothes and medicine during
World War I, the Armistice Period, and the Reconstruction
Period. 191
b. The Marshall Plan
After the devastation of World War II, the frigid winter of
1946-47 followed by a summer drought resulted in a severe food
shortage in Europe. 92 Once again, Europe relied upon both trade
with and aid from the United States to secure the food, capital
goods and investment funds necessary for recovery.' 93 In contrast,
by 1945 the United States economy was strong and not dependent on imports for its survival." Still, the United States feared
the threat of communism and the destruction of trade if Europe's
economy failed. 95 The United States, therefore, decided to aid
recovery by establishing the European Recovery Program (ERP),
known as the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was named for Secretary of State George C.
Marshall who, in a speech at the Harvard University commencement ceremony on June 5, 1947, invited the European countries
to plan a program of reconstruction, to which the United States
would contribute.
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to
do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world,
190. Id. at 264.
191. Id. at 9.
192. See generally Newton, How Successful Was the Marshall Plan?, HisT.
TODAY, Nov. 1983, at 11.
193.

THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM, S. Doc. No. 935, 80th Cong., 2d

Sess. 2, 5 (1948).
194. Newton, supra note 192, at 11. The United States estimated that in
1947 it would export $16 billion of goods but import only $8 billion in return. Id.
at 12.
195. Another objective of the United States was to aid the complete restoration of West Germany's highly industrialized areas without facilitating its accumulation of great military power. H. Doc. No. 478, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12
(1947).
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without which there can be no political stability and no assured
peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine
but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos ...
It is already evident that, before the United States Government
can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation
and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there
must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the
requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action
may be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting
nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. . . The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The
role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of
a European program and of later support of such a program so far
as it may be practical for us to do so.198

Following Marshall's speech, French Foreign Minister George
Bidault invited British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and Soviet
Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov to discuss aid proposals in
Paris on June 27.197 The French and British ministers invited
twenty-two European nations to send representatives to Paris to
help develop a comprehensive aid program; sixteen of the nations
accepted. 198 At the conference the countries created the Commit-

196. THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM, S. Doc. No. 111, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 74-75 (1947). Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson made a similar address on May 8, 1947 at the Delta Council in Cleveland, Mississippi and again
on June 16, 1947, at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. Id. at 2.
197.' See id. at 4. Molotov attended the Paris conference but left after a few
days because the United States would not specify the exact amount of aid to be
provided and because Russia disliked the idea of a central committee to coordinate te work of the ERP. Russia believed that such a committee would interfere in'domestic affairs of independent nations. The Russians attacked the Marshall Plan as "an instrument of American Imperialism designed to enslave the
economies of the European nations in order to save the United States from economic collapse." Smith, The Marshall Plan, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA AM. FOR. POL'Y

535, 540 (1978).
198. Russia and other members of the Communist bloc refused to participate. Sanford, The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation, DEP'T ST.
BULL. 17 (June 1982). The countries represented were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Not
represented were Finland, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Russia. S. Doc. No. 111, supra note 196, at 5.
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tee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) 199 to distribute
the United States appropriations for European relief.2 0 0
The plans, negotiations and investigations of the United States
and the European Countries required time. A comprehensive program for long-term recovery would not be feasible until the spring
of 1948.1 Thus, during the initial two and one-half years of the
program, Congress had to provide interim emergency aid to meet
the food and fuel needs of Europe. 0 2 Most emergency assistance
was in the form of repayable loans, although some assistance consisted of grants and relief, including a $2.7 billion contribution to
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, an
authorization of $332 million in July 1947, and a donation of $15
million to the International Children's Emergency Fund. 3
The emergency relief program provided only basic necessities
such as food and medical supplies. Relief was granted to specific
nations pursuant to agreements in which the United States reserved the right "to select the recipients, to determine the
amounts, and to apply its own administrative standards and pro-

199. S. Doc. No. 111, supra note 196, at 5.
200. H. Doc. No. 478, supra note 195, at 8. Meanwhile, President Truman
appointed three committees to examine the proposed aid to Europe. Secretary
of the Interior Julius Krug's committee studied the United States' ability to provide aid and the resulting impact on United States natural resources. See Official Summary of "NationalResources and ForeignAid" by the Krug Committee, released Oct. 19, 1947, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 111, supra note 196, at 89.
The Council of European Advisors studied the impact of foreign aid on the
United States economy. See Official Summary of "The Impact of ForeignAid
Upon the Domestic Economy" by the Council of Economic Advisors ("Nourse
Report"), released Nov. 1, 1947, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 111, supra note 196, at
97. The President's Committee on Foreign Aid, chaired by Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman analyzed Europe's commodity needs on a regional
basis and the limits of United States assistance. See Official Summary of "European Recovery and American Aid" by the President's Committee on Foreign
Aid (HarrimanReport), released Nov. 8, 1947, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 111,
supra note 196, at 103.
201. Smith, supra note 197, at 542.
202. Id.
203. Other grants and relief included $522 million interim aid to Austria,
France, and Italy in December 1947; Greek-Turkish aid worth $400 million; and
not-repayable lend-lease aid. S. Doc. No. 935, supra note 193, at 9. These figures
do not include donations from private individuals and voluntary agencies in the
United States, which equaled more than $500 million in 1946 and again in 1947.
Id.
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cedures. '20 4 Total loans, credits, grants, and relief extended from
July 1, 1945, to December 31, 1947, exceeded $11 billion.20 5
After several years of study and debate, in December 1947
President Truman submitted a proposal for a $17 billion European Recovery Program to Congress. Congress subsequently
passed the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, appropriating $4.3
billion for the first year of the program. Congress also established
the Economic Cooperation Administration to administer the program. 20 6 By 1952, when the program ended, the United States had

contributed over $13 billion to the ERP, less than half the
amount originally requested by the Paris Conference countries. 20 7
2. Execution of Aid Activities During Recent Years
a. Utilization of Agreements for Assistance
In recent years, the United States generally has taken two approaches to establish structures for food aid assistance to countries in times of disaster or need: (1) the institution of international agreements delineating the terms of economic assistance
and cooperation among nations and (2) the implementation of
bureaucratic committees to coordinate the efforts of nations in
the event of a disaster.
204. The 1947 Foreign Relief Program, DEP'T ST. BuLL. 95 (July 25, 1948).
The Department of State negotiated the agreements with the recipient countries
concerning distribution and usage of relief supplies. The United States concluded its first agreement with Austria; it was signed on June 25, 1947. The

United States also signed agreements with Italy and Greece on July 4, 1947, and
July 8, 1947, respectively. Id. at 100-01.

The relief agreements were divided into ten articles which regulated the following: distribution of supplies; utilization of funds accruing from sales of

United States supplies; effective production, food collections and use of resources to reduce relief needs; United States representatives; freedom of the

United States press and radio representatives to observe and report; reports,
statistics and information; publicity regarding United States assistance; termi-

nation of relief assistance; and date of agreement. Each agreement became effective on the date it was signed and continued in force until a date determined by

both governments. Id.
205. S. Doc. No. 935, supra note 193, at 9.

206. Smith, supra note 197, at 542. Paul G. Hoffman, President of the Studebaker Corporation and a member of the Harriman Committee, headed the

organization.
207. Id. at 543.
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i. Measures Enacted in Anticipation of Disaster
In the mid-1970s, the United States entered into agreements
with Ethiopia, 0 s Mali,20 9 and Senegal,21 0 setting up programs to
try to avert the disastrous effects of an impending drought.211 The
Ethiopia Agreement established a national food and nutrition
surveillance system to warn of problems in Ethiopia and compile
data on drought conditions. 1 2 This Agreement also provided
funding to construct unpaved roads in Ethiopia to facilitate
ground transportation of relief to drought-affected areas.21 3 In addition, the Ethiopian government assented to report the progress
of the project on request and to cooperate fully in the execution
of the project. 214 The agreements with Mali and Senegal estab-

lished programs for relief as well as for the rehabilitation of agricultural production, animal health and management, and storage
and transportation of food.2 15 Both agreements further provided
that each recipient government would be responsible for import
taxes and duties on commodities used in connection with relief
operations. 216 These three agreements reflected a recognition of
208. Ethiopia Recovery and Rehabilitation Grant Agreement, June 30, 1976,
United States-Ethiopia, 27 U.S.T. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 8337 [hereinafter Ethiopia
Agreement].
209. Sahel Drought Recovery Program Grant Agreement, Jan. 28, 1974,
United States-Mali, 28 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 8461 [hereinafter Mali
Agreement].
210. Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation Program, Mar. 23, 1974, United
States-Senegal, 27 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 8339 [hereinafter Senegal
Agreement].
211. See Ethiopia Agreement, supra note 208, art. I, § 1.2; Mali Agreement,
supra note 209, art. I, § 1.2; Senegal Agreement, supra note 210, art. I, § 1.2.
212. See Ethiopia Agreement, supra note 208, art. I, § 1.2(a). These activities
will be combined with other similar activities funded by the Swedish Development Association, the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF),
and other organizations. Id.
213. Id., art. I, § 1.2(b). The unpaved roads were to be constructed in the
southern Gemu Gofa Province. Id. The agreement further set forth the procedures required to establish these programs. Id., arts. II-VII.
214. Id., art. III, § 3.1(a)-(c).
215. See Mali Agreement, supra note 209, art. I, § 1.2; Senegal Agreement,
supra note 210, art. I, § 1.2. The agreements also set forth the conditions that
must be met in order to receive this aid, and how the aid is to be disbursed. See
Mali Agreement, supra note 209, arts. II-VII; Senegal Agreement, supra note
210, arts. II-VII.
216. See Mali Agreement, supra note 209, art. III, § 3.1(d); Senegal Agreement, supra note 210, art. III, § 3.1(d).
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the impending disaster and attempted to establish programs
before the drought was at its peak.
In 1958, Ethiopia and the United States executed an agreement
under which the United States "will furnish to the Imperial Ethiopian Government such economic or authorized related assistance
as may be requested by [Ethiopia] and approved by the Government of the United States. 21 7 Another section of the agreement
provided for exemptions from taxes, currency controls, deposit requirements, tariffs, or customs duties in Ethiopia on any supplies,
218
materials, funds, or equipment used in an approved project.
Last, the agreement exempted all personnel, other than citizens
and peimanent residents of Ethiopia, from Ethiopian income
taxes if they paid United States income and social security taxes
and they were working on an approved project under the agreement. The personal property of the workers and their families

was also exempt from all taxes, tariffs and customs duties.

9

This

type of agreement assists disaster relief by establishing procedures for the approval and use of aid, and it authorizes tax exemptions for personnel and property that will ease the flow of aid

217. Economic Assistance, Apr. 25, 1957, United States-Ethiopia, 8 U.S.T.
627, T.I.A.S. No. 3813 [hereinafter Ethiopia Economic Assistance Agreement].
Such assistance will be furnished in such form, on such terms and for such
purposes as may be provided for in such additional arrangements as may
be agreed upon between appropriate representatives of the agency designated by the Government of the United States to discharge its responsibilities under this Agreement and representatives of any agency or agencies
designated by the Imperial Ethiopian Government, or between other designated representatives of the two governments.
Id. at 627-28.
218. Id. The section stated:
Any supplies, materials, equipment or funds introduced into or acquired
in Ethiopia by the government of the United States of America, or any
contractor financed by that Government, for purposes of any program or
project conducted pursuant to this Agreement shall, while such supplies,
materials, equipment or funds are used in connection with such a program
or project, be exempt from any taxes on ownership or use of property, and
any other taxes, investment or deposit requirements and currency controls
in Ethiopia, and the import, export, purchase, use or disposition of any
such supplies, materials, equipment or funds in connection with such a
program or project shall be exempt from any tariffs, customs duties, import and export taxes, taxes on purchase of disposition of property, and
any other taxes or similar charges in Ethiopia.
Id., § 4(c).

219. Id., § 4(d).
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into the country during the time of disaster. 220
Some measures require the government of the recipient country
to pay its fair share of the costs of the relief program. According
to an agreement between the United States and Guinea, for
example,
[i]t is understood that the Government of the Republic of Guinea,
in conformity with its principle sovereign responsibility in the economic development of Guinea, will assume a significant portion of
the cost of this joint program determined by agreement ... and
the aid envisaged by the Government of the United States of
America will be used to supplement rather than replace22the
costs
1
assumed by the Government of the Republic of Guinea.
Another provision that aids in the flow of relief is the grant of
privileges and immunities for the personnel who are participating
in relief projects. 2 22 Although such preventative measures may be
helpful, they are not always available to a nation when a disaster
occurs.
ii. Measures Enacted in Response to Disasters
Although preexisting measures are helpful in guiding disaster
relief efforts, frequently there are no such measures and nations
are forced to respond quickly. In 1956, the United States and
220. This type of agreement, exempting the aid from internal taxation and
entry duties by the recipient country, is fairly common. In 1959, the United
States entered into an agreement with Ghana exempting relief supplies and
packages from internal taxation and entry duties. Relief Supplies and Packages:
Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation, Apr. 9, 1959, United
States-Ghana, 10 U.S.T. 720, T.I.A.S. No. 4203. Under this agreement, also the
cost of transportation within Ghana for relief supplies was to be borne by
Ghana. Id., § 4. The United States, however, was to furnish an ocean freight
subsidy for basic necessities supplied by the United States. Id., § 2.
Similar provisions were also included in agreements between the United
States and Tanzania, Drought Assistance in Arusha Region, Aug. 13, 1975,
United States-Tanzania, art. IX(d), 29 U.S.T. 9, T.I.A.S. No. 8786; Sudan, Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance, Mar. 31, 1958, United States-Sudan,
§ 7, 9 U.S.T. 343, T.I.A.S. No. 4014; Guinea, Economic, Technical, and Related
Assistance, Sept. 30, 1960, United States-Guinea, § 5(a), 11 U.S.T. 2258, T.I.A.S.
No. 4603; and Egypt, Relief Supplies and Equipment, United States-Egypt, Oct.
30, 1954, §§ 1, 3, 5 U.S.T. 2551, T.I.A.S. No. 3119.
221. Economic, Technical and Related Assistance, Sept. 30, 1960, United
States-Guinea, 11 U.S.T. 2258, T.I.A.S. No. 4603.
222. See Drought Assistance in Arusha Region, Aug. 13, 1975, United StatesTanzania, § IX(c), 29 U.S.T. 9, 18, T.I.A.S. No. 8786.
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Peru entered into an agreement through an exchange of letters
whereby the United States would supply the drought-stricken
Puno and Cuzco departments of Peru with food.22 3 After several
communications, the countries agreed that the United States
would give Peru 47,000 tons of grain and dried milk, and sell an
additional 90,000 tons of grain to Peru on a favorable loan basis. 2 2 4

In response to disasters in Chile, the United States in 1960

entered into a pact with the Chilean government, sanctioning a
maximum grant of $4.8 million in aid.2 25
Other responses to disasters have been agreements that reduce
the bureaucratic obstacles that impede relief. Examples of this
type of response are agreements which bestowed the same privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic, administrative and
technical staffs upon United States military personnel who assist
relief efforts.226 In an agreement supplying aid to Italian earthquake victims, the United States included a clause that all supplies, materials, or equipment furnished by the United States will
levies imposed by
be exempt in toto from taxes, duties or other
227
either Italy or the European Community.
Some agreements both govern the immediate supply of aid and
attempt to institute preventative measures to stay further disaster. An agreement of this type was undertaken in an effort to assist Libya 228 when the United States promised up to 24,000 tons
of grain and $7 million in economic aid for immediate assistance. 22 9 The agreement provided further assistance for Libya until 1971: $4 million per year for the first six years and $1 million,
per year for the next eleven years.2 30
In contrast, other nations have exhibited increased reluctance
223. Surplus Agricultural Commodities: Drought Relief Assistance, May 8,
1956, United States-Peru, 7 U.S.T. 2529, T.I.A.S. No. 3645.
224. Id., 7 U.S.T. at 2537.
225. Emergency Relief Assistance, June 29, 1960, United States-Chile, 11
U.S.T. 1777, T.I.A.S. No. 4517.
226. See Privileges and Immunities, Dec. 18, 1979, United States-Nicaragua,
32 U.S.T. 514, T.I.A.S. No. 9720; Privileges and Immunities for Emergency Repairs Personnel, Sept. 17, 1979, United States-Dominica, 31 U.S.T. 5056,
T.I.A.S. No. 9655.
227. Earthquake Assistance, June 9, 1976, United States-Italy, § 5, 27 U.S.T.
3988, T.I.A.S. No. 8416.
228. Economic Assistance, Sept. 9, 1954, United States-Libya, 5 U.S.T. 2435,
T.I.A.S. No. 3105, terminated Feb. 5, 1972.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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to initiate bilateral agreements delineating procedures for the request and acceptance of disaster relief. In 1985, for instance, the
Mexican government did not "formally [request] assistance"
when Mexico experienced a sudden rash of traumatic earthquakes.231 Mexican officials initially wanted to determine both the
extent of damage and the nation's needs in order to conduct its
own emergency relief operation without outside help.? Subsequently, government officials in Mexico claimed that although the
nation had not requested relief, it would not reject incoming
aid. 3
b. Aid Operations During African Crisis
Under Public Law 480, Title II, the United States channels
food commodities to voluntary relief agencies,234 international organizations 23 5 and "friendly governments

' 238

for distribution

abroad. Additionally, the United States subsidizes the cost of
ocean freight transportation of food aid to a recipient country's
port, or to a point of entry in the case of landlocked countries,
where targeted populations participate in the following massfeeding programs: (1) mother/child feeding; (2) school lunch programs; (3) preschool feeding; (4) food for work; and (5) emergency
feeding. 237 In October 1984, however, new legislation was enacted 238 which permits the use of P.L. 480 Title II appropriations

to pay the cost of internal transportation of donated commodities. To further facilitate the flow of aid, other statutory provi231. Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1985, at A18, col. 1.

232. Id. See also Mexico/Earthquake, NBC, Sept. 21, 1985 (President of
Mexico asserted that the country could solve its own problems).
233. See Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1985, at A18, col. 3.
234. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
237. The U.S. in 1984 transported over 1.3 million metric tons of food aid to
Africa at a cost of more than $44 million, U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs,
84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 44 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter U.S. Response].
238. President's Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 305, 98 Stat. 2194, 2195 (1984) provides in pertinent part:
Section 203 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954 is amended by inserting after the semicolon at the end of clause (4)
the following: "in the case of commodities for urgent and extraordinary
relief requirements, including prepositioned commodities, transportation
costs from designated points of entry or points of entry abroad to storage
and distribution sites and associated storage and distribution costs;".
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sions call for common carriers to transport charitable property
and persons participating in charitable work at no charge or at a
reduced fare. 239 Similarly, a freight forwarding service, also administered without cost or at a lowered rate, is available to acknowledged charitable or relief agencies.24 0
The United States in its relief efforts has undertaken to channel food aid through Sudan border crossings to two war-torn
northern provinces of Marxist Ethiopia-Tigray and Eritrea.2 4 1
Mercy Corps International and Lutheran World Relief have principally aided the United States in its efforts,2 42 although CARE is
currently responsible for the delivery of United States food relief
from Port Sudan to the Ethopian border.2 43 The International
Red Cross is also involved in channeling some emergency aid for
the Agency for International Development.2 44 Until recently the
United States had been using private relief agencies as a conduit

for food aid distribution instead of shipping food directly to the
Ethiopian government, since the regime agreed not to impede the
relief efforts of private organizations in the country's two rebelheld areas; such operations, however, have been discontinued.2 45

239. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10723 (West Supp. 1985).
240. 46 C.F.R. § 510.22 (1984). Furthermore, U.S. donors' contributions of
gift parcels to a donee such as a charitable organization must be without cost to
the donee. 15 C.F.R. § 371.18 (1985).
241. Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1985, at Al, col. 3. The U.S. initial participation in
the cross-border feeding began in early 1984. Id. Other donor nations and aid
organizations have been supplying Eritrea and Tigray through what has become
known as the "back door." See Cooper, supra note 147, at 69-70. That route is
through the Sudan, which borders Ethiopia on the west. Id. The supplies are
then turned over to relief organizations affiliated with the main rebel groups for
distribution. Id. See also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
242. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, at A32, col. 1. The two paramount private
groups that assist the Lutheran and Mercy Corps are (1) the Eritrean Relief
Committee (ERA) and (2) the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). These two
groups transport food supplies to the contested regions at night to prevent their
exposure to the Ethiopian military. Id.
243. Id. at A32, col. 1. Western Relief Agencies also move food supplies from
the Sudan by plane into Ethiopia with implicit consent of the Ethopian government. Schwab, Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia, CURRENT HIsT., May
1985, at 221, 223. In addition, food relief to the two rebellious provinces is channeled through Ethiopia and is delivered to feeding centers on the Wollo-Tigre
border. Id.
244. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, at A32, col. 1.
245. Millions Starve in Ethiopia as Drought Intensifies, 1984 FACTS ON FuLE
889-90. Peter McPherson, Administrator of AID, announced his intention of set-
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In 1984, when the United States commenced the cross-border
feeding program, AID lawyers fretted over its legal ramifications;

246

"today they are satisfied that it is within the interna-

tional understanding of what is acceptable in helping people in an
'247
emergency situation.

B. Private Voluntary Organizations
1. The Significance of Private Voluntary Organizations in the
International Disaster Relief System
Private voluntary organizations (PVOs), occasionally referred
to as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), perform several
unique functions within the international relief community. Disasters such as'the African famine may develop slowly, so PVOs
already operating in the afflicted region frequently are in a position to perceive the increased urgency of a deteriorating situation
before it comes to the attention of the outside world. They have
no political incentive to discount the seriousness of a growing
problem.248 PVOs therefore are often the first to alert the public,
functioning as international pressure groups by exposing regional
problems.249
Moreover, most government-and United Nations-sponsored relief efforts require time to organize and to execute. Political considerations usually accompany the decision to render aid. Thus,
private organizations, motivated by humanitarian or religious impulses, often are able to provide aid more rapidly and more impartially. PVOs also provide a distinct channel for both public
and governmental disaster aid, offering alternate or additional
distribution systems for relief supplies, as well as trained personnel to administer assistance.2 50 This latter contribution may prove

invaluable to the typically understaffed agencies of a disasterstricken government. In addition, PVOs can monitor the distribution of governmental aid when the recipient government would
ting up 14 food distribution centers in Eritrea to supply food aid to 180,000
drought victims. Wash. Post, June 1, 1985, at A14, col. 1.
246. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, at A32, col. 3.
247. Id.
248.

See

P. MACALISTER-SMITH,

INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN

ASSISTANCE

(1985) [hereinafter MACALISTER-SMITH].
249, Id.; UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE USA., DISASTER ASSISTANCE
12 (L. Stephens & S. Green eds. 1979) [hereinafter DISASTER ASSISTANCE].
250. DISASTER ASSISTANCE, supra note 248, at 12.
119
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view the donor government's presence as an encroachment on its
sovereignty 2 5 '
Many private organizations have provided relief during past
and present crises. The purpose, development, and activity of several major actors is discussed below.
2. The Administration of Relief During Past Crises Through
Various Organizations
a. Catholic Relief Services
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), founded in 1943, is the aid
agency of the United States Catholic Conference. "The main purpose of the organization is to draw upon the American
sources-both financial and material-and to make those readily
available to local social welfare and development agencies
throughout the world. 2'

52

CRS attempted to accomplish this goal

during World War II by aiding German and Polish -refugees,
homeless Portuguese and Spanish persons, and other Allied
needy. In China, CRS established medical stations and day nurseries for civilians and war orphans.2 3 By 1945, the agency had
organized254245 welfare centers worldwide for Polish and Jewish
refugees.
In 1950, CRS expnded the scope of its relief efforts by becoming one of the first voluntary agencies to distribute American surplus food.2 55 During this decade, CRS founded the Institute of

Rural Education in Chile to train rural leaders in agriculture and
also established CARITAS, a social service organization in Columbia. 256 By the 1970s, CRS mainly conducted development

projects; nonetheless, CRS still responded to emergency needs
251. Strained relations between the United States and the Marxist Ethiopian government would have made distribution of U.S. relief supplies less feasible without a strong PVO presence in Africa. Review the World Hunger Problem: HearingsBefore the House Committee on Agriculture, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
38 (1983) (statement of Mr. Gladson, Agency for International Development).
252.

See

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE:
INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE, U.S. NONPROFIT ORGANIASSISTANCE
TECHNICAL
ZATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ABROAD: TAICH DIRECTORY 1983 88-89 (F.

Lowenstein & R. McClanahan eds. 1983).
253.

1

GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS,

Organizations 213 (P. Romanofsky ed. 1978).
254. Id.

255. Id. at 214.
256. Id.

Social Service
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such as those of refugees in Pakistan and drought victims in the
African Sahel.257 CRS facilitated the mobilization of such emergency aid by maintaining a "disaster response reserve unit" lo8
cated near John F. Kennedy International Airport.2 5
Currently, Catholic Relief Services programs emphasize feeding
and nutrition education and the operation of mother/child health
centers. Catholic Relief Services classifies the many countries it
assists into four different regions: Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, and Near East-South Asia.259
b. Church World Service
Founded in 1946 "to serve as the development, refugee, relief
and rehabilitation agency of the National Council of
Churches,

2 60

Church World Service (CWS), along with the

World Council of Churches, Regional Councils of Churches and
National Christian Councils or other cooperative bodies, 26 1 assists

local church councils or ecumenical and community organizations
in their efforts to alleviate poverty and foster basic human development.6 2 Church World Service has sponsored programs which
have provided food, clothing, and medicine to meet immediate
needs and also has implemented other programs such as disease
control programs, public health and nutrition education, and family planning clinics.26 CWS furnishes the funds and ships the
257. Id. at 215.
258. Id.
259. See Field, supra note 127, at 18. Countries assisted by CRS include
these found in the following four regions of the world: (1) Africa: Angola, Benin,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoro Islands, Ethiopia, Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,

Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Zaire; (2) East Asia and the Pacific: Fiji,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philip-

pines, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Thailand, and Western Samoa; (3) Latin
America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Do-

minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,

Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela;

and (4) Near East-South Asia: Bangladesh, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, India, Iraq,

Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, West Bank (administered territory) and Yemen (San'a). Id.
260. Id. at 25.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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government surplus commodities necessary to support these programs. Each year CWS ships government surplus grain and dried
milk overseas to needy countries.2 64 Food is also purchased from
CROP, the Constituency Education and Fund Raising unit of
CWS, which raises grain donations from United States farmers
and monetary donations from various sources to aid
65
development.
c.

Lutheran World Relief

Lutheran World Relief, Inc. (LWR), founded in 1945 and located in New York City, represents the aid efforts of the American Lutheran Church, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran
Churches and other Lutheran denominations in the United
States. LWR provides funds, supplies and personnel assistance,
often through correspondent church-related agencies, to pprsons
afflicted by disasters or other emergencies in the poorer regions of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. 26" Like CWS, LWR initiates programs to improve living conditions, such as agriculture, sanitation, nutrition education, family planning and health care
projects. For example, the Calcutta Mobile Milk Canteen in India

264. Id. Countries that CWS assists include these found in the following four
regions of the world: (1) Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia (South-West Africa), Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia; (2) East Africa and the Pacific: Burma,
Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Vietnam, and Western Samoa; (3) Latin
America: Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela; and (4) Near East-South Asia: Bangladesh, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, India,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Turkey. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 28. Countries assisted by LWR include these found in the following four regions of the world: (1) Africa: Angola, Botswana, Central African Empire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia; (2) East Asia and the Pacific: Hong Kong, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam; (3)
Latin America: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Uruguay; and (4) Near East: India, Iran,
Jordan, and Lebanon. Id.
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provided milk to children. Also, 35,000 children in fifteen poverty-stricken areas of Calcutta received additional feeding
rations.2 67
d.

Save the Children Federation

Save the Children Federation, Inc. 268 is an international consortium of Austrian, Canadian, Danish, Norwegian and British child
assistance agencies, founded in 1932 "to improve the quality of
life and defend the rights of children-particularly children in
underprivileged communities-without regard to race, religion or
place of origin. ' 269 The Federation attempts to achieve its objectives through the use of a child sponsorship program. Under this
program, a donor may make contributions either in the name of a
particular child or to a group of children; often several donors act
as project partners who make donations regularly. In 1978, approximately 25,000 individuals sponsored more than 28,000 children, their families and their communities.
The Federation also provides emergency supplies to refugees.
For example, in the late 1970s, it sent tons of rice, milk, sugar, oil
and high-protein fish meal to the Cambodian refugees. The Federation also provided food, medicines and English language training to the Vietnamese boat people.27 1 The Federation currently is
spending over $3 million in health and nutrition services, primarily for development purposes rather than emergency assistance.
For example, in Bangladesh and Indonesia, village health workers
are being trained in health care and nutrition. In Colombia, Korea and Israel, children receive nutritious meals in local day care
centers.27 2 The Federation supports its programs with funds from
private citizens, school and church groups, public and private employee groups, corporations, service organizations, foundations,

267. Id.
268. The Federation is located in Westport, Ct. and at the United Nations
Plaza in New York City.
269. Field, supra note 127, at 32.
270. Id.
271. Id. Countries which are assisted by Save the Children include these
found in the following four regions of the world: (1) Africa: Cameroon, Tunisia,
and Upper Volta; (2) East Africa and the Pacific: Indonesia and Korea; (3) Latin
America: Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and
Mexico; and (4) Near East-South Asia: Bangladesh, Greece, India, Israel, Lebanon and Yemen (San'a). Id.
272. Id. at 33.
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and government agencies.171

3. Administration of Aid During African Crisis
The development of public response to the African famine illustrates the many distinctive features of private aid. For several
months during mid-1984, PVO reports of a growing crisis trickled
into the international media.274 The response to these accounts
was very limited until African cameraman Mohammed Amin of
VisNews, a European television news agency, visited Ethiopia
with Michael Buerk, a correspondent for the BBC. Their report
aired on BBC television and, in the United States, on the NBC
Nightly News on October 23, 1984.275 The footage and commentary developed into a week-long story on NBC and was picked up
by other networks." 6 By October 31, the New York Times listed
277

five PVOs as accepting donations for Ethiopian famine relief;
the number had doubled by November 4.271 By the end of the

year the Times listed the names and local addresses of fifteen
PVOs who would convert donations into Ethiopian disaster assistance. 279 The widespread desire to contribute in large and small

ways became news in itself. In New York City, a sixty-one year
old regulation banning solicitation in public schools was set aside
so the city's 920,000 school children could raise money for starving Ethiopian children.28 ° Within these first two months, the
American public responded to the crisis by donating $40 million
273. Id. Other humanitarian groups include the Peace Corp and Food for the
Hungry International.
274. For example, CBS Evening News on Aug. 2, 1984, and NBC Nightly
News on Aug. 11, 1984, each carried a warning by Oxfam field personnel in Ethiopia that a crisis of extreme proportions was developing.
275. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1984, at 25, col. 4.
276. The first such account on another major network was carried by the
CBS Evening News on Oct. 29, 1984.
277. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1984, at 4, col. 6. The agencies listed were the Red
Cross, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief,

and Save the Children.
278. Id. at 3, col. 1. The new agencies listed were U.S. Committee for
UNICEF, Oxfam America, World Vision USA, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and Grassroots International.
279. Id. at 5, col. 1. The five groups added at this time were Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Africare, American Council for Voluntary Agencies
for Foreign Service, American Friends Service Committee, and CARE.

280. Id.
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to PVOs. 28 1

Response to the current African crisis has been characterized
by both traditional and innovative approaches to the provision of
private relief aid. Agencies that the world has relied upon for decades, such as the International Red Cross and CARE, now have
been joined in their efforts by emerging groups with impressive
fund-raising capabilities, such as the USA for Africa Foundation.
a. The International Red Cross
The International Red Cross (IRC) is the foremost voluntary
assistance organization in the world. Based in Geneva, this organization has earned preferential treatment from governments and
other international bodies. It enjoys consultative status with the
United Nations despite the fact that Switzerland is not a member
of that body. Its agents act on their own initiative both in making
direct appeals and in negotiating agreements with governments. 28 2
The American Red Cross has a congressional charter 28 3 and participates in the benefits of AID registration by statutory
authority.
The International Red Cross consists of the National Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies of various countries, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross
Societies.8 4 The ICRC, comprised entirely of Swiss citizens, coordinates relief mainly to victims of armed conflict.28 5 The 125 na-"

tional societies share general Red Cross principles and values but
focus primarily on disaster relief, health, and welfare, particularly
in their own countries. 26 The League of Red Cross Societies
281. Id. at 1, col. 1.
282. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 76.
283. 36 U.S.C. § 1-17(b) (1982). Section 3 defines the purposes of the American Red Cross, including a mandate "to continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating
the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national
calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same." Id., §
3.
284. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 75. See also THE RED CROSS
HANDBOOK, cited in MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 185, n.1. The ICRC's
supreme governing body is the International Conference of the Red Cross which
consists of delegates from the various Red Cross organizations and meets'every
four years. Id. at 76.
285. Id.
286. See DISASTER ASSISTANCE, supra note 249, at 13.
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(LORCS) is a federating body for the national societies, assisting
them in the development and coordination of international disaster relief efforts. LORCS circulates assessments of relief needs
among the national societies and interested private voluntary
agencies. 287
The concept of the IRC originated with the efforts of Henry
Dunant, a Swiss citizen who "advocated rules for the protection
of victims of international war as well as the establishment of voluntary relief organizations. ' 288 Dunant promoted this idea at the
adoption proceedings of the Geneva Convention, a treaty to establish measures for providing neutral aid to the wounded. 28 9 The
Convention's Standing Committee for Aid to Wounded Soldiers
thereafter founded the International Committee of the Red
Cross. 290 Subsequently, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were formed in many countries.291
The IRC does not recognize a national society until the country
in which it is located adopts the Geneva Convention. Because the
United States' isolationist policy prevented it from signing the
Convention at its inception,29 2 the American Red Cross was not
formed until May 21, 1881, shortly before the United States
adopted the Convention.29 3
National societies have provided aid to those afflicted by an
earthquake in Turkey in 1939,294 floods in Yugoslavia in 1940,295
earthquakes in Romania and Peru in 1940, hurricanes in Portugal
in 1941, earthquakes in Persia and Argentina in 1944,298 and
287. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are private organizations governed by the laws of their own states. Id. at 77.
288. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 9.
289. DULLES, THE AMERICAN RED CROSS 8 (1950). The signatory countries
were Baden, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Prussia, Saxony, Spain,
Switzerland, Wuirttemberg. They were joined within two years by such countries

as Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Turkey.
Id. at 8-9. The Treaty "was open to accession by non-signatories and quickly
gained world-wide acceptance."

290.

MACALISTER-SMITH,

MACALISTER-SMITH

supra note 248, at 10.

supra note 248, at 9.

291. Id. at 76.

292.

DULLES,

supra note 289, at 9.

293. Id. at 2.
294. INTERNATIONAL

COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMM. OF THE RED CROSS ON ITS ACTIVITIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR:
SEPT. 1, 1939 - JUNE 30, 1947 179 (1948).

295. Id. at 180.
296.

Id.
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floods in Bolivia in 1947.297 The American Red Cross also has
aided the needy abroad. Between 1881 and 1955, this organization
contributed $34 million for disaster preparedness and relief overseas. 298 Among the larger expenditures were $11.8 million to victims of an earthquake in Japan in 1923 and $6 million to victims
of a hurricane in the West Indies in 1928.299
Not only have the various Red Cross organizations contributed
funds; they also have supplied foodstuffs to needy nations. For
example, in 1979, the League of Red Cross Societies contributed
6,819 tons of cereal, 2,322.5 tons of dairy products and 1,644.9
tons of other foodstuffs to various countries.30 0 In 1980, the ICRC
contributed 8,320 tons of cereal, 1,190.5 tons of milk powder and
453 tons of other dairy products including 5 tons of animal fat
shipped to Angola and 3 tons to Ethiopia.30 1
As during previous times of disaster, the Red Cross has been in
the forefront of the African crisis. When media reports of famine
in Ethiopia incited the American public in October 1984, the
American Red Cross was among the first of the voluntary agencies to announce to the public its willingness to channel private
contributions into African relief.302 Within two weeks, LORCS
appealed for $18 million to provide special aid to 200,000 of the
most vulnerable drought victims. 30 3 Throughout the African crisis, Red Cross staff, food and medicine have represented a major
source of relief aid.
b.

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere

Formerly the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe,
CARE was founded in 1945 by twenty-two American organizations to aid European recovery after World War II. CARE's primary objective is to assist low income persons in using their material and human resources to improve the local community. 304 For
297.

Id. at 181.

298. THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CRoss, THE RED CROSS AcTnWTIEs OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE DURING 75 YEARS, 1881 THROUGH 1955 22 (1955).

299. Id.
300.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FOOD

88 (1984) [hereinafter FOOD AID IN FIGURES].
301. Id. at 89.

AID IN FIGURES

302. One week after the first network reports of African famine, the Red
Cross publicized its intent to channel private donations into African relief.
303. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1984, at 3, col. 3.
304. Cooper, supra note 147, at 71.
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example, CARE has supplied seeds and farming equipment and
30 5
has established school kitchens and food preservation plants.
CARE has also distributed food furnished by the United States
Government under Title II via both continuous and emergency
relief feeding programs. 0 In Mother/Child Health projects,
women of child-bearing age and their children receive instructions on health care and food; in Child Feeding projects, children
ages six through fourteen receive food in hospitals, orphanages
and schools.3 07 In 1978, CARE funds exceeded $270 million: $269
million financed the distribution of food through established
feeding projects while over $4 million funded emergency food aid
endeavors. 30 8
Currently, CARE is distributing food aid, tents, blankets and
medical supplies throughout nine drought-stricken African countries. In the Ethiopian region of Hararge, CARE distributed
50,000 tons of food relief through the use of thirty trailers and
trucks. 30 9 CARE has delivered 26,000 tons of food to 370,000 famine victims in Kenya. 310 In Chad, with the use of twenty trucks,
CARE has disbursed more than 5,000 metric tons of food.3 1'
CARE also has set up a logistical unit in Mauritania to enhance
emergency food delivery and is also disbursing approximately
15,000 tons of food relief 3 12 In Niger, CARE is dispensing both
the United States' donation of 9,000 tons of sorghum and Canadian medical supplies.3 13 In the Sudan, CARE has instituted the
largest single emergency feeding operation undertaken to combat
the African famine and drought. The operation consists of delivering 160,000 tons of sorghum and other grains from Port Sudan
to twenty-one disbursement sites in the Kordofun province of Sudan. 14 From these sites the food is transported in private trucks

305. Field, supra note 127, at 16.
306. CARE Fact Sheet (CARE, N.Y.) (available from CARE World Headquarters, 660 First Avenue, New York, New York 10016). Most of the food
CARE distributes is contributed under Title II. Id.
307. Field, supra note 127, at 17.
308. Id.
309. CARE, Campaignfor Africa (May 1985).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. CARE, CARE Primary Feeding Program Kordufan Province, Sudan
(Sept. 17, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Feeding Program].
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to 1,436 end points at the village level, and village councils then
distribute it to both villages and families. 1 5
CARE programs are operated under contracts with the Ministries of Education, Health and Social Affairs of the host government.3 16 The delivery of food to village end points is contractually
arranged between CARE and local transporters. 17 CARE is also
responsible for the storage of food and supplies 3 18 In addition,
CARE and regional governments closely coordinate allotment of
foods, designation of the most needy areas, movement of the population, schedules for delivery, and use of food reserves. 9
CARE's programs are supported by one of three methods: (1) the
host government and CARE share costs, supplemented by funds
from public donations; (2) the host government totally finances
the program; or (3) CARE totally finances the program.32 0
c.

The USA for Africa Foundation

The USA for Africa Foundation (the "Foundation") 31 joined
the international relief community when it released its recording
"We Are the World" in March 1985. Performed by more than
forty American pop and rock musicians, the song soon became the
most popular single in the United States. Four million albums,
three million singles, 400,000 posters and 140,000 copies of a "We
Are the World" book sold within one month, generating $20 million. The project was inspired by a gathering of British pop stars,
recording as "Band-Aid," whose record "Do They Know It's
Christmas?" topped the music charts in Great Britain and raised
315. Id.
316. Field, supra note 127, at 16.
317. See Feeding Program, supra note 314, at 5.
318. Id. at 6.
319. Id.
320. Field, supra note 127, at 16. Those countries which totally fund the
CARE programs include Chile, Dominican Republic, Gaza, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Panama, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. CARE assists these countries
found in the following four regions of the world: (1) Africa: Chad, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierre Leone, and Tunisia; (2) East Asia and the
Pacific: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao, and Philippines; (3) Latin
America: Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru; and (4) Near
East-South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and West Bank (administered
territory).
321. United Support of Artists for Africa Foundation.
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millions of pounds for African famine victims.3 22 By June 11,
1985, when its first chartered 747 jumbo cargo jet containing 120
tons of supplies arrived in the Sudan and Ethiopia, the USA for
Africa project had raised $45 million,3 23 a figure which would continue to rise.
Established as a section 501(c)(3) public foundation, USA for
Africa generated income through both sales and contributions. In
contrast to the Red Cross and other more established agencies, it
had no preexisting relief network in operation. Instead of trying
to develop one, it has worked with existing private groups and
U.N. agencies to develop channels of distribution for Foundation
money which would provide effective relief. "After receiving extensive field information on urgent needs" from the United Nations, InterAction, which is the United States umbrella group representing 110 PVOs, and the United States Government, the
Foundation's board of directors decided to allocate the first
thirty-five percent of the funds for emergency "in the areas of
transportation, logistics and communication, storage, medical and
nutritional supplies, shelter and welldrilling equipment. 3 24 It also
chose to combine long-term programs with the emergency operations, allocating the second thirty-five percent of its funds to agricultural aid and another twenty percent for long-term economic
development; the Foundation designated the final ten percent of
its money for aid to the hungry and homeless in the United
States.325
The idea of a major rock music event to raise money for famine
relief is not new, but promoters have had to learn from mistakes
of the past. George Harrison of The Beatles staged a 1971
Madison Square Garden benefit for the starving population of
Bangladesh featuring more than two dozen contemporary pop
stars, but because proceeds from the concert were channeled
through the Beatles' Apple Corporation rather than through a
specially created tax-exempt charity, more than $8.8 million remained in escrow for eleven years. Lawyers for Apple, UNICEF,
322. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, at 60, col. 1.
323. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1985, at A7, cols. 5-6. See also N.Y. Times, June
12, 1985, at A5, col. 4.
324. Hoeffel, Music Groups Make Allocations, 4 AFRICA EMERGENCY 4, 4
(Sept. - Oct. 1985); N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, at 60, col. 2 (statement by Martin
Rogol, the Foundation's executive director).
325. N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, at 60, col. 2 (statement by Martin Rogol, the
Foundation's executive director).
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and the IRS finally reached an "administrative settlement," and
sales of the concert album and other sources have continued to
bring in royalties approaching $1 million annually as recently as
1984.26

The promotional expertise to be found within the contemporary music industry has proven to be particularly applicable to
charitable fundraising. Ken Kragen, executive producer of the
"We Are the World" recording and president of USA for Africa,
is a southern California promoter and manager who claims to
treat the African situation like any other client. "When something is [as] big as Africa is right now," says Kragen, "it can cool
off quickly. The way I am going to keep that from happening - it's
the same thing I do with careers ....,,327 While veteran relief
workers share this concern with fading public interest, Kragen's
show business approach has proven astonishingly successful. He is
credited with directing initial efforts away from the idea of a benefit concert toward production of the extremely profitable record
and video. He assisted in the production of a related HBO television special and the organization of a highly-publicized whirlwind
tour of Africa. He coordinated a simultaneous broadcast of "We
Are the World" on Good Friday by thousands of radio stations,
including Voice of America and Muzak. Additionally, in June of
1985, he announced arrangements for full-page USA for Africa
advertisements to be run free of charge in such diverse publications as Reader's Digest, Life magazine, the Los Angeles Times,
and the Bloomingdale's catalog. 328 The record itself proved to be
the fastest climbing single of the decade, the biggest seller in the
history of Columbia records, 29 and the winner of the 1985
Grammy Award for Record of the Year.
C. Intergovernmental Organizations
Other than individual governments and private voluntary organizations, the third major source of international humanitarian
assistance is the network of Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs). The United Nations is the most extensively involved of
all multilateral organizations in gathering and channeling dona326.

Some Concerts That Worked and Some That Didn't, PEOPLE WEEKLY,

Feb. 25, 1985, at 33.
327.

Harden, Taking Relief on Tour, Wash. Post, June 19, 1985, at B1.

328. Wash. Post, June 19, 1985, at B1, col. 1.
329.

Cocks, Strike Up the Bandwagon, TME, Apr. 22, 1985, at 66.
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tions to relief operations around the world. Thus, most of the major IGOs are either U.N. agencies or have substantial ties with the
U.N., although the nature of their relationship varies from organization to organization. The following are brief background summaries of several U.N.-related IGOs prominent in current African
3 30
relief operations.

1. United Nations Humanitarian Agencies
a. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCR has primary responsibility for providing and coordinating international assistance for displaced persons, especially in
the event of man-made disaster. The office fulfills this mandate
by providing international legal protection for refugees, extending
material assistance and working toward voluntary repatriation or
resettlement into other countries.3

31

The General Assembly estab-

lished UNHCR in 1950 and still draws upon the regular U.N.
budget for its administrative expenses, although material assistance and program costs are financed entirely by voluntary
32
contributions. 3
b. The U.N. Disaster Relief Coordinator
The UNDRO directs and organizes the relief activities of the
various organizations of the U.N. system in response to a request
for emergency assistance from a disaster-stricken country.333 UNDRO mobilizes and coordinates U.N. assistance with aid from
other organizations, assists governments in the assessment of
their relief needs, and supplies information necessary for the effi.
cient execution of relief efforts. 34 It also attempts to promote dis330.

These summaries were compiled from the following sources: D.C. COYLE,
G. SCHIAVONE, INTERNA111-280 (1983); United

THE UNITED NATIONS AND How IT WORKS 22-65 (1969);
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DICTIONARY AND DIRECTORY

Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa, Status Report on the
Emergency Situation in Africa, Report Nos. OEOA/3/1, 3/2, 3/3, 3/4 (July Oct. 1985).
331. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 196; D.C. COYLE, supra note 330, at 88-

89.
332. G.

SCHIAVONE,

supra note 330, at 197.

333. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 132-33; G.A. Res. 2816, 26 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 86, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
334. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 132-33.
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aster preparedness and prevention.3 35 Established in 1974 by
General Assembly Resolution 2816 (XXVI),33 6 UNDRO is an independent entity within the U.N. Secretariat; it is empowered to

maintain independent contact with U.N. bodies, donor and recipient governments, and NGOs. According to the UNDRO, there
were at least seventeen NGOs, as of March 1, 1985, operating in
fifty African countries.3
c.

United Nations Children's Fund

Created338 in 1946339 to extend emergency aid to children in Europe following World War 11,340 UNICEF in recent years primarily has attempted to meet the essential needs of children living in
developing countries. 4 1 In countries most frequently afflicted by
disasters, approximately one-half of the population consists of
children under the age of fifteen; such children usually suffer
some form of malnutrition and are more susceptible to disease
than adults.3 42 Moreover, most developing countries lack the
amount of protein foods and milk necessary to feed their children. 43 To meet these particular needs of children, UNICEF has
3 44
instituted both developmental and emergency relief projects.
UNICEF's developmental projects focus on the provision of
primary health care, education, nutritional assistance, clean water
and sanitation, and other family welfare programs. 4 5 UNICEF

335. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 195.
336. G.A. Res. 2816, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 85, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971).
337. See UNDRO Africa Emergency: An Overview (March 1, 1985).
338. MACALISTER-SMrrH, supra note 248, at 100. The General Assembly established UNICEF under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.
339. In 1953, the United Nations decided that UNICEF should operate on a
permanent basis. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 99. See G.A. Res. 802, 8
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953). See also G.A. Res.
1038, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (1956).
340. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 245.
341. See id.
342. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 100.
343. Id.
344. "In many recent cases UNICEF relief actions have been part of wider
international operations, but have concentrated on meeting the special needs of
children which are not always understood or are neglected in the provision of
basic relief." Id.
345. Family welfare programs include responsible parenthood and family
planning, child mental health, and improvment in the lives of women and girls.
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has also provided equipment both to produce and to process food,
such as machinery to pasteurize milk and apparatus to manufacture soya, peanut flour, and fish-protein concentrate.3 46
UNICEF's emergency relief activities have included the donation of money, supplies, and foodstuffs. For example, UNICEF
contributed $95,000 to Thailand for flood rehabilitation and
$404,000 in supplies to Mexico for health and nutrition services
for children.3 47 Between 1972 and 1981, UNICEF donated 36,223
tons of wheat and wheat flour, 6,477 tons of rice, 57,196 tons of
milk powder, and 185,869 tons of other foodstuffs to countries
such as Ethiopia, India, Lebanon, Romania, Somalia, Thailand,
Turkey, Upper Volta, and Vietnam. 48 UNICEF recently has
channeled millions of dollars worth of food and medical assistance for children into the African relief effort.34
An Executive Board of representatives from thirty nations govern UNICEF; the Secretary-General appoints the Executive Director of the Board. The Economic and Social Council supervises
the Board.3 50 UNICEF is not supported by the U.N. budget but
by voluntary contributions from governments, private organizations, and individuals. 351
d. The United Nations Development Program
UNDP is the world's largest organization providing multilateral
technical assistance.3 52 It has a basic mandate to help developing
countries increase the wealth-producing capabilities of their
human and natural resources. Its operation has been characterized as "pre-investment" work: the exploration of natural resources and the training of local people to handle resource development.3

13

UNDP supports projects in the areas of agriculture,

industry, education, power production, transport, communications, health, public administration, housing, trade, and related
See G. SCHIAVONE,

supra note

330, at 245-46. See D. C. COYLE, supra note 330, at

29.
346. D. C. COYLE, supra note 330, at 29. UNICEF has also provided hatchery
fish for stocking fishponds, vegetable garden seeds and poultry. Id.

347. Field, supra note 127, at 8.
348. FOOD AID IN FIGURES, supra note 300, at 84-85.

349. See id.
350. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 99-100.
351. D.C. COYLE, supra note 330, at 27.
352. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 249.
353. D. C. COYLE, supra note 330, at 65.
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fields. 354 The Program works with local authorities at the request

of host governments, which pay over half of the total cost of its
work. Voluntary contributions from U.N. member countries and
other participating agencies cover remaining UNDP costs. As a
part of the African relief effort, UNDP has funded emergency airlifts and provided agricultural equipment, fuel, fertilizer, water
supply materials, and logistical support.
2. United Nations-Related Agencies
a. The Food and Agriculture Organization
Created in 1943 at the United Nations Conference on Food and
Agriculture, 355 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has
three primary objectives: 356 "[to raise] levels of nutrition and
standards of living, [to secure] improvements in the efficiency of
the production and distribution of food and agricultural products,
and [to improve] the conditions of rural populations. ' ' 357 Based in

Rome with a present membership of over 150 countries, the FAG
is an independent agency, affiliated with the United Nations by
agreement with the Economic and Social Council.3 58 The FAG

Conference, its governing body, meets every two years. 359 The

FAG finances its program budget from dues paid by its
members. 60
The FAG has at times provided emergency aid. In 1947, for example, the Organization imported powdered milk to Polish children. 61 More recently, the FAG in 1973 founded the Office for
354. G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 250.
355. The Conference was held in Hot Springs, Virginia. Its Constitution became effective in 1945. Id. at 111. The original FAO Constitution is printed in 23
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 416 (1946). See also BASIC TEXTS OF THE FAO OF THE UN
(1980). To execute its programs, FAO has ten principal divisions, including Land
and Water Development, Plant Production and Protection, Animal Production
and Health, Forestry, Fisheries, Nutrition, and various economic branches. D. C.
COYLE, supra note 330, at 23.
356. The purposes are set forth in the preamble to the Constitution of the
FAO.
357. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 101-102. See G.A. Res. 626, 7
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 106, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
358. D.C. COYLE, supra note 330, at 22.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Second Annual Report of the Director General of the FAO Conference,
in THE WORK OF THE FAO 36 (1946) [hereinafter Second Annual Report].
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Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO) to provide emergency relief to
the drought-stricken Sahel.3 2" But the primary role of the FAO in
the U.N. aid network is to study and report on the world food
situation. In 1947 and 1948, the FAO conducted a study of the
water supplies and of forest conservation in Siam. 63 The Organization also prints publications annually on nutrition education,
3 64
dietary surveys, fishing, agriculture, forestry, and marketing.
OSRO as well has abandoned its emergency aid function;
renamed in October 1975 the "Office for Special Relief Operations," OSRO currently is investigating prospects for local food
production and the extent of food aid required. 5 In Africa, FAO
has played a major role in identifying and assisting those areas in
greatest need of food and agricultural inputs.
b. The World Food Programme
In 1963, the FAO, in conjunction with the U.N., sponsored the
experimental World Food Programme (WFP) to supply basic
foodstuffs to needy countries and to institute procedures to meet
emergency food needs.3 66 Emergency needs were defined as "food
needs arising from sudden and unexpected natural disasters, such
as earthquakes, floods, droughts, pests and epidemic diseases...
and man-made emergency situations, including political conditions rendering persons homeless. 31 6 7 Twenty-five percent of the
Programme's total resources were used in emergencies. Voluntary
cash contributions supplemented these resources.3 6 8
In 1965, the U.N. decided that WFP should function as a permanent entity.36 9 After one decade of operations, WFP had utilized fifteen percent of its total expenditure, $110 million, to support 159 emergency operations in seventy-six countries. Of its
total emergency allocations, it applied forty-four percent to remedy the effects of drought, thirty-three percent to aid the victims
362. The Sahel is a region on the southern perimeter of the Sahara desert.
363. Second Annual Report, supra note 361, at 34.
364. Id.
365. Id. See generally G.A. Res. 3348, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).

366.

MACALISTER-SMITH,

supra note 248, at 104.

367. WFP CONST., para. 10(a). See G.A. Res. 1714, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
368. 39 U.N. ESCOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 16) at 5, U.N. Doc. E/4015
(1965).
369. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 104.
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of natural disasters, and twenty-three percent to alleviate the
37 0
consequences of man-made emergencies.
The WFP coordinated food relief operations to aid the victims
of the Sahelian drought in the late 1970s, contributing 65,000 tons
of cereals . 37 1 The WFP also provided 97,000 tons of wheat flour to
Vietnam for emergency food assistance,3 2 and it maintains an International Emergency Food Reserve which donates food yearly
to various needy countries. Other activities have included aiding
victims of floods, droughts, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions, 37 3 as
well as refugees and war victims.
The WFP between 1963 and 1982 contributed over $1.1 billion
to emergency operations: 37 4 $195.4 million financed natural disaster operations 3 5 and $347.6 million facilitated drought and crop
failure operations. 7 6 Regions receiving aid were Latin America,
the Caribbean, North Africa, the Near East, Sub-Saharan Africa,
37 7
Southern Europe, Asia, and the Pacific.
Within the U.N. system, the WFP contributes a substantial
amount of emergency food aid and coordinates the logistics of
emergency operations. In the past two decades, the WFP has provided Sub-Saharan Africa with over $1.5 billion in assistance and
currently has increased its efforts not only to meet the new massive food needs, but also to improve the continent's food producing capability.37 8 WFP's current efforts include the provision of
more than 350,000 tons of food relief to stricken African populations. It also supplies these nations with mobile and fixed food
storage facilities to expand food storage capacity, charters landing
crafts to unload food into smaller ports, and mobilizes truck

370. Id. at 104-05. See G.A. Res. 2095, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 32,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); E.S.C. Res. 1080, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 32,
U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965).
371.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, REPORT OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED

NATIONS/FAO COMMITTEE ON FOOD AID POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES 11 (Rome,

Apr. 21, 1978).

372. Id. at 12. Total cost of aid in 1977-78 was $24 million.
373.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH SESSION

OF THE

UNITED NATIONs/FAO COMMITTEE ON FOOD AID POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

(Rome, May 14-24, 1978).
374. FOOD AID IN FIGURES, supra note 300, at 79.

375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.

9
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transport fleets with vehicle maintenance facilities. 9 In addition
to its own direct contributions, WFP provides various services to
bilateral food aid donors,380 including the purchase, transportation and monitoring of food aid donations. In 1984 it handled, on
behalf of donors, an additional 350,000 tons of food aid for
Africa.38s
The size and prominence of the WFP has been increasing.
Some commentators believe that food aid efforts should be coordinated through the WFP on an international basis rather than
through bilateral agreements between nations. 2 If all food aid
were coordinated through the WFP, food aid could be more efficiently distributed and more effectively used to aid development.38 3 A large international organization involved in development rather than emergency relief, however, would severely
impact current channels of commercial trade. Already the WFP is
considering shipping food through commercial channels and selling food for local currency; this would be similar to United States
P.L. 480 operations. 8 Moreover, the WFP also hs executed largescale projects, such as the establishment of wheat reserves in Turkey, which have affected commercial trade.38 5
c. World Food Conference
In 1974, the World Food Conference (WFC)
the Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger
which created the World Food Council. 6 Some
many nongovernmental agencies adopted the
379. WFP Moves Food, Tackles Bottlenecks, AFRICA
at 10.
380. Id.
381.

in Rome adopted
and Malnutrition
130 countries and
Declaration that

EMERGENCY, June

1985,

The WFP implements immense and rigorous logistical activities and

employs such transport means as planes, trucks, and ships to facilitate its operations. Id. In Mozambique, for example, "to improve off-take of bulk-shipped cereals, WFP Coastal Operations has chartered landing craft with four steel barges
which will shuttle food from a coastal vessel to the tiny fishing villages at Inhassoro and Vilanculos." Id.
382. The term "bilateral aid" generally refers to donations made directly
from one country to another.
383. WFP Moves Food, Tackles Bottlenecks, AFRICA EMERGENCY,
June 1985, at 1.

384. BARD,
385. Id.
386. Id.

FOOD AID AND INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE 27

(1972).
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"[e]very man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be
free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and
maintain [his or her] physical and mental facilities .... [T]he
eradication of hunger is a common objective of all the countries of
the international community....
The World Food Council,
charged to implement the WFC goals, consists of 36 states nominated by the Economic and Social Council and elected by the
General Assembly. The Council is the highest-ranking U.N. organ
which addresses only world food problems, including emergency
food aid. s
WFC resolutions concern food production, food security, food
aid, and food trade.389 Resolution 17 contains a voluntary agreement by governments to ensure adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs if widespread crop failures or natural disasters should
3 90

occur.

d. World Health Organization
Following the International Health Conference in New York on
July 22, 1946, 61 governments adopted the Constitution of the
newly-created World Health Organization (WHO) under Article
59 of the U.N. Charter. 9 1 Although independently established,
WHO entered into a formal relationship with the U.N. in 1948392
that authorized WHO to propose conventions, agreements, and
regulations. According to Article 1 of its Constitution, WHO's objective is the attainment of the highest possible level of health for
all persons.3 93 Article 2(d) permits WHO to supply necessary
emergency aid either to those governments that request it or to
3 4
those that will accept it. 1

387. Id. The Turkish Wheat Reserve cost the WFP $35 million.
388. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 103.

389. Id. at 103. See generally SUBCOMM.

ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL POLICY

OF THE SENATE COMM.ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, HUNGER & DIPLOMACY: A

PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. ROLE AT THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE,

94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 60-62 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter HUNGER & DIPLOMACY].
390. HUNGER & DIPLOMACY, supra note 389, at 84-85; MACALISTER-SMITH,
supra note 248, at 103.
391. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 105.
392. Id.

393. WHO

CONST.,

art. 1, reprinted in

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC

DOCUMENTS 2 (1976); G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 277.
394. WHO CONST. art. 2(d), reprinted in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS 2 (1976); G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 277.
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Originally, WHO directed and coordinated relief efforts, having
only a limited capacity to provide direct relief. In 1954, however,
the U.N. Executive Board established a special emergency fund
that enabled field teams to assist directly in relief operations. In
1974, the U.N. Executive Board and the Assembly further augmented WHO's ability to provide emergency relief by creating (1)
the Responsible Officer for WHO Emergency Relief Operations,
the liaison between countries in emergency situations and the
U.N. Director-General; and (2) a special disaster fund enabling
WHO to channel independent funds to meet emergency needs.25
The Organization currently directs its efforts toward disease
control, environmental health, family health, mental health,
training health workers, strengthening national health systems,
formulating international health regulations, promoting medical
research, and processing statistical data."' In addition, the U.N.
has empowered WHO to establish and promote international
standards concerning food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar
products. As part of the African relief effort it has worked closely
with UNICEF in Africa to fight the spread of cholera, tuberculosis, and measles.
3. OEOA at Work
The Office for Emergency Operations in Africa's (OEOA) first
act was to target twenty African countries 98 with the most critical immediate problems and specifically assess their food and
nonfood needs.399 The OEOA then endeavored to mobilize the resources needed to meet these needs. To consolidate the OEOA
effort and explain its emergency assessment to the international
donor community, representatives from 125 countries and thirty
nongovernmental organizations met in Geneva on March 11-12,
395.

MACALISTER-SMITH,

supra note 248, at 105.

396. See G. SCHIAVONE, supra note 330, at 280.
397. United Nations Office for Emergency Operationsin Africa Status Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa, Report No. OEOA/3/3 at 67, 77
(Sept. 1, 1985) [hereinafter OEOA Report 3/3 ].
398. Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Rwanda, Sene-

gal, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe were the targeted nations.
399. This initial assessment was compiled in Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa, U.N. Conference on the Emergency Situation in Africa, U.N.

Doc. SG/CONF.2 (1985). Shelter, health, and sanitation are examples of nonfood needs.
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1985.400 At this conference, the Secretary General conferred on
the OEOA the responsibility to:
(a) Monitor the emergency situation and co-ordinate the flow of
assistance;
(b) Identify emergency needs and facilitate the mobilization and
delivery of regources;
(c) Identify weaknesses in response capacity and deal with them
urgently;
(d) Help to develop, upon request, the capacity of African Governments to handle the growing burden of emergency-related activities themselves;
(e) Facilitate communication, consultation and co-operation
among all organizations and institutions, governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental, involved with the crisis;
(f) Ensure that full account continues to be taken of the linkages
between emergency, development and environmental dimensions;
acquired in this emergency to pro(g) Evaluate the experience
40 1
vide lessons for the future.

The scope of the OEOA effort following this conference to coordinate governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental
assistance is illustrated by an excerpt from an OEOA monthly
status report on the African emergency listing pledges and contributions to the crisis for September 1985:
Italy: 35 trucks, 1 mobile workship and 1 technician for one year.
USA for Africa: $120,000 (through CARE) for 4,000 kits for village
health workers and midwives; $25,000 (through CARE) for vitamins (A and D); $45,000 (through CARE) for ORS and/or basic
medicines; $10,000 (through CARE) for fuel; $225,000 (through
CARE) for four 8- to 10-ton trucks; $50,000 (through Africare or
UNDP/UNICEF) for well-deepening of village wells; $359,355
(through UNDP/UNICEF) for well-deepening in Tahoua; $165,000
(through WFP) for ten 500-ton silos.
Sweden: $224,719 for water supply rehabilitation.
FAO: $160,000 for dry-season farming and livestock assistance.
400. In this conference called by the Secretary General, the OEOA reported
that $1.6 billion was needed immediately to assist 30 million men, women and
children who were facing extreme malnutrition, starvation, and death on a daily
basis. See OEOA Report 3/3, supra note 397, at 5. Ethiopia alone accounted for
almost eight million of this total. Id. at 61.
401. Id. at 3.
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Band-Aid: $1.6 million for emergency and recovery projects (details are awaited).
France: 100 mt of special milk for calves.
Islamic Bank: 6,000 mt of fodder concentrate.
UNICEF: $139,904 for child nutrition and drugs.
EEC: $15,580 [for] services of a logistician.
Federal Republic of Germany/CARITAS: $417,937 cash.
Netherlands: $50,000 [for] services of a logistician for four months.
SwitzerlandICARITAS: $200,000 cash.402
By late October 1985, the OEOA had added more than half a
million dollars to its earlier needs assessment, but its other projections for 1986 were evidence of the progress made. Of the original twenty targeted countries, only eleven were expected to remain on the critical list for both food and nonfood needs. Three
countries were still targeted for critical nonfood assistance, and
the remaining nine were expected to be removed from the critical
list altogether. °3
D.

Recipient States' Efforts

Frequently, the government of the recipient state will facilitate
the relief operations of donor governments, IGOs or PVOs by assisting in the delivery and/or distribution of aid. For example,
some African governments have provided facilities and personnel
for unloading, handling, transporting, and warehousing commodities and project materials without cost to voluntary organizations. 404 African aircraft, 40 5 as well as aircraft donated or supplied
402. United Nations Office for Emergency Operationsin Africa Status Report on the Emergency Situation in Africa, Report No. OEOA/3/4 at 72 (Oct.
1985).
403. Id. at 8.
404. See Letter from Shawn McCutcheon, Jr., Senior Writer in CARE
Comm. Dep't. of New York, to Sharon Janarek, at 1 (Sept. 18, 1985) (discussing
Sudan and Somalia) (a copy of this letter may be obtained from the VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L.). The fundamental relationship between CARE and a particular
African government is outlined in a basic Country Agreement signed by both
parties. Id.
405. For the first time in March 1985, the Ethiopian military became directly
involved in the famine relief effort. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1985, at A5, col. 4.
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by other nations, 40 6 have engaged in massive airlifts to carry food
and supplies to millions facing starvation. 0 7 Trucks, 0 8 helicopters, 40 9 and trains are also participants in food transportation, but
planes and helicopters are essential in food distribution because
of their ability to deliver aid to areas so remote that they are either difficult or impossible to reach by truck. Furthermore, in
some situations, African governments have found it more expedient and cheaper to have victims come to the food, rather than
moving food aid to those facing starvation.4 10

406. The U.S. has utilized commercial aircraft to assist in food distribution.
Africa's Need for Food Tests: Limits of U.S. Emergency Aid, CHRISTIANITY ToDAY, Feb. 1, 1985, at 53. In addition, the U.S. has also used military aircraft in
famine relief efforts. See InternationalAffairs-African Famine, 1985 FACTS ON
FmE 44. Soviet and British military planes deliver supplies to remote areas in
East Africa along with planes from Czechoslovakia, East Germany and other
planes from around the world. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at A3, col. 4. Two
British transport planes scheduled to remain in Ethiopia for three months were
expected to make three round trips a day transporting relief aid. Id. The Soviets
have also pledged their transport planes to Ethiopia to help in food distribution.
Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1984, at A26, col. 1. Likewise, the British Red Cross has
chartered Boeing 707's to airlift supplies to Ethiopia. Id.
407. Airdrops have also gained increased popularity in food aid distribution.
On February 13, 1985, the governments of Ethiopia, Poland, Great Britain, West
Germany, the United States, Italy, Sweden and medical volunteers from the private French organization-Doctors without Borders-participated in an airdrop
called Operation Tesfa. Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1985, at A17, col. 1. The Ethiopian
government has not yet announced whether it would allow such airdrops in sites
not compatible with government rule. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1985, at A4, col. 4.
See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1985, at A6, col. 1. In January 1985, another airdrop (Operation St. Bernard) took place and-delivered 32 tons of grain to inaccessible areas in Ethiopia. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1985, at A6, col. 1. The governments of Belgium, Sweden, Italy, France and Canada assisted in the operation.
Id. Airlifts also have aided earthquake victims in Mexico. Mexico/Earthquake,
ABC, Sept. 20, 1985.
408. Various countries have recognized the importance of machinery in food
aid distribution. The U.S. pledged "$1 million to .

.

. [purchase] trucks and

spare parts to speed [the] distribution of [the] supplies." Wash. Post, May 8,
1985, at A26, col. 5. The Soviets pledged $992,200 for trucks and airplanes. Millions Starve in Ethiopia as Drought Intensifies, 1984 FACTS ON FILE 889.
OPEC, under a five million dollar emergency grant for long-term development
projects in developing countries, made available 179 heavy-duty trucks to the 12
most affected countries. OPEC Provides Emergency Transport, AFRICA EMERGENCY, July 1985, at 12.
409. The Soviets pledged 24 helicopters to be used for shuttle flights for the
famine relief effort. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
410. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A2, col. 3.
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One approach some African governments have taken to combat
starvation is the resettlement of parts of the population to more
fertile lands,41 ' stating that "resettlement is necessary to thin out
the overpopulated and ecologically deteriorated countryside.

4

12

A

second approach is the Lagos Plan, adopted by fifty African countries.41 3 The Lagos Plan emphasizes the African countries' belief

that the continent must begin feeding itself."4' The plan calls for
an end to Africa's reliance on the exportation of cash crops and
instead advocates expanded food output, "African regional cooperation," and escalation of African agricultural grades. 4 5 Furthermore, it encourages "strengthening the subregional economic
communities, with the idea that these would lead to a Pan-African common market by the year 2000." 4 1 Thus far, twelve African states have begun utilizing established national food
17
schemes.
IV. POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS LINKED WITH
THE DISASTER RELIEF SYSTEM: RECOMMENDED REFORMS

Political objectives, legal structures, and logistical factors affect
and sometimes impede the execution of disaster relief. The first
part of this Section examines the policy objectives underlying
United States laws related to the provision of aid, the dearth of
international law governing aid and donor-recipient relationships,
the logistics of administering aid to the recipient nation, the intervention of the recipient government in relief endeavors, and
miscellaneous forces which affect the distribution of aid. The last
part of the Section offers recommendations to alleviate some of
the negative effects of these factors on the provision of aid and
concludes that a nexus between emergency aid and development
is crucial to the resolution of a catastrophe.
411. The Ethiopian government in January 1985, planned to move approximately 100,000 persons to fruitful lands in Ethiopia's south and southwest regions. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A2, col. 1. The Ethiopian government this
year is planning to move two million refugees. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at A6,

col. 3.
412. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at A2, col. 2.
413. Shepard, When ForeignAid Fails, ATL. MONTHLY, Apr. 1985, at 45. In
1980, the Lagos Plan was also adopted by the Organization of African Unity. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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A. The Problems
1. United States Laws Related to Provision of Aid
a. Principal Policy Objectives
The United States Government has stated its policy with respect to each of the laws discussed in Section II. Some have suggested that the government's behavior has been inconsistent with
its stated policies, revealing its underlying motives. This inconsistency is not surprising, because a government's motives or objectives in giving aid are usually multifaceted, encompassing humanitarian, political, and economic objectives. For instance, either the
United States or the Soviet Union could have a strategic interest
in giving aid to Ethiopia, whose location on the Horn of Africa
could make it a focus of superpower rivalry.
A distinct delineation of the policy objectives behind United
States laws governing food aid is not possible because those
objectives necessarily overlap, but several major themes manage
to emerge. The examination focuses on Public Law 480 because
that law is the most widely utilized and debated. (Note, however,
that the objectives of Public Law 480 often refer to the law in its
entirety, not simply to its donative aspects.)
i. Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Although humanitarian concerns have been perceived as the
primary motive behind United States food assistance activities,
the United States has engaged in programs which tend to further
its political objectives. For example, the trend in United States
aid has been towards bilateral assistance, 418 as evidenced by its

reduction in contributions to the World Food Program.419 While
multilateral food assistance programs 420 place a premium on humanitarian, emergency and developmental objectives, such programs restrict the use of food assistance to further United States
domestic and foreign policies.421 Moreover, the Title II program
was under attack in the years prior to the World Food Conference
418. See R.

HOPKINS &

D.

PUCHALA, GLOBAL FOOD INTERDEPENDENCE

92

(1980).
419. Id. United States contributions fell from 35% in 1969-70 to 15% in
1979. Id.
420. See supra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
421. See infra notes 438-58 and 534 and accompanying text.
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in Rome in 1974.422 Criticism of the program fueled efforts to emphasize the humanitarian aspects of United States food aid programs and to deemphasize political and surplus disposal facets.
One proposal that emerged from that conference was a system of
423
food reserves.
The utility of such a system was dramatized by the volatility of
the world food situation during the 1970s. United States food aid
4 24
shipments to developing countries had droppped drastically
during the global food crisis of the early 1970s.4 25 Subsequently,
increased food production due to favorable weather conditions
worldwide allowed rebuilding of grain stocks to pre-1972 levels.426
Amendments to Public Law 480 in 1975427 and 1977, which added
the minimum tonnage provisions of Title 1428 and permitted the

increase of shipments in times of urgent need, even if United
States supplies were limited, 429 enabled the United States once

again to offer abundant amounts of aid.
As of the enactment of the 1980 Food Security Wheat Reserve
422.

Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64, at 338. See Food For

War, supra note 17, at 7-8. Wallerstein argues that until the Kennedy administration the driving force behind foreign aid policy was domestic agricultural sur-

pluses. Id.
423.
CONG.

H.R. REP. No. 966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.

CODE

& ADMIN. NEWS 5458, 5460.

424. Id. at 5-6, reprinted at 5462-63. Public Law 480 shipments decreased
from 9.9 million tons for fiscal year 1972 to 3.3 million tons for fiscal year 1974.
Wheat shipments dropped from 6.5 million tons for fiscal year 1972 to 1.4 million tons for fiscal year 1974. Id. at 5, reprinted at 5462. United States carryover
stocks of wheat dropped from 26.8 million tons at the end of crop year 1971-72
to 9.3 million tons by the end of crop year 1973-74 and did not recover until the
crop year 1976-77 when the stocks equaled 30.3 million tons. Id.
425. The "global food crisis," which lasted from 1972 through 1974 was precipitated primarily by two factors: (1) a political decision by the United States
to reduce its levels of agricultural stockpiles; and (2) severe droughts and crop
failures experienced in the USSR, India, and Sahel, which caused these nations
to increase substantially their food import levels. See Bale & Southworth, World
Agricultural Trade and Food Security: Emerging Patterns.and Policy Directions, 1 WIs. INT'L L.J. 24, 29 (1982).
426. H.R. REP. No. 966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5458, 5462.
427. International Development and Foods Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-161, (89 Stat.) 849.
428. Id. Tonnages were set at 1.3 million metric tons, one million of which
would be made available only to private voluntary organizations and the World
Food Program.
429. Feeding the World's Population,supra note 64, at 346.
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Act,430 United States grain stocks were adequate for a minimal
level of world food security, but this security was offset by increased world consumption over the decade.43 ' If unfavorable
weather conditions again caused shortages in production, forcing
grain prices to rise, millions in developing countries could suffer.432 In addition, developing countries had been steadily increasing their dependency on food imports and food aid.433 Although
recognizing that food aid is not the long-term answer to these
countries' problems, Congress realized that an emergency wheat
supply could stave off hunger while a country increased its production capabilities. Moreover, an emergency food supply could
prevent a major setback in world food security if another serious
worldwide production shortfall should occur. 434 Although the four

million metric ton reserve was not a final solution to such a crisis,
Congress determined that a reserve of wheat stocks, upon which
so many developing countries rely as a staple of their diets, would
be of great assistance.43 5 Hence, the Food Security Wheat Reserve
was established and reserved solely for "emergency humanitarian
36
'
food needs.

4

Though humanitarian considerations are a component of all
United States donative assistance, they appear to be the primary
impetus for the creation of the wheat reserve,437 an act by which
430. Agricultural Act of 1980, Title III, 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-1 (Supp. 1985).
431. H.R. REP. No. 966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5458, 5462.
432. Id. at 5, reprinted at 5463.
433. Id. In the early 1950's developing countries produced almost all their
own food. Id. As of the 1980 Act, legislators projected 75 million tons of grain,
13-14% of which was food aid, for 1980. Id. The International Food Policy Research Institute also projected increases for the 1990s. Id.
434. Id. at 6, reprinted at 5463-64.
435. Id. at 6, reprinted at 5464. The Agriculture Department assured Congress that the reserve would not depress United States wheat prices because
they do not displace commercial sales but are used only for Public Law 480
concessional sales or grants. Id. at 7-8, reprinted at 5465.
436. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-1(a) (Supp. 1985).
437. In addition to its humanitarian goal, the Reserve helped fulfill the
United States commitment under the Food Aid Convention of 1980. H.R. REP.
No. 966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONG. CODE & ADMIN.
NEws 5458, 5464. The United States pledged 4.47 million tons of grain annually
to developing countries. Id. The 1971 Food Aid Convention contained a United
States pledge of 1.89 million tons a year. Id. During a period of tight domestic
supply, the United States would be unable to meet its 4.47 million ton pledge
without a wheat security reserve because Public Law 480 procurement is limited
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Congress responded to past food crises by attempting to guard
against, or at least to augment the seriousness of, similar situations in the future.
ii.

Supplementing United States Farm Policy

Congress' initial motive in enacting Public Law 480 was to assist the ailing agricultural industry. 38 The policy underlying Public Law 480 is:
to expand international trade; to develop and expand export markets for United States agricultural commodities; to use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in
the developing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to
those countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural production; . . . and to promote in other ways the foreign
policy of the United States." 9
to commodities in excess of domestic requirements, carryover, and commercial
exports. Id.
The rationale underlying the establishment of a wheat reserve rather than a
financial reserve is fourfold. First, the availability of money does not assure the
availability of food, and "[p]eople cannot eat dollars." Id. at 9, reprinted at
5467. Second, a fund would have an adverse price impact because purchasing
food when it is in short supply would increase prices. Id. Third, the President
may be reluctant to purchase scarce wheat and increase domestic prices. Id.
Fourth, wheat may be purchased for a reserve when stocks are plentiful and
prices are lower, thus strengthening prices when farmers need it most. Id. at 10,
reprinted at 5467.
The reserve was confined to wheat because wheat is less expensive to acquire
and store than other foods, is the most widely traded grain, and may be substituted in human consumption for rice or coarse grains if necessary. Id.
438. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
439. 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1973 & Supp. 1985). The President is directed "to give
priority consideration ... to making available the maximum feasible volume of
food commodities (with appropriate regard to domestic price and supply situations) required by those countries most seriously affected by food shortages and
by inability to meet immediate food requirements on a normal commercial basis." Id,, § 1691(1). He is also directed to urge other donors to increase their
participation, id., § 1691(2); to emphasize development in donee countries, id., §
1691(3); to "give special consideration to the potential for expanding markets for
America's agricultural abundance abroad in the allocation of commodities or
concessional financing," id., § 1691(4); and to "give appropriate recognition to
and support of a strong and viable American farm economy in providing for the
food security of consumers in the United States and throughout the world." Id.,
§ 1691(5).
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While humanitarian objectives have influenced the development
of the law over the past thirty-two years,440 disposal of agricul-

tural surplus and its corollary, market development, remain major
441
policy goals.

All commodities exported under Public Law 480 must meet the
requirements stated in section 401 of the law.442 Under that section, the Secretary of Agriculture must determine that domestic
supply requirements are met, that adequate carryover stocks exist, and that sufficient commodities are available for commercial
export sales before approving Public Law 480 assistance amounts,
except in the case of special and urgent humanitarian needs.443
Title II of Public Law 480 requires the President to "take
reasonable precaution to assure that commodities furnished...
will not displace or interfere with sales which might otherwise be
made," except in the case of emergency. 444 The potential for displacement of commercial markets for United States wheat products or surpluses by section 416 is one of the concerns of the Department of Agriculture.445 When asked the reason that the
United States is reluctant to donate wheat under section 416,
even though it donates dairy commodities under that section,
Daniel Amstutz of the Department of Agriculture 446 replied:
[D]isplacement of wheat is of greater concern [than displacement
of dairy products] because ...

to be candid, in international mar-

kets we are not displacing [United States] exports of dairy products; in the area of wheat, we could be displacing [United States]
exports. That is a very selfish answer, and it is a factual
440. See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text.
441. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 47-48. Agri-

cultural surpluses have been increasing, forcing down the prices received by
farmers for their products. Id.
In at least one instance Public Law 480 has been used to protect domestic
industry from foreign imports. In the early 1970s South Korea was importing

inexpensive textiles to the United States. To help the textile industry, the
United States agreed to furnish South Korea with $275 million in Title I concessional loans in exchange for a voluntary restriction on textile exports to the
United States. Food for War, supra note 17, at 154-55.
442. 7 U.S.C. § 1731(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
443. Id.

444. 7 U.S.C. § 1722 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
445. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 7. See generally

id. at 10-25.
446. Undersecretary, International Affairs and Commodity Programs.
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statement. 44 7

United States agricultural exports constitute a substantial portion of United States farm income448 and consequently are important to its balance of trade. 449 Although the United States only
recently became a major exporter of agricultural commodities,4 50
forty percent of United States farmland now produces commodities which are consumed abroad. 451 In 1981, the United States experienced record agricultural exports, valued at $43.8 billion.4 5 2
Since peak sales in 1981, agricultural exports have been declining. 453 This reduction has been attributed to a decreasing world
demand caused by a global recession, a strong dollar, worldwide
harvests, and the increased use of export subsidies by other nations.45 4 Because the agriculture and food system is the nation's
largest industry and employer, 45 5 its stability is imperative for a

sound United States economy.
The United States has the capacity to export twice the amount
of grain that is actually exported. 456 Because the agriculturalcommodity needs of traditional importers, such as Japan and
Western Europe, have levelled off, the United States must develop new markets in order to expand exports and decrease sur-

447. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 22.
448. International Trade and Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on InternationalDevelopment Institutions and Finance of the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985) [hereinafter International Trade and Development]. In 1980, exports comprised approximately 30% of United States farm cash receipts. Id.
449. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
24 (1984) [hereinafter Subcomm. on Foreign Agriculture].
450. See International Trade and Development, supra note 448, at 24. In
1950, only 10% of farm cash receipts came from exports, which increased to
14% in 1960. Id.
451. Id.
452. Subcomm. on Foreign Agriculture, supra note 449, at 76 (statement of
Wayne A. Boutwell, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives).
453. Id. By 1983, the value of agricultural exports dropped to 34.8%. Id.
454. International Trade and Development, supra note 448, at 24.
455. Id. Agricultural assets are worth about $1 trillion, "an amount equal to
almost 90% of the combined assets of all manufacturing corporations in the
United States." Id. In 1982, farm commodities added $71 billion to the gross
national product. Id.
456. Id.
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plus. 457 Although developing countries have increased their level
of United States imports, long-term expansion of agricultural exports lies in the cultivation of African markets." 8
iii. Encouraging Two Types of Development
Through Public Law 480 and USDA export credit programs,
the United States encourages other nations to decrease their reliance on emergency aid and aims at the expansion of export markets. Efforts to emphasize the developmental aspects of food aid
have been carried out through Titles I and III of Public Law 480
more often than through Title II or other laws.
Many poor countries are prohibited from purchasing United
States agricultural commodities because they are unable to secure
credit.459 Title I agreements help nations overcome this problem
by affording direct loans at concessional rates of interest; 46 0 Title
I agreements also open markets which were previously unavailable to United States exporters. 46 ' Title III, known as the "Food
for Development" program, is intended to give Title I recipients
an incentive to develop their agricultural capabilities by forgiving
Title I debts, so long as the proceeds were used for additional
development purposes. 4 2 A 1981 amendment required self-help
measures contained in sales agreements to be more specific and
measurable.4 63
As stated in Section II, the supply of donative aid through Title
II primarily meets emergency needs. Another objective of Title H
assistance, however, is to support "community and self-help activities designed to alleviate the causes of need for [emergency
aid]. '' 464 Section 206 of Title II directs that foreign currencies
generated from Title II commodity sales be used, except under

457. Subcomm. on Foreign Agriculture, supra note 449, at 24 (statement of
Robert W. Kohlmeyer, Northern American Export Grain Association).
458.

Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of

Richard Goldberg, Deputy Under Secretary, USDA).
459. Id.
460. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
461. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. One condition of receiving
Title I concessional sales is that the recipient must agree to execute self-help
activities to improve its production capabilities.
462. See Feeding the World's Population,supra note 64, at 342. See text
accompanying note 67 supra for a discussion of Title Ill.
463. Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64,. at 342.
464. 7 U.S.C. § 1722(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
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certain conditions, for agricultural development, rural development, or nutrition programs. 465 Title II also is considered a useful
market development tool. 466 Eight of the ten most profitable commercial importers of United States agricultural commodities are
"graduates" of the Title II program. 6 7 Together, Title I and Title
II food assistance enable poor countries to free some of their capital for use in development so they may at some point engage in
46
commercial trading.
Public Law 480 is employed in conjunction with private enterprise development projects to expand United States export markets. A particularly successful project has been implemented by
Land O'Lakes, Incorporated, a United States food cooperative. 46 9
Land O'Lakes created a nonprofit organization in Jamaica called
the Jamaica Agricultural Development Foundation.7 0 Under Title II, the United States donates surplus dairy products to the
Foundation. 7 1 The Foundation then contracts with Jamaican
processors to ready the dairy products for consumption; they are
then sold in Jamaican commercial markets.472 Land O'Lakes provides the Jamaican processors with technological assistance. 47s
The profits 4 4 are used by the Foundation to help strengthen the
Jamaican economy, 475 thus enabling Jamaica to increase
imports. 76
The USDA, through the CCC, administers two other programs
465.

7 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
466. Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 35 (statement of
Robert D. Fondahn, President, Fondahn & Associates, Inc.).
467. Id.
468. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 81 (prepared
statement of W. Glenn Tussey, Associate Director, Washington Office, American
Farm Bureau Federation). For example, Korea received Public Law 480 assistance from 1956 through 1981, totaling more than $1.6 billion. During that period, per capita income rose from $100 to $1500 and yearly exports rose form $20
million to $18 billion. Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 162.
Yearly exports to Korea are now worth more than all the aid given to Korea
under the Public Law 480 program in 25 years. Id.
469. Uses of Agricultural Abundance, supra note 27, at 163.
470. Id. Land O'Lakes serves on the board of directors of the Foundation.

Id.
471.
472.

Id.
Id.

473.
474.
475.
476.

Id.
The estimated profits over six years are $35-50 million. Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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designed to facilitate the exportation of United States agricultural commodities to countries with credit problems: 4 " the Export Credit Sales Program (GSM-5) 47 s and the Export Credit
Guarantee Program (GSM-102). 7 Under the Sales Program, the
CCC buys an exporter's accounts receivable after the exporter has
delivered the commodity to the importer. 48 0 The importer has a
maximum of three years to pay the CCC with interest.4 8 Under
the Guarantee Program, the CCC acts as guarantor of foreign letters of credit given to United States exporters in the sale of agricultural commodities. 8 2
The majority of credit has been extended under the GSM-102
program. 48 3 In fiscal year 1984, $4 billion in GSM-102 guarantees
were extended, comprising ten percent of all agricultural exports.48 4 The export credit programs have been successful market
development tools. 4 15 For example, with the use of export credits,
Iraq increased United States agricultural imports from $135 million in 1982 to approximately $700 million in 1985.486
Finally, the United States is attempting to influence the development of recipient nations by insisting that they adopt economic
reforms. One such approach to influence development in African

477. Id. at 12 (statement of Richard Goldberg, Deputy Under Secretary,
USDA).
478. 7 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1982); 7 C.F.R. § 1488.1-.22 (1985).
479. 15 U.S.C. § 714(c)(f) (1982); 7 C.F.R. § 1493.1-.15 (1985).
480. 7 C.F.R. § 1488.1(b). See also Transportation Institute v. Dole, 603 F.
Supp. 888, 891 (D.D.C. 1985).
481. 7 C.F.R. § 1488.1(a). See id., § 1488.14.
482. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1493.1, 1493.4, 1493.9, & 1493.10. See also Dole, 603 F.
Supp. at 892. The CCC also provides a "blended credit" program which combines GSM-5 and GSM-102 financing. Id. The blended credit program has recently been suspended by the USDA as a result of a ruling in the Dole case
which applied cargo preferences to the program.
483. Subcomm. on Foreign Agriculture, supra note 449, at 21.
484. Id. In fiscal year 1985, $5 billion in guarantees will be made available.
Rural Development, supra note 3, at 43 (statement of Melvin E. Sims, General
Sales Manager, USDA).
485. Rural Development, supra note 3, at 105 (statement of Melvin E. Sims,
General Sales Manager, USDA).
486. Subcomm. on ForeignAgriculture, supra note 449, at 21. Nonpayments
under GSM-102 will cost the CCC as much as $4 billion by 1985. The large
payments by the CCC due to defaults have for practical purposes made the
GSM credits a vehicle for donative aid in addition to their market development
function. See id.
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nations is the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI).4 8 7 The EPI aims
to encourage African countries to redirect their economic philosophy along capitalist lines. To those African countries indicating a
willingness and capacity to undertake growth-oriented policies, 8
the EPI will provide $500 million in economic aid over five years.
A second policy of reform is the "Food for Progress" initiative.
This program provides food relief for African countries obligating
themselves to agricultural reforms "stressing market approaches
in agricultural pricing, marketing, and input supply and
48 9
distribution.'
iv. Subsidizing Maritime Industry
Under the Cargo Preference Act of 1954,490 at least fifty percent
of all government-generated cargo "shall be transported on privately owned United States-flag vessels, to the extent such vessels
are available at fair and reasonable rates. .... -41 The intent in
passing the Act was to further the policies of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936,42 which included developing a United States
merchant marine fleet that could meet the country's shipping
needs and serve in the military when necessary.4 93 Since United
States-flag ships generally are more expensive to operate than are
foreign-flag ships, the Cargo Preference Act is in effect a subsidy
to strengthen the Merchant Marine.4 94
The cargo preference requirements apply to the Title I,495 Title
487. Lyman, FY 1985 Foreign Assistance Requests for Sub-Sahara Africa,

84 DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1984, 44-45.
488. Id.
489. U.S. Assistance and Africa's Economic Crisis, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar.
1985, at 23, 25.
490. Pub. L. No. 83-664, (68 Stat.) 832 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b)(1)

(1982)).
491. Id.
492. Pub. L. No. 74-858, (49 Stat.) 1985 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§
1101-1295 (1982)). See Application of Cargo Preference Laws Relating to the

Exportation of United States Agricultural Commodities: HearingsBefore the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Application of Cargo Preference Laws].

493. 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
494. See Dole, 603 F. Supp. at 896-97; Application of Cargo Preference
Laws, supra note 492, at 13.
495. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE MILLICENT
FENWICK 2 (1982) (on the effect of cargo preferences on Title II). The CCC only
pays the differential cost of complying with the Cargo Preference Act.
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Section 416,
and blended credit4 98 programs. Since the
passage of Public Law 480, the Cargo Preference Act has increased the cost of providing food aid by $1.6 billion. 499 Glenn
Tussey, a member of the American Farm Bureau Federation, testified before Congress that cargo preference requirements increase the cost of food assistance that the United States furnishes
to hungry people by approximately twenty-five dollars per ton.'
As a result of the district court's application of the Cargo Preference Act to the USDA's blended credit program in Transportation Institute v. Dole,50 1 the Secretary of Agriculture has suspended the extension of blended credit. 2
The Cargo Preference Act directs the Department of Transportation to survey compliance of other government agencies with
cargo preference requirements, 50 3 but the statute does not provide
the Department of Transportation with any enforcement authority. 504 Congresswoman Helen Delich Bently has accused the
USDA of "constantly and flagrantly" violating the Cargo Preference Act in its Title I, Title II, and Section 416 shipments, 50 5
though the Maritime Administration itself has not made any public accusations. 50 6
11,498

496. Id.
497. 22 C.F.R. § 210.5(d)(1)(i) (1985).
498. See Dole, 603 F. Supp. 888. The cargo preferences do not apply to the
individual GSM-5 and GSM-102 programs. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1488.1(c), 1493.1(c)
(1985).
499. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 48 (statement of
Glenn Tussey, American Farm Bureau Federation).
500. Id. at 49.
501. 603 F. Supp. at 907. The court rejected the USDA's contention that the
Act applied only to "food aid" programs. Id. at 901.
502. See Application of Cargo Preference Laws, supra note 492, at 4. Initially, the Maritime Administration had not applied the Cargo Preference Act to
the blended credit program, stating that "flag carriage requirements ... would
result in costs that would entirely offset the program's benefits, thereby defeating the underlying purpose of both the blended credit program and the cargo
preference laws." Dole, 603 F. Supp. at 893.
503. 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b)(2).
504. Morison, Bentley Rips Preference Evasions, J. of Commerce, Apr. 19,
1985, at 1B, col. 2.
505. Id. at 1B, col. 1.
506. See id. at 1B, cols. 1-2. In 1983, the USDA and AID were warned by the
Maritime Administration about violations of the cargo preference requirements
for Title I, Title II and Section 416 programs. Application of Cargo Preference
Laws, supra note 451, at 3.
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b. Criticism of Policy: Effect on Aid Programs
i. Using Food as Aid
Although the majority of United States foreign aid since World
War II has been in the form of capital, food assistance has comprised a significant portion of relief efforts, 0 7 and the amount of
food aid probably will increase in the future.50

At least one ex-

pert 0° has identified some specific advantages to the use of food
as aid. Food is cheaper and more readily available than other
forms of aid. 510 Money, if not used to buy food directly, must be
applied to programs or to projects, and the poor benefit only
slowly and indirectly via the "trickle-down effect" of economic
development.5 11 "[Ploor people cannot eat capital loans and
grants.

' 51 2

Food aid alleviates hunger and malnutrition while fa-

cilitating other developmental activities.1
Furthermore, the public reacts more favorably to funding for
food aid than to appropriations for capital and technical assistance. 1 4 The average taxpayer can more easily identify with the
need to feed "starving children" or even the need to aid farmers
than with the concept of "foreign capital *assistance. 515 Finally,
food aid has become a more attractive form of assistance because
the United States produces greater quantities of agricultural commodities than it consumes; food, therefore, has a lower opportunity cost than capital, particularly because the exorbitant federal
deficit precludes an increase in capital assistance.516
507. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at xvi. About 28% of United States overseas aid between 1946 and 1976 consisted of food. Id.
508. See id.
509. Mitchel B. Wallerstein. See supra note 17.
510. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 24.
511. Id.

512. Id. (citing Field & Wallerstein, Beyond Humanitarianism:A Developmental Perspective on U.S. Food Aid, in FOOD POLICY - THE RESPONSIBMILITY OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE LIFE AND DEATH CHOICES (P. Brown & H. Shue eds.
1977)).
513. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 24. Wallerstein notes that "food-forwork" projects, those projects that pay for labor on development projects with

food, are based on this concept of food as "double-barreled." Id.
514. See id. at 25.
515. Id.
516. See id. at xvi, 24. Expansion of food aid will be somewhat retarded by

the importance of agricultural exports in helping with the United States balance
of payments problem. Id. at xxi. In addition, surplus agricultural commodities
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Notwithstanding these advantages, the use of food as aid often
has been severely criticized. Although food aid may be politically
preferable to capital assistance, food donations are not always the
proper response to disaster. For example, in 1975 the United
States responded to an earthquake in Guatemala by donating
emergency food aid. Because the earthquake had not affected
Guatemalan food production, however, the United States food assistance depressed food prices in the local market. 1 7 Yet, even if
food aid is the proper response to disaster, surplus foods from the
donor country may not correspond to the types of food indigenous to the recipient nation, 518 leading to changes in the diet of
the recipients." 9 Though the donor country may benefit from the
disposal of its surplus commodities, the needy recipient may become dependent upon this foreign food.52 0 This change of diet
and subsequent dependency may provide disincentive to local
farmers to grow their own crops again. 2 ' Moreover, the poor may
begin to spend their scant incomes on imported foods that have
become part of their diets.2 2
Food as aid may be peculiarly suited to exercising coercive
power over a recipient country's government. Because food is the
most basic of necessities, the threat of withholding it could be a
powerful method of influencing a poor state's government to act
in accordance with the donor government's policies. 523 The hungry would suffer most from such a strategy.
The donor government is not the only party in the position to
use food as a political weapon. Donor governments have little
control over the food once it has been delivered to the recipient.
Recipient governments then have an opportunity to use the food
are not "free" resources at the disposal of the government. Food must be purrequires
Congressional
which
and transported,
chased,
processed,
appropriations.

517. See R.

HOPKINS

& D.

PUCHALA, GLOBAL FOOD INTERDEPENDENCE 88

(1980).
518. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 23; Schlosser, The Starvation Cycle:
Perpetratingthe Aid-Famine Process, 32 WORLD PRESS REV., Feb. 1985 at 40.
519. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 23. See also, Schlosser, supra note
518, at 40.
520. See FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 23.
521. Schlosser, supra note 518, at 40.
522.. See generally Doyle, Cultivating Disaster: Local and International
Contexts Affecting the Provision of Food in NaturalDisasters, in DISASTER AsSISTANCE 130, 148-53 (L. Stephens and S. Green eds. 1979).

523.' See id.
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for their own political purposes. 5 24 They may terminate the delivery of food to populations in certain regions in which civil uprising occurs, as has been reported in Ethiopia. 25 They also could
add the donated food to food that is already available on the
commercial markets in their countries, lowering prices and raising
526
the standard of living in certain politically unstable regions.
This may have the effect of reducing farmers' incomes as well as
their incentive to reinvest in production.2 7 Furthermore, attempts by the donor government to monitor the use of aid necessitates involvement in the recipient government's internal affairs.52 s Such encroachment on the sovereignty of the recipient
will be resented and may, in the long run, be damaging to the
529
donor country.
Many critics argue that though food aid should not be eliminated, it should be used sparingly and only in conjunction with
long-term developmental assistance.5 30 They contend that the
United States utilizes Public Law 480 to respond on a "crisis-bycrisis" basis, ignoring long-term planning.5 3 ' The United States'
belated response to the African famine is cited as an example of
this short-sightedness. 2 Furthermore, critics perceive food aid as
"part of the problem as well as the solution because its disincentive effect drives down prices for domestically-grown commodities, reducing incomes and the incentive to reinvest in ways that
would increase productivity.5 33 Continued short-term assistance

524. See Feeding the World's Population,supra note 64, at 340.
525. See supra notes 617-630 and accompanying text.
526. Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64, at 340.
527. Id.
528. FOOD FOR WAR, supra note 17, at 23.
529. Id. at 23-24.
530. See id. at 24.
531. African Drought Poses Major Aid Challenge, CONG. Q., Dec. 1, 1984, at
3041-42.
532. Id. The Ethiopian government had requested famine relief in October
of 1982 but the United States did not respond until May 1984, according to Rep.
Howard Wolpe (D. Mich.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Africa. Id. at 3043. Following the October 1984 broadcasts, AID administrator Peter McPherson announced increases in emergency aid to Ethiopia. Id. The
total emergency aid donated to Ethiopia for the first 45 days of fiscal year 1985
was estimated at $97.5 million, substantially greater than the $19.8 million
donated to that country for the entire fiscal year 1984. Id.
533. Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64, at 339. But see Food
Crisis in Africa: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Africa of the Comm. on For-
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may contribute to the recipient government's delay in confronting
deeper problems.
Long-term development assistance may be less practicable than
short-term aid, however, because of the need to reappropriate aid
programs each year. Moreover, the implementation of development assistance programs may be unlikely in the face of a hostile,
uncooperative recipient government.
Even if the recipient government is willing to work with the
donor government, other obstacles impede developmental assistance. Hunger is not an isolated problem. It is rooted in poverty,
overpopulation, and crop instability. Rivalry between governments and political strife within recipient countries aggravate the
causes of hunger. Yet these problems cannot be eradicated by another country alone; the needy nation must be responsible for
helping itself.
ii.

Disposing of Surplus Commodities

One criticism of the Public Law 480 program is that it is principally a method for disposing of unwanted surplus foods. 4 The
objection is that the program focuses on the needs of United
States farmers instead of the needs of aid recipients. As previously discussed, the recipients' diets may be disrupted, local food
production may be hampered, and the country receiving the surplus food may have inadequate facilities for storage and distribution. If a food donation program is executed to promote only the
policy of surplus food disposal, relief may do more harm than
good for the recipient. Recipient governments may begin to resent
the efforts. Ultimately, the program's original goal of aiding the
United States farmer may be undercut.
iii.

Supporting Maritime Industry

Various bills have been introduced in Congress to exempt the
cargo preferences from export credit, concessional loans, and don-

eign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983), which, while agreeing that "[flood
and food production aid must go hand in hand with total development efforts,"
states that "no inherent reason [exists] why food aid needs to have a disincentive effect on production."
534. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 88 (prepared
statement of Colleen Westbrook, Public Policy and Research Coordinator,
Oxfam America). This criticism relates primarily to Title I food sales.
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ative aid programs,5 35 but no legislation has been enacted. The
criticism of applying the Cargo Preference Act to export credit is
aimed at the fact that programs designed to assist the troubled
agricultural industry should not be diminished to subsidize the
maritime industry."8 Those opposing the Cargo Preference Act's
application to donative and concessional aid programs argue that
the maritime subsidy reduces the USDA's ability to feed the
5 37
world's hungry.
The President's Task Force on International Private Development recommended that cargo preference costs should be eliminated from the Public Law 480 budget,538 but the Reagan Administration has stated that
[it] will oppose legislation which would remove cargo preference requirements from programs under which U.S. agricultural commodities or products thereof are donated, bartered, or sold for foreign
assistance or humanitarian purposes under concessional terms, including those programs carried out under the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act5 of 1954 ... and the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980.

'1

Representatives of the maritime and agricultural industries developed a joint plan to resolve the cargo preference dispute. 40
The plan called for removing the requirements from "commercial
exports" but increasing the requirements for "concessional" cargo
from fifty percent to seventy-five percent in 1986.541 The Depart-

535. S.721, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (S.721 only proposed the removal of
cargo preferences from export credits); H.R. 1760, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
536. See Application of Cargo Preference Laws, supra note 492, at 16. This
was the view of the dissenting members of the Senate Commerce Commission
which reported unfavorably on S.721. The dissentors were not arguing against
the propriety of subsidizing the maritime industry, but only that it not be done
through the blended credit program. Id. at 13.
537. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 82 (statement
of W. Glenn Tussey, American Farm Bureau Federation). But see Morison,
Bentley Set to Fightfor Cargo Preference,J. of Commerce, May 10, 1985, at 1B,
col. 3. Congressman Norman Lent argued that if the cargo preferences were removed from Public Law 480, additional food would not be available for aid because "any money saved would be swallowed up by the federal deficit." Id.
538. InternationalTrade and Development, supra note 448, at 3.
539. Letter from David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and
Budget, to Sen. John Danforth, Chairman, Senate Commerce Commission, reprinted in Application of Cargo Preference Laws, supra note 492, at 12, 13.
540. J. of Commerce, July 29, 1985, at lB.
541. Id.
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ment of Transportation would be responsible for funding the cost
differential on the additional twenty-five percent.5 2 The plan was
3
sent to Congress, but it has been unable to attract a sponsor.4
iv.

Achieving Short-Term Political Goals

One approach taken by the United States to achieve its social
objectives abroad has been to make economic assistance to foreign countries contingent upon their respect for human rights. In
1977, United States legislation was enacted that denied food
aid 54 4 to "the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights; 5 45 the legislative intent was to advocate the advancement of human rights.5 46
The United States in the past has been accused of using its
foreign economic assistance to African countries as a tool to further its political ideologies. The accusations may not be unjust;
the United States has proclaimed its intention to employ food aid
as a political instrument.5 47 American officials made no attempt to
conceal usage of aid to topple the Marxist regime of Colonel
Mengistu 4 8 The United States is now utilizing its foreign policy
542. Id.
543. Id. Although public opinion arguably favors the removal of Cargo Preference Act Requirements from P.L. 480, section 416 and the Blended Credit
Program in order to decrease the cost of providing aid, the Reagan Administration takes the more pragmatic approach. The Cargo Preference Act generates
39.8% of all cargo which United States flag ships move in international trade,
Application of Cargo PreferenceLaws, supra note 492 at 3, while an increase in
the amount of food aid as a result of removal of the preferences is speculative.
Nonetheless, the Cargo Preference Act should not apply to the Blended Credit
Program because its application furthers no legislative policy. Preferences have
caused the abandonment of the program, reducing farm exports, food for the
needy and shipments for the Merchant Marine.
Whether to ease the plight of the world's hungry at the expense of the troubled farm and shipping industries is not the subject of debate. Instead, the issue
is who should benefit from the United States tax dollars, foreign commercial
shipping interests or the United States Merchant Marine.
544. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, § 112, 22
U.S.C. § 2151n (1982).
545. Id., § 2151n(a).
546. See S. REP. No. 406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-36, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1651, 1675-80.
547. Sethi, The Politics of Hunger, WORLD PRESS REV., Feb. 1985, at 39.
548. Id. at 38. See also Timberlake, Beyond the Famine, WORLD PRESS REV.,
Jan. 1985, at 50.
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to regain influence in Ethiopia and to weaken Ethiopia's alliance
with the Soviet Union.54 9 In its 1986 budget requests to Congress,
the White House underlined its policy change in Africa to longterm economic assistance determined by political ideology rather
than need. 550 The Reagan Administration also has declared that it
will use its bilateral aid to compensate its "proven friends, 5 51 although the Administration has publicly stated it is being recep'552
tive to Africa's needs "without regard to politics.
Two amendments to the United States Foreign Assistance Act
have placed conditions upon the donation of United States food
aid in the past to African countries. The amendments prevent the
government from giving anything other than "humanitarian" aid
to countries that have not paid their debts to the United States.
Under the amendments, United States food can only be donated;

it cannot be earned. The first amendment, the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment, 553 prohibits development aid to countries
that have nationalized the property of United States citizens
without taking the "appropriate steps" for payment. The African
Relief and Recovery Bill, 4 however, has now waived this require-

549. In May of 1984, Ethiopia claimed that some countries were using food
relief as a political device because it had received no food shipments since the
end of March. 30 KEESINGS CONTEMP. ARCHVES 33017 (1984). In 1983, the U.S.

severed all food relief to Ethiopia, but nine months later because of pressure
from Congress and the press, the Reagan Administration again granted food relief. Shepard, Drought of the Century: Africa, ATL. MONTHLY, April 1985, at 36.
In Mali, the United States has been successful in using its food assistance as a
political tool to move the country away from its socialist ideology to a more
capitalist democracy. Shapiro, Starving-A Close-Up View of Famine in Africa,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1985, at 34. See also Mayer, infra note 584,
at 54.
550. Shepard, Congress and the White House at Odds, AFRICA REP., MayJune 1985, at 25, 28.
551. Lancaster, Africa's Development Challenges, CURRENT HIsT., Apr. 1985,
at 148, 183. "The United States sharply cut its aid to Zimbabwe in the wake of
Zimbabwe's abstention in the United Nations on the resolution condemning the
Soviet destruction of the Korean airliner and its support of the resolution condemning the United States invasion to Grenada." Id.
552. See Food for Hungry Without Regard to Politics, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., May 13, 1985, at 37.
553. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e)(1) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(1) (1982)).
554. African Relief and Recovery Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-8, 99 Stat. 21

(1985).
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ment. The second amendment, the Brooke Amendment,5 5 5 prevents development aid to countries that have not paid off loans
from the United States government. Unlike the Hickenlooper
Amendment provisions, waiver of the Brooke Amendment's penalties is much more difficult to achieve; the President may waive
only in the event of a national security threat to the United
States.
Many commentators on United States foreign aid programs
contend that the nexus between political goals and aid hampers
the effectiveness of those programs. More development assistance
is given to allies than to nonallies, regardless of relative need.
Many poor countries that do not pose a threat to United States
security do not receive nearly the amount of aid needed 56 The
disparity between the amount of aid given to the friendly or strategically important countries and that given to unfriendly or
nonimportant countries exists in the donative context as well. A
comparison of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization's statistics on food need to actual Title II assistance given
to Africa demonstrates this contention.5 57 The United States insists that it does not allow political differences to determine assistance to the needy. 55 s Nonetheless, critics believe that in the case
of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, the United States is "employing
emergency relief as a carrot and stick to achieve its foreign policy
objectives." 559

555. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(c) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(1) (1982)).
556. OVERCOMING WORLD HUNGER. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON WORLD HUNGER, AN ABRIDGED VERSION at

13 (1978).

Egypt has been the largest recipient of foreign assistance since 1976, reflecting
the United States' policy of using aid both as an inducement and a reward for
participation in Middle East peace negotiations. Feeding the World's Population, supra note 64, at 335.
557. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 90 (statement of
Colleen Westbrook, Public Policy and Research Coordinator, Oxfamn America)
(relying on statistics compiled by the Agency for International Development).
Id. at 97. See also Feeding the World's Population,supra note 64, at 332-35.
558. See, e.g., Food for Hungry Without Regard to Politics, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 13, 1985, at 38 (interview with Peter McPherson, Administrator of the Agency for International Development).
559. Tucker, The Politics of Famine in Ethiopia,THE NATION, Jan. 19, 1985,

at 48.
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Complicating Implementation

In 1978, the World Hunger Working Group 560 found that the
organization and management of United States food, nutrition,
and agriculture programs was not conducive to a coherent government-wide world hunger policy.5 61 Among the specific problems
cited were: (1) failure to identify clearly the responsibilities for
food aid policy and operations; 5 2 (2) the lack of a mechanism by
which the private sector can participate systematically in the
planning and execution of programs; 56 3 and (3) the abundance of
congressional constraints imposed on AID, relegating its top staff
to operational details and paperwork at the expense of policy formulation and coordination.5 64
The machinations of the political process in this country inevitably will result in delays in the formulation of policy and more
often in the appropriations process. Even though members of various committees, representatives of diverse constituencies and
members of opposing political parties may be able to agree on the
ultimate goal they wish to achieve, such as aid to Africa, often
they vigorously disagree on the amount or the dispostion of aid.
This disagreement results in delays; often the targeted recipients
of donative aid cannot wait months for the President and members of Congress to attach riders to the legislation which appropriates the money for their food.
In 1984, for example, President Reagan insisted on tacking military aid to El Salvador and covert aid to Nicaraguan "contras"
onto a bill providing $150 million in food aid to Africa.56 5 In 1985,

560. President Carter created the World Hunger Working Group in 1978 to
study world hunger and malnutrition and to assess and make recommendations
on United States food policy and programs. Exec. Order No. 12,078, 43 Fed.
Reg. 39,741 (1978).

561.

WORLD HUNGER WORKING GROUP, WORLD HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION:

IMPROVING THE U.S. RESPONSE

47 (1980).

562. Id. The Group found that "[c]riteria are vague, planning is weak, action
is uncertain, evaluation is slight, and financial responsibility is questionable."

Id.
563. Id. at 47-48.
564. Id. at 47.
565. See Emergency Africa Assistance Faces a New Round of Delays, CONG.
Q., Mar. 2, 1985, at 375. The House of Representatives passed Joint Resolution
492 on March 6, 1984, but the bill was delayed in the Senate by an attempt to
attach to the bill $93 million in military aid to El Salvador. See African Drought
Poses Major Aid Challenge, CONG. Q., Dec. 1, 1984, at 3042. Ninety million dol-
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Congress tacked relief for United States farmers onto H.R. 1096,
authorizing $175 million in nonfood aid to Africa.566 Reagan vetoed the resolution.5

67

When farm state senators further delayed

action on the African aid bill, President Reagan prepared to use
his emergency powers to send additional aid without congressional appropriation by revaluing United States-owned food
aid.5 8 Such political maneuvering is counterproductive in the
midst of a consensus that the United States should send aid to
starving people.
2. International Law Related to Provision of Aid
No international law exists which defines the obligations of donor and recipient states before, during and after disasters.
Neither the United Nations nor any state has enacted a law
which defines the legal relationships between donor and recipient
states;59 moreover, very little law addresses the right of an individual to receive disaster relief. Although the Preamble to the
U.N. Charter states as a goal the "reaffirm[ation of] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person,

' 57 0

it does not contain any specific rights to disaster relief.

Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter is the primary provision dealing
with human suffering, but it does not list as a purpose the alleviation of human suffering on an international scale. Furthermore,
no provision in the U.N. Charter or in Article 55, which addresses
international economic and social cooperation, proposes a method
lars of the $150 million for food aid, however, was successfuly attached to another supplemental measure, Joint Resolution 493, of which the House approved
on March 28, 1984. The remaining $60 million in food aid, however, was further
delayed until June 25, 1984, because of other efforts to attach El Salvador aid
and covert aid to the contras. P.L. 98-332, containing the $60 million, had to be
programmed for fiscal year 1985 because of the delay.
566. Emergency Africa Assistance Faces a New Round of Delays, CONG. Q.,
Mar. 2, 1985, at 375.
567. See Stalled Africa Aid Bills Prompt Executive Steps to Free Funds,
CONG. Q., Mar.. 9, 1985, at 431.
568. Id. The Agriculture Department has authority to set any value up to the
export market value on United States-owned food sent overseas via P.L. 98
(1981).
569. Samuels, The Relevance of International Law in the Prevention and
Mitigation of Natural Disasters, in DISASTER ASSISTANCE 245, 246-47 (L. Stephens and S. Green eds. 1979).
570. U.N. CHARTER Preamble, reprintedin CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(Goodrich, Hambro & Simons eds. 1969).
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of accomplishing these objectives. 1 Unlike the Preamble to the
U.N. Charter, the International Bill of Human Rights57 2 and the
International Covenants 57 3 proclaim that individuals should possess the right to freedom from hunger but add that this right cannot be perfected by specific enforcement. 7 4
Although the U.N. Charter does not designate responsibility for
disaster relief,57 5 the General Assembly has stated that UNDRO 57 6 is to coordinate relief facilities. 57 7 The U.N. has urged re-

571. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 161.
572. G.A. Res. 217, Third Session (1948) (U.N. Doc. No. unavailable). See
Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 Y.B. INT'L L.
CoMM. 356 (1948).
573. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). See also Covention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, United States Comm. on Foreign Affairs, in HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS

(1983).

574. See MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 161.
575. Green, Be'nevolent Chaos: The Capacity of International Agencies in
Disasters, in FAMINE 141, 141 (Cahill ed. 1982).
576. See supra notes 332-36 and accompanying text.
577. The specific duties of UNDRO are to:
(a) To establish and maintain the closest cooperation with all organizations concerned and to make all feasible advance arrangements with them
for the purpose of ensuring the most effective assistance;
(b) To mobilize, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of the various
organizations of the United Nations system in response to a request for
disaster assistance from a stricken State;
(c) To co-ordinate United Nations assistance with assistance given by
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, in particular by
the International Red Cross;
(d) To receive, on behalf of the Secretary-General, contributions offered
to him for disaster relief assistance to be carried out by the United Nations, its agencies and programmes for particular emergency situations;
(e) To assist the Government of the stricken country to assess its relief
and other needs and to evaluate the priority of those needs, to disseminate
that information to prospective donors and others concerned, and to serve
as a clearing-house for assistance extended or planned by all sources of
external aid;
(f) To promote the study, prevention, control and prediction of natural
disasters, including the collection and dissemination of information concerning technological developments;
(g) To assist in providing advice to Governments on pre-disaster plan-
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cipient governments to cooperate with UNDRO by appointing a
single national disaster relief coordinator, stockpiling emergency
supplies, informing UNDRO in advance of facilities and services
available and taking other preparedness measures. 78 Moreover,
the General Assembly has not only invited governments to adopt
legislative measures to aid the disaster relief process,5 79 but also
has offered several recommendations to nations: 1) waiver of visa
requirements applicable to relief personnel; 2) relaxation of air
traffic regulations and procedures for flights carrying emergency
aid; and 3) designation of free or reduced airfares for relief shipments and personnel. 58 0
Although the U.N. recommendations are helpful, the dearth of
relevant law nonetheless hinders the expediency of disaster relief.
International disaster relief laws regulating the relationships between donor and recipient states and coordinating international
responses to disaster relief are needed to prevent and mitigate
disasters.5 81

ning in association with relevant voluntary organizations, particularly with
the League of Red Cross Societies, and to draw upon United Nations resources available for such purposes;
(h) To acquire and disseminate information relevant to planning and
coordinating disaster relief, including the improvement and establishment
of stockpiles in disaster-prone areas, and to prepare suggestions to ensure
the most effective use of available resources;
(i) To phase out relief operations under his aegis as the stricken country
moves into the stage of rehabilitation and reconstruction, but to continue
to interest himself, within the framework of his responsibilities for relief,
in the activities of the United Nations agencies concerned with rehabilitation and reconstruction;
(j) To prepare an annual report for the Secretary-General, to be submitted to the Economic and Social Council and to the General Assembly.
G.A. Res. 2816, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 86, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 154. The United Nations also offered three recommendations to donors. These recommendations were "intended
to ensure greater suitability of relief contributions, a more rapid response to the
most essential needs, and correct notification of impending relief shipments." Id.
at 155.

581. Samuels, supra note 569, at 246-47, 254.
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3. Logistics of Administering Aid
In many African countries, though food aid is rushed to the
country's ports, distribution bottlenecks choke the relief effort.
Getting food supplies to those in need is a major challenge. As of
April 1985, of the 6.3 million tons of food aid pledged to Africa,
only 2.7 tons had been delivered.58 Some of the factors that constrain the distribution of food aid include: (1) shortage of trucks,
planes and fuel;583 (2) inadequate road structure;581 4 (3) limited capacities of warehouse facilities and ports;5 5 (4) inaccessibility of
certain regions; 586 (5) lack of coordination; and (6) insurgency587
A severe problem that creates a backlog of food at ports and
warehouses, causing food shortages at many feeding centers, is
the lack of trucks for disbursing food aid. 588 In Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, forty percent of food aid is held up at ports and
railroad terminals waiting to be moved 88 9 One reason for the
shortage of trucks in Ethiopia is the need to divert trucks to aid
the Ethiopian government's resettlement operation and to deliver
seed and fertilizer to farmers.5 90 Furthermore, shipment delays

also have occurred because starving children stop food trucks on
the road.591 Consequently, the United Nations and other international organizations threaten to delay food shipments because of
their fear of food spoilage 59 2 on the docks.5 93
582. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1985, at A3, col. 4. In June 1985, only about 4 million of the 8 million in need throughout Ethiopia were being helped due to the

shortage of transportation. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1985, at A3, col. 4. Further,
60% of the food relief delivered since December was not yet dispensed as of

June. Id. The Ethiopian Government claims that those donating food aid should
also furnish the "instrumentalities" to disburse such relief. Id.

583. See infra notes 588-603 and accompanying text.
584. See infra notes 598-99 and accompanying text.

585. See infra notes 602-03 and accompanying text.
586. See infra notes 604-09 and accompanying text.

587. See infra notes 626-29 and accompanying text.
588. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A15, col. 1. The Ethiopian army until recently was reluctant to loan any of its own trucks to the rescue effort. Anderson,
Too Little-Too Late, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 12, 1984, at 71.

589. Wash. Post, June 11, 1985, at A4, col. 5. Two hundred twenty two thousand metric tons o" :ood was backed up in Ethiopia at the entry ports o! Asab,
Massawa and Djiboutlin in June 1985. Id. With a need of about 2,500 trucks in
Ethiopia for food distribution, only 1,000 are available. Id.

590. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A15, col. 1.
591. Mayer, A Five Point Plan for Action,

NEWSWEEK,

592. See infra notes 649-51 and accompanying text.

Nov. 26, 1984, at 5.
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Moreover, fuel shortage is a major affliction of trucking fleets. 9 4
Even if truck capacity can be found, no network of roadside service can readily assist a disabled vehicle or provide a needed
spare part.59 5 Contract negotiations for truckers also may hamper
relief efforts..59 Additionally, if a relief agency wants to hire
trucks, aid programs must compete with the needs of commercial
industries. 59 7 While a country might somehow manage to obtain
the trucks, food supply distribution may still be hindered by the
lack of roads.5 98 Likewise, food relief delivery where roads do exist
also can be obstructed by traffic jams.5 99
Planes, like trucks, are desperately needed and are considered a
highly preferable means of delivering aid to those in need. 0 0 Insufficient airport capacity to unload the large number of aircraft
which transport food into African countries poses a severe problem. 0 1 Similarly, limited port and warehouse facilities hinder the

593. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A15, col. 1.
594. Although in April 1984 CARE and UNICEF signed an agreement with
Shell Oil Company for 3,000 metric tons of fuel to facilitate the operation of
machinery, this then posed the problem of installing gasoline stations. E.
Girardet, In Sudan, Aid Workers Keep On Truckin' Food to Famine Victims,
CARE in Action: Sudan (1985) [hereinafter Sudan].
595. Two hundred of the Ethiopian Relief Commission's trucks are nonoperative because of lack of spare parts. See Anderson, supra note 591, at 71. U.S.
officials have stated that the general manager of the state-run railways was responsible for delays and that their offer to fly in spare parts under a $3 million
emergency fund evoked no positive response. Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 1985, at A21,
col. 6.
596. In the Kordofan province of Sudan, trucking contract disputes delayed
deliveries of United States donated grain from Port Sudan. Wash. Post, Apr. 28,
1985, at A21, col. 5.
597. See Sudan, supra note 594, at 1.
598. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984, at A6, col. 3. See also Timberlake, Beyond
the Famine, WORLD PRESS REV., Jan. 1985, at 50. Many African countries "are

larger than most European countries-some of Sudan's provinces are larger than
France, for example, and the country is larger than all of Western Europe-and
yet their permanent roads total often a fraction of their northern counterparts."
The Nightmare of Logistics, AFRICA EMERGENCY, July 1985, at 3. Chad, for example, has a total of 100 miles of paved roads. Id. In the Kordofan province of
Sudan less than 100 kilometers of roads are paved. See FeedingProgram,supra
note 314, at 1. In Ethiopia, the closest road for half its population is a two day
hike away. Iyer, The Land of the Dead, TiM, Nov. 26, 1984, at 68.
599. See Mayer, supra note 591, at 53.
600. See Hanlon, A Race Against Time, WORLD PREss REP., Feb. 1985, at 37;
Timberlake, supra note 598, at 50.
601. See Mayer, supra note 591, at 54. In Ethiopia, at an airport normally
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delivery of food aid.6 0 2 Limited dock facilities and a small harbor

in Mauritania force ships from the United States and Europe to
dock in Dakar, Senegal, thereby detaining the delivery of food aid
to Mauritania for up to eight hours. 0
The remoteness of numerous drought-stricken areas60 4 also
poses problems which hamper food relief efforts. In Ethiopia, of
the estimated seven million people confronting starvation, only
one million are easily accessible to relief workers.6 05 Landlocked

countries 6 6 which have no "control over access to the ports from
which they must receive their food

. . .

are totally dependent on

the ability of other countries to provide the facilities they
need. 6 0 7 Chad provides in excellent example of the logistical
trap of a landlocked nation.60 8 The two closest ports to Chad are
Apapa in Nigeria and Douala in Cameroon. The journey from
Douala to Chad takes approximately a month; the trip from
Apapa to Chad, if traveled by road, requires one week. 60 9
Because relief agencies may fal to coordinate their famine re6
lief operations, overlapping efforts and inefficiency often result.

10

Other than the host government, generally no principal coordinator for all relief efforts exists.6 11 "The business of overseas disaster relief [is] one of the few remaining multi-million dollar concerns that operate[s] on such an amateur basis, with little outside
control, and few standards or sanctions. ' ' 61 2 In Ethiopia, the sysequipped to handle three to four planes a day, 54 airplanes have waited at times

to be unloaded. Id.
602. N.Y. Times,Sept. 21, 1985, at A14, col. 2.
603. CARE Inspector Ensures Food Reaches Destination,CARE In Action:
Mauritania (1985).
604. One relief worker in Ethiopia commented that the obscurity of some
areas rivals the "crossing [of] four or five grand canyons." The Nightmare of
Logistics, AFRICA EMERGENCY, July 1985, at 3.
605. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984, at A6, col. 3.
606. Four of the Shahelian countries-Chad, Mali, Niger, and Upper
Volta-are landlocked and must depend almost entirely on road and rail links to
one of the West African ports to transfer grain to their distribution centers.
607. The Nightmare of Logistics, AFRICA EMERGENCY, July 1985, at 3.
608. See id.
609. Id.
610. Gower, The Aid Failure,WORLD PRESS REP., Feb. 1985, at 39. Unlike
Ethiopia, which has a government commission to coordinate relief efforts, the
Sudanese Government has not designated a ministry to coordinate and lead the
relief effort; consequently, relief efforts are often inefficient and duplicative.
611. Id.
612. Id. "Relief Programs go badly wrong [sic] money is wasted, people die,
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tern for determining the requirements of the country's 225 feeding centers is ineffective.6 13 In part, the absence of organization
and coordination in Africa relief programs is attributable to a
lack of necessary management skills. 14 Additionally, the competition for funds among voluntary relief agencies, forcing them to
strive for recognition, further discourages coordination of agencies' efforts.6 15 Competition not only produces "redundancy and
waste;" it diverts concentration "away from real needs."6 16
4.

Intervention of Recipient Government

In addition to the mechanical, logistical and coordination
problems associated with food relief programs, efforts may also be
frustrated by the recipient countries themselves. When donor interference threatens a country's sovereignty, the donee government may respond with noncooperation or hostility. Because government invitation 617 is the customary means for the
commencement of an international relief agency's work in another
country, relief workers who do not confine their endeavors to "officially sanctioned projects" may face expulsion.6 1 Donors must
adhere to the rules and regulations that countries dictate.
The lack of cooperation by African governments in handling
emergency food supplies from donor nations may be a result of
threatened sovereignty or simply a different perception of government priorities. The Ethiopian Government at times has closed
its ports to shipments of emergency aid, instead giving priority to
cargos of fertilizer and concrete. 1 9 Moreover, some governments
and ... no institutional mechanism [exists] for insuring that such mistakes are
not repeated." Id. See also F. CuNY, supra note 5, at 127-28.
613. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at A15, col. 2.
614. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1985, at A19, col. 5. Similarly, relief agents in
Mexico have claimed that both insufficient communication and lack of coordination in dilapidated areas have obstructed aid efficiency. See Barber, World
Ready to Help If Mexico Makes Request, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1985, at A18,
cols. 4-6.
615. DISASTER ASSISTANCE 18 (L. Stephens & S. Green eds. 1979). See also F.
CUNY, supra note 5, at 130-32.
616. See F. CUNY, supra note 5, at 130-31.
617. Green, INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF 60 (1977) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF].
618. See Cooper, supra note 147, at 68.
619. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at A15, col. 1. The delay in unloading emergency food aid may cost a donor $5,000 per day. Id. See also Karlen & Greenberg, The Deadly Politics of African Aid Efforts, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1985, at 37
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have utilized their resources to emphasize political or religious
celebrations, instead of allocating them for the distribution of relief. For example, in Ethiopia, although millions of its citizens
were facing food shortages, the government concentrated on commemorating its tenth anniversary in power, a celebration which
reportedly cost $100 million.62 0 The Sudanese government also
has delayed food transportation by permitting a major railroad to
transport "religious festive goods" rather than food supplies.6 2 1
Finally, a missing document or one lacking
a signature may pre62 2
vent the distribution of food relief.
Donor assistance or interference may result in hostile reactions
from the recipient government, especially when the donee country
is already experiencing civil strife. For example, in Ethiopia, internal war between government troops and anti-government
rebels in the northern regions of Eritrea and Tigre prevented relief programs from functioning. Government attacks on trucks
carrying relief supplies to famine victims in rebel-held areas are
evidence that the Ethiopian Government has impeded and refused food aid delivery to these provinces.2 s The Ethiopian Government in January 1985 appropriated both the cargo and crew of
an Australian ship carrying food aid intended for guerrilla-held
areas because it charged that donor food aid delivery to the wartorn provinces was a violation of Ethiopian sovereignty and an
interference with its internal affairs. 24 In addition, Ethiopia does
not allow humanitarian agencies unrestricted passage to guerrilla-

[hereinafter The Deadly Politics]; African Famine, 1985 FACTS ON FILE 221
[hereinafter African Famine].

620. Millions Starve in Ethiopia as Drought Intensifies, 1985 FACTS ON FILE
889; Africa's Agony Stirs the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 12, 1984, at
14,
621. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
622, See The Deadly Politics, supra note 619, at 37.
623. See Murphy, Bare Cupboard, TIME, Dec. 10, 1984, at 44 ; Iyer, supra
note 591, at 68; Africa's Agony Stirs the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
12, 1984, at 14; Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1985, at A20, col. 2. "Part of a cargo of
emergency supplies destined for refugee camps in Sudan was seized by Ethiopian officials from a West German vessel in mid-January. The supplies were
released when the charitable organization which had donated them agreed to reconsign the cargo to Ethiopia." 31 KEESINGS CONTEmp. ARCHIVES 33384 (1985).
Also, the government in Zimbabwe has, in the past, stopped food shipments to

areas held by anti-government rebels in the Matabeland Province.
624. Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1985, at A32, col. 4. See also Harden, Despite Vast
U.S. Aid, Ethiopia Stays Hostile, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1985, at A33, col. 1.
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held areas because the methods of executing the humanitarian
objectives of an international disaster relief system are frequently
perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of its nation. 25
It is not only government officials, 26 but also guerrillas that

hamper food delivery; in the Tigre province a rebel faction allegedly prevented the hungry from travelling to government relief
centers located in the southern region. 27 Guerrillas have on occasion impeded relief efforts by delaying relief vehicles and assailing
food aid disbursement centers.628 Consequently, aid trucks are
avoiding the most dangerous areas and many starving victims are
thus being cut off from regular food supplies. Even if food aid
does arrive in guerrilla-held areas, monitoring it to ensure that
famine victims receive the food instead of rebels is virtually impossible. 29 In an effort to combat guerrilla troops, the Ethiopian
Government expends two times the amount of funds it disperses
on agriculture to subsidize its military, and consequently desper6 30
ately needed food is taken from the mouths of famine victims.
Corrupt African governments also impede food distribution 6 3 1

Some African governments themselves are reportedly the recipients of disappearing food aid.6 32 Exchanges of emergency grain

625. INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF, supra note 617, at 63.
626. Relief Agencies, middlemen and railway workers have also been accused
of corruption. The International Christian Aid (ICA) has allegedly misdirected
relief funds. Spring, InterAid Activities Provoke a Federal Investigation,CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 1, 1985, at 36. Relief workers in Sudan claimed that "shipaents of food and other goods sent by relief agencies in 1984 had never reached
the refugees because they have been diverted by middlemen and sold on the
open market." N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at A10, col. 4. Also in Sudan, relief
workers have claimed corruption on behalf of persons operating the railway.
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1985, at All, col. 1.
627. See Murphy, supra note 623, at 44. Tigrean Rebels have halted trucks
carrying refugees and set them on fire after disembarking refugees. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1984, at A20, col. 3.
628. Starvation in Africa, AMERICA, June 16, 1984, at 450. See also N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1985, at A13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
Guerrillas ambushed five crewmen flying a cargo plane to the region of Wollo in
Ethiopia. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at A7, col. 5.
629. Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1985, at A32, col. 1.
630. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1985, at A3, col. 2.
631. See African Famine, supra note 619, at 221.
632. See The Deadly Politics, supra, note 619, at 38. By May 1985, 30,000
tons of food in Ethiopia were disappearing each month. N.Y. Times, May 29,
1985, at A9, col. 1.
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supplies for arms are alleged to have occurred. 3 3 It has been alleged that the European Community's food supplies to Sudan
were delayed due to the Sudanese government's desire to sell
such aid through the "open market" instead of delivering it to
famine victims.6 34 In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Government has diverted food aid to its army.6 35 In Korem, Ethiopian people are
unable to obtain food unless they either (1) move to the resettlement areas; or (2) pay the Farm Administration. 36 Similarly, in
Mexico, policemen in search of bribes6 37 and food stolen from
Mexico City's airport 3 ' also have hampered aid relief to victims.
Even recipient government efforts to compensate may have disastrous results for relief programs. Some African countries have
instituted resettlement programs to move famine victims to more
fertile lands, but this too may create food distribution problems.
In Ethiopia, for example, relief workers have alleged that starving
victims were denied food if they did not cooperate and board vehicles used in the government's resettlement program.6 39 Diplomats also have decried the rapidity of the Ethiopian Government's resettlement program claiming that "[b]y moving too
many people too fast, without adequate preparation or sufficient
resources and infrastructure in place, . . . the Government is not
only endangering the success of the resettlement effort but also
jeopardizing the continuing emergency relief program. 6 40 Frequently, farmers are not given the tools and seeds essential to resettlement; thus, the resources utilized in the resettlement program, which are diverted from drought victims, benefit no one.6 1
The huge amount of food relief donated to Africa each year assists in alleviating starvation, but in turn it allows or even induces
the recipient African governments to follow policies which ignore

633. See African Famine, supra note 619, at 221.
634. Id.
635. Zimbabwe-Internal Security, Politicaland Economic Development, 29
KEESINGS CONTEMP. ARCHIVES 32240 (1983).

636. Cry, The PitilessLand, LIFE, May 1985, at 126-27. The European Community donated the grain, which allegedly was re-exported to Russia in ex-

change for weapons.
637. Cody, Mexicans Blame Bureaucrats,Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1985, at A17,

col. 3.
638. Id.
639. Cry, The Pitiless Land, LIFE, May 1985, at 126-27.
640. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at A6, col. 3.
641. Accord, Iyer, supra note 598, at 67-68.
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the problems of food production and agriculture.64 2 Specifically,
"[flood aid has . . .enabled some . . .governments to postpone
essential agricultural reforms, to give low priority to agricultural
investment, and to maintain a pricing system which gives farmers
inadequate incentives to increase local production. ' 643 Furthermore, African dependency on food aid impedes the discovery of
64
long-term solutions to facilitate self-sufficiency.
Finally, the recipient government's perception of relief efforts
presents an intangible yet undeniable problem. For example,
some African nations have viewed the United States' contributions of aid negatively. Despite the United States' position as
Ethiopia's principal supplier of food aid, Ethiopia clearly denounces United States efforts and instead remains closely aligned
with the Soviet Union, which donates only a "fraction" of United
States contributions. 45 In diplomatic negotiations between Ethiopia and Western donors, Ethiopia has often criticized both the
lack and the inadequacy of Western efforts. 4
5.

Miscellaneous Forces

In addition to logistical and government-inflicted problems, refugee immigration, weather, and the spoilage of food generate further problems for relief efforts. Even if governmental and logistical problems are overcome, operating forces nonetheless remain
uncontrollable. In Sudan, refugees from Chad and Ethiopia drain
the country's food supply. 47 Sudan's concern is that the continuing influx of refugees and the effect of their presence on its economy may overwhelm the nation. 4 Rotting food, piled up on the
docksides6 49 because of the lack of means to move it inland, cre-

642.
at 43.
643.
644.
645.

Shepard, When Foreign Aid Fails, THE ATLANTIC

MONTHLY,

Apr. 1985,

Id.
See Mayer, supra note 591, at 55.
Africa's Need for Food Tests Limits of U.S. Emergency Aid, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Feb. 1, 1985, at 53.
646. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
647. In January of 1985, Sudan was experiencing an influx of 3,000 Ethiopians a day. Randal, Sudan's Burden Grows Heavier, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1985,
at Al, col. 1.
648. Id.
649. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1985, at A6, col. 3; See Murphy, supra note
623, at 44.
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ates another pressing dilemma.6 50 Loads of food relief sit on docks
for weeks and remain unprotected from the brutal heat and sunlight, and as a result, the bags break open and the food spoils.651
Rain not only ruins unshielded food, 652 but it also washes out railroad tracks 653 and makes clay roads impassable thereby obstructing food relief distribution.
B.

The Suggested Reforms

To suggest that definitive solutions exist to a situation of this
magnitude is presumptuous. A number of suggestions have been
made, however, that involve donative aid on some level. Those set
forth below are not meant to be comprehensive. Rather, they
identify themes that reappear in discussions of the reform of
United States donative aid laws. Many of these suggestions come
from private voluntary organizations. Members of these organizations who are directly involved with the recipient countries are
uniquely qualified to identify aspects of the laws which are effective or ineffective and to suggest ways in which laws can be improved. Unlike legislators, whose knowledge of a disaster is received at best second-hand, PVO workers actually view the
results of the implementation of a particular law or program.
Moreover, private voluntary organizations are far less concerned
with the political ramifications of food aid than are legislators.6 5
Legislators are often qualified to make recommendations from a
political or budgetary perspective; private organizations may better understand how to incorporate those concerns into programs
that truly have the best interests of the hungry in mind.
The first set of recommendations suggests modification of
650. See supra notes 588-603 and accompanying text.
651. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at 3, col. 3.
652. Id.
653. May, Sudan's Need: A Fast Track For Food Aid, N.Y. Times, July 2,
1985, at All, col. 1.
654. Oxfam-America, headquartered in Boston, is an example of a PVO
which is involved on a "grass roots" level with poor countries. Oxfam neither
seeks nor accepts P.L. 480 funds because it contends that the policies behind the
law adversely affect the law's role in development. Food Aid and the Role of the
PVOs, supra note 4, at 87 (statement of Colleen Westbrook, Public Policy and
Research Coordinator, Oxfam-America) [hereinafter Westbrook statement].
Those policies are the use of food aid to increase demand for United States farm
products and the use of food aid to promote United States foreign policy. Id. at

88-89.
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United States aid laws and the execution of programs under
them; the second set of recommendations examines proposals for
the establishment of international humanitarian rules for adoption by nations or organizations to facilitate relief. The third set
of recommendations proposes coordination of relationships between donor states and organizations and between donors and recipients. This third set of recommendations also proposes coordination of relationships within donor states and organizations and
within recipient states. The final recommendation emphasizes the
necessity of establishing a nexus between emergency aid and
development.
1. Modification of Aid Laws and Programs
a. Enhancement of Monetization
Food aid may be viewed as a resource for development 5 and
as a component of an overall plan for world food security rather
than as an isolated ingredient.656 Selling or bartering some of the
food available as food aid could implement and sustain foreign
'programs such as nutrition education, basic health care, water
57
management, agricultural extension, and small-scale credit.
The needs of the recipient, however, must be taken into account
as well. The amount of food that can be sold before local prices
are depressed depends upon the recipient country's market; 58 a
provision which sets a percentage applicable to all countries will
not reflect the ability of a particular nation's market to absorb
monetization of that amount of food. Therefore, Title II language
allowing monetization should be made more concrete, 5 9 and per655. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 27 (prepared
statement of Robert J. McCloskey, Senior Vice President for External Affairs,
Catholic Relief Services) [hereinafter McCloskey statement].
656. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 91 (Westbrook
statement, supra note 654). See also Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra
note 4, at 4 (statement of Daniel G. Amstutz, Under Secretary, International
Affairs and Commodity Program, United States Department of Agriculture)
[hereinafter Amstutz statement]; Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra
note 4, at 73 (prepared statement of Charles L. Sykes, Assistant Executive Director, CARE) [hereinafter Sykes statement].
657. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 26 (McCloskey
statement, supra note 655); Food Aid and the role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at
91 (Westbrook statement, supra note 654).
658. Id.
659. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 91 (Westbrook
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haps a minimum percentage could be established so that the impact on the individual recipient could be assessed.660 Monetization of section 416, not currently authorized, could offset costs of
distribution, inland transportation and processing costs of the
section 416 commodities, as well as finance nutrition education.6
b. Establishment of Multiyear
Assistance

Agreements and Increased

Planning future food assistance programs is impossible if funding varies from year-to-year. Thus, to enhance the law's development capability, Title II should be committed on a multi-year ba6
sis.*
2 Also, emergency assistance limits should be increased to
avoid the need for Congress to pass supplemental bills to cover
actual emergency needs, which not only delays but often holds
emergency assistance "hostage" to other political concerns. 683
c. Separation of Public Law 480 and Increase of Title II Minimum Tonnage
Oxfam America recommends the separation of the Title II program from the remaining provisions of Public Law 480; separating
it completely would emphasize nonpolitical aspects and lend
credence to nonpolitical goals."6 The increase of the Title II minimum tonnage has implications for both developmental and emergency food assistance. One argument is that an increase of the 1.7
million ton minimum would give the program the added flexibility it needs6 65 Such an increase would reflect the United States'
willingness and ability to take a leading role in combatting hunger and malnutrition and providing emergency assistance. Furstatement, supra note 654). Westbrook favors the use of direct cash aid to either
monetization or direct food aid. Id.
660, Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 26 (McCloskey
statement, supra note 655.
661. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 73 (Sykes statement, supra note 656).
662. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 72 (McCloskey
statement, supra note 655). See also, Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra
note 4, at 73 (Sykes statement, supra note 659).
663. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 95 (Westbrook
statement, supra note 654).
664. Id.
665. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 73 (Sykes statement, supra note 656).
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thermore, because motivation to provide assistance may diminish
once the minimum required tonnage is met, an increase in the
minimum tonnage would ensure that a needy country receives an
adequate amount of food assistance.
A counter argument is that a minimum tonnage level only reinforces legislators' views of food aid as surplus-motivated. 6 Instead, food aid should be allocated on the basis of the realistic
needs of the recipient country and not on other motives such as
the availability of United States farm surpluses. 6
d.

Expansion of the Section 416 Program

Section 416 is a more flexible program than Public Law 480 because, unlike Title II, it does not require the appropriations process.6 6 8 Currently this law authorizes the release of wheat as well
as dairy products, although wheat has not yet been shipped under
that program. The use of section 416 could be expanded, as a supplement to Title II, to include the shipment of wheat, incorporating Title II protections against market disruption and disincentives to local production. 669 Also, as mentioned previously,
permitting section 416 to allow the sale or barter of some commodities could defray costs of implementation as well as finance
development projects. 7
Unfortunately, the increased usage of section 416 to feed the
world's hungry encounters practical limitations due to federal
budget accounting practices. Section 416 expenses are repaid to
the CCC from the agricultural account and therefore compete for
limited resources with domestic programs such as farm price supports. Alternatively, Public Law 480 is financed from the foreign
affairs and foreign assistance accounts. 7 1

666. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 92 (Westbrook
statement, supra note 654).
667. Id.
668. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Title II appropriations process.
669. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 72 (McCloskey
statement, supra note 655).
670. See generally supra notes 17-68 and accompanying text.
671. See Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 4-5 (Amstutz
statement, supra note 656).
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2.

Proposal of International Humanitarian Measures

a.

Establishment of United Nations Humanitarian Order

Over the years, the United Nations has repeatedly requested
that its members cooperate in the development of international
law for disaster relief. In a 1983 appeal, the United States was the
only state to vote against such a proposal. 2 The General Assemdiscussed a declaration for a new hubly in its fortieth session
6 3
order.
manitarian
Before discussing the proposal, the Assembly requested and received the comments of various nations on such a declaration. 4
In his Report, the Secretary-General stated that article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives everyone a right "to
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food. .... ,675 Certain countries suggested codification of this right and other humanitarian
ideals into a governing declaration or model law. An effort to codify is currently being considered and several proposals to that effect have been submitted to the General Assembly by the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic andSocial
672. Strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to respond

to naturaldisasters and other disastersituations,G.A. Res. 202, 38 U.N. GAOR
Press Release (Jan. 13, 1984) at 309, 310, U.N. Press Release GA/6935 (1984).

673. New InternationalHumanitarianOrder,Report of the Secretary-General Part One, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. No. A/40/348 (1985).

674. New InternationalHumanitarianOrder,Report of the Secretary-General Part Two: Views and Comments Received from Governments, U.N. GAOR,

U.N. Doc. A/40/348/Add.1 (1985). Issues raised were the needs for further study,
for international standards, for early-warning systems and for co-ordination.
The United States recommended that internationally recognized procedures for
emergency relief be formulated, but expressed doubt whether a broadly drafted

declaration would actually have any effect. Id. at 34. The Sudan contended that
serious problems such as drought, desertification and food shortages needed immediate attention. Id. at 26. Governments responding were Australia, Austria,
Barbados, Belgium, Brukina Faso (formerly the Upper Volta), Burundi, Canada,
Central African Republic, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger-

many, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United
Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

675. New InternationalHumanitarian Order Part One, supra note 673, at
14. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217/A, U.N. Doc. A/

810 (1948), sets forth the right to be free from hunger, but these rights are
unenforceable.
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Council. 6 Other countries stressed that a current international
framework exists in the form of UNDRO, UNHCR, and the
ICRC, and that current principles and norms for regulating humanitarian affairs already exist. These countries stressed implementation of and compliance with the already existing principles.'" Thus, the United Nations' efforts to promote a new
international humanitarian order which might provide better disaster relief or less of a need for such assistance have so far resulted in only a re-evaluation by governments of the humanitarian issues addressing today's society. The difficulty of obtaining
voluntary compliance, enforceability, and agreement between nations probably renders insufficient any attempts to improve the
human condition, and specifically the problems of responding to
disasters, by the drafting of declarations. Still, a declaration may
initiate a long-term plan to improve disaster response and certainly will serve as a basis for further evaluation of the problems
resulting from disaster assistance.
b.

Enactment of International Law Association Model Rules

In the early 1970s, the International Law Association's (ILA)
Committee on International Medical and Humanitarian Law
studied the legal problems of disaster relief operations and
drafted a model agreement to regulate technical problems such as
the distribution of aid. 7 s Based upon relief agreements which actually have been used in relief situations, the provisions of the
agreement are only applicable to donors which are states or intergovernmental organizations.6 79
In 1980, the ILA revised the Model Agreement,68 0 which now
consists of four sections. Section I regulates the execution of the
relief effort. Under Article 1, the recipient state may request specific aid, in specific locations.6 81 Article 2 requires the donor state
to respect the laws of the recipient state and to maintain a

676. New InternationalHumanitarian Order Part One, supra note 673, at
14.
677. Id. at 36. The existing principles were not specified.
678. 58 INT'L L. A. 461-72 (1978).
679. Bothe, International Medical and HumanitarianLaw, 59 INT'L L. A.
520, 526-27 (1980).
680. See id. at 521-27; Resolutions, InternationalMedical and Humanitarian Law, 59 INT'L L. A. 5, 5-7 (1980).
681. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 153.
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nonpolitical position. 8 2 Article 3 provides for the appointment of
a central relief director over the relief unit, while Article 4 grants
privileges and immunities to the relief organization. Articles 5
through 9 govern the provision of facilities, importation of food,
access to telecommunications, freedom of movement of relief personnel and assistance from local authorities. Under Article 10, either a relief agency of the recipient state or the foreign relief organization under the supervision of local authorities may
distribute aid. Article 11 requires communication between the director of the relief organization and the authorities of the recipiin Section I, Article 12, concerns
ent state. 8 3 The final provision
4
financial responsibility.
Section II governs the actions and treatment of relief personnel.
Article 13 defines the members of the mission and compels them
to respect national law. 5 Under Article 14, personnel are exempt
from immigration requirements. Article 15 requires relief workers
to wear a distinctive emblem or a uniform. The third section addresses compensation for injuries, liability incurred by either
party and settlement of disputes. Article 18, the last in Section
IV, governs the duration and termination of the agreement. 6
c. Publication of United Nations Institute for Training and Research Model Rules
Published in 1982687 by the U.N. Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the "Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations" have a dual function: to augment the inadequate regulation
in international humanitarian law of assistance to victims of disasters and to surmount some of the legal restrictions and bureaucratic impediments which hinder the success of relief endeavors.6 8 The Model Act consists of three categories of rules, each of
which is applicable to a particular class of potential parties. 8 9
The first category contains an agreement between the donor

682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id. See also Baradei, Model Rules for DisasterRelief Operations,Policy & Efficacy Studies, 8 UNITAR 3 (1982).
689. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 248, at 155.
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state and the recipient state which regulates the provision of assistance. In the second category is an agreement between a donor
organization, either governmental or nongovernmental, and the
recipient state which also regulates the provision of aid. The
agreement in the third category, between a donor state or organization or a recipient state and a state, governs the transportation
of assistance. 9 0 UNITAR designed the Model Rules to regulate
immediate relief, not to address disaster prevention or post-disaster rehabilitation. 9 1 Thus, the rules establish procedures to expedite the distribution of aid in the event of a disaster. For example, Model Rule 1 provides that the recipient state is to designate
a national relief director to coordinate relief operations. 92 Model
Rule 3 requires the distribution of supplies without discrimination. 93 Similarly, Rules 4 through 17 govern the packaging, transportation, and importation of supplies, as well as the treatment of
personnel.694 The UNITAR proposals emphasize practical, non8
controversial rules.

95

Although international law regulating disaster relief is strongly
needed, few states have hastened to accept the ILA or UNITAR
conventions. International law is needed to establish a state's legal obligation (1) to assist another in disaster, (2) to prepare for
disaster relief within its borders and (3) to accept relief from donors when the state suffers a disaster. 96 The enactment of international law defining such responsibilities will expedite disaster
aid and more lives will be saved.
3.

Coordination of Relationships

a. Institution of Agreements Between Donor Nations
Although an immediate response to a disaster is often difficult
to institute, the agreements mentioned in Section III can provide
guidance for measures that should be taken in the event of future
690.
691.
692.
693.

Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.

694. Id.
695. Id. The Model Rules have foundations on the Principles and Rules for
Red Cross disaster relief and the Red Cross Declaration of Principles for Relief
to the Civilian Population of 1969, as well as General Assembly Res. 2816
(XXVI) of 1971. Id.
696. Samuels, supra note 569, at 263.
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disasters. Another approach of interest was instituted in an agreement between the United States and Mexico that was later repealed;6 97 the agreement attempted to establish the means and
procedures for mutual relief in the event of a disaster or catastrophe."9 8 The agreement created a joint committee composed of
representatives from both countries. The task of this committee
was to prepare a study of "the measures that [could] be applied
in emergency cases and that [could] serve as a guide to the authorities of the two countries at the national, state, and municipal
levels."6 99 Though not all nations may desire to establish such
committees, other solutions may be viable to ease the flow of aid.
In order to improve the mechanisms for the food aid distribution, all nations must participate in the negotiation and execution
of multilateral agreements. Many nations, however, are extremely
wary about entering into multilateral aid agreements; sovereigns
are concerned about the entrance of foreign aid workers during a
time of disaster and the possibility that unfriendly governments
will interfere with their sovereignty. One possible solution to
these concerns is the enactment of a multilateral treaty which
provides for the establishment of a commission composed of
countries representing numerous political blocs. In the event of a
disaster, a recipient country could select certain member states
through which all aid would flow. The recipient nation would no
longer fear that hostile nations would impinge on its sovereignty;
yet all necessary relief could still be sent to the disaster area. If
the nations selected to channel aid into the country had difficulties in meeting all the requirements, other signatories could assist
in funding the relief efforts. Enactment of procedures for emergency relief in advance of disasters could prove to be of great benefit to all disaster victims.
b.

Coordination of Efforts of Various Donors

To effectuate delivery of food aid, the competition for success
and recognition among relief agencies must be lessened so that
cooperation will be enhanced rather than discouraged.70 0 The establishment of the OEOA has proven to be an effective method of
697. Disaster Assistance, May 3, 1968, United States-Mexico, 19 U.S.T. 4810,
T.I.A S. 6481 (repealed Jan. 15, 1980).
698.' Id. at 4812.
699. Id. at 4813.
700. See F.

CUNY,

supra note 5, at 130.
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coordinating the relief efforts of PVOs, IGOs and governments.
As stated above, the existence of the OEOA is limited to the duration of the African crisis. Nonetheless, perhaps the U.N. should
extend the life of the OEOA, or at least assist another group of
nations or some other organization in the creation of a similar
permanent office of emergency operations. This office could implement predisaster planning, in order to assure carefully chosen
strategies instead of hasty responses.7 01 Moreover, during a disas-

ter, the office could solicit regular and comprehensive reports
from the recipient government concerning the needs of victims,
effectuating more efficient use of available supplies. Such an office
could prove an invaluable vehicle for the coordination of emergency operations.
c. Restructure of Hierarchy Within PVOs and Training of
Workers
To facilitate the efficiency of food aid distribution, "choices
must be made at the field level, and the people making these
choices need a supportive, not restrictive, framework of rules,
procedures, and policies to assist in this process. ' ' 70 2 To imple-

ment such a scheme, a few relief agencies have investigated and
initiated three approaches.7 0 3 The first approach enables field

workers with prior sanction from headquarters officials to make
immediate "on-the-spot decisions.

' 70 4

The second approach al-

lows for a quicker response in times of emergency because rather
than transmitting data to the headquarters for execution, the
headquarters dispatch specialists to the scene with the authority
to make most decisions.70 5 The third approach focuses on the restructuring of organizations to execute the majority of resolutionmaking abroad.70 6 Better training for relief-agency personnel

could also expedite food-relief distribution. Relief agencies usually conduct an orientation program for new personnel regarding
agency procedure, but they seldom conduct training regarding approaches to be taken, strategies to be used, and potential
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.

See id. at 132.
See id. at 125.
See id. at 126.
Id. Oxfam and CARE have implemented the "devolution" approach.
Id.
Id. Church World Service has taken this approach.
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problems encountered in a disaster management situation. 70 7
d. Modification of Recipient Nation's Response to Influx of
Workers and Aid
'The response of recipient nations to the influx of relief workers
and emergency aid varies. In regions fraught with civil or political
strife, such as Ethiopia, relief workers are frequently unable to,
fulfill their obligations to disaster victims. Thus, recipient governments should negotiate with rebels to permit the entry of relief
workers into such regions. Yet even workers who are permitted
access to the region cannot execute their duties with inadequate
systems of delivery. Thus, grain should be positioned overseas for
ready access.7 81 Furthermore, recipient governments should discharge army trucks for the delivery of food and improve the
schedule of port facilities to eliminate wasteful congestion in
harbors. Steps such as these to improve the distribution of relief
in Africa are strictly logistical and could be implemented
immediately.
4.

Establishment of Nexus
Development

Between

Emergency

Aid and

Oxfam views short-term emergency relief aid as the most effective use of food aid. 0 9 Because a disaster does not always disrupt
food supplies, however, sending food aid in any emergency may
only depress local prices and hamper rather than encourage overall recovery.7 10 Furthermore, a reasonable termination date for
the provision of food aid should be established so that people can
prepare to provide for themselves again; prolonging food aid only
reinforces the perception that relief and feeding centers are permanent.7 11 Above all, relief must be coupled with recovery assistance in the form of seeds, tools and animals.71 2 While emergency
food assistance should be adequate and timely, it should also be
707. Id. at 136.
708. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 95 (Westbrook
statement, supra note 654).

709. Id. at 93.
710. Id. Ms. Westbrook cites the Guatemalan earthquake in 1976 as an example. See supra note 657 and accompanying text.
711. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 7, at 94 (Westbrook
statement, supra note 654).
712. Id.
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coordinated with local crop and development programs to ensure
that it facilitates recovery.
V.

LEGAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES OVER AID AGREEMENTS

In foreign aid agreements between states and international organizations, the donor state promises either a nonrefundable
monetary amount, a credit, other services or other contributions.71" These agreements indicate the purpose of the aid and the
specific projects for which the aid is intended.7 14 Even if the recipient state receives the aid without having to repay, the agreement is a binding contract, not a gift. The recipient state's consideration may be, for example, its obligation to provide necessary
materials and experts, exempt materials from customs and taxes,
distribute the emergency aid as specified, or fulfill other provi71 5
sions of the agreement.
Foreign aid agreements raise several types of legal issues: (1)
the applicable law; (2) the liberty of the recipient state to dispose
of the aid as it chooses; (3) the preservation of donor states' interests; (4) privileges and immunities for deliveries; and (5) "the political conditions which may be linked with the conclusion of aid
agreements. 7 11 When disputes arise over such issues, the parties
may seek resolution in several types of fora. This section discusses the choice of applicable law and examines the various fora.
A.

Choice of Applicable Law

Most aid agreements today do not state the law applicable to
them. Thus, the concept that the municipal laws of one of the
participating states control the implementation of the provisions
of an aid agreement is no longer valid.
Instead, international
law generally is applied to foreign aid agreements. The sources of
international law are the constitution of the donor organization,
customary law, treaties and various human rights covenants.7 18
Nonetheless, the agreement may designate that certain provisions
7 19
are governed by state law.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.

8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Dolzer ed. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239.
Id.
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (Dolzer ed. 1985).
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (Dolzer ed. 1985).

446

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19.333

B. Judicial Arenas for Dispute Resolution
1. The International Court of Justice
a. Organization and Procedure of the Court
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) consists of fifteen
judges elected by the United Nations General Assembly and the
Security Council.7 20 Members of the U.N. nominate the candi-

dateS7 21 and the General Assembly and Security Council elect
them. Only one national from each state may sit on the panel. 22
own
The judges must meet the qualifications necessary in their
7 23
offices.
judicial
highest
the
to
appointment
for
countries
Official Court languages are French and English.2 The Court
of the Court
settles disputes over its jurisdiction. A majority vote7 25
rules and a party may not appeal a Court decision.

b.

Competence of the Court
The substantive law applied by the Court is set forth in Article

38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.7

26

The

720. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 3, para. 1, Documents
of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco,
1945), vol. 15, p. 355, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 61 (Rosenne ed. 1974) [hereinafter Statute]. Of the judges elected at the
first election, five are elected for three-year terms and five are elected for sixyear terms based on the drawing of lots. Id., art. 13, paras. 1-2. The judges of the
Court may not be removed which assures their independence. Id., art. 18, para.
1.
721. Statute, supra note 721, at art. 4, para. 1.
722. Id., art. 3, para. 1. "Judges with the same nationality as one of the parties do not have to disqualify themselves, but the opposing party can then
choose a judge of the same nationality from a list of qualified candidates." Id.,
art. 31, paras. 1-2.
723. Id., art. 2. The judges have diplomatic privileges and immunity when
engaged in court business. See id. art. 19. They meet at The Peace Palace in
The Hague. See id. art. 22, para. 1.
724. Another language may be used if the Court consents to it and the parties agree as well. G. ELIAN, THE. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 56 (1971). See
Statute, supra note 720, art. 39, paras. 1-2.
725. Statute, supra note 720, art. 60.
726. According to article 38, paragraph 1:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
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statute compels the Court to apply first any bilateral or multilateral international treaties, which the two parties accept as binding upon them. Thereafter the Court may examine customary international law applicable to the case. "Either in addition to, or
in the absence of these two sources, the Court may [seek] general
principles of law commonly recognised as law by the international
1 27
legal community. 7
Procedural rules of the Court are set forth in the Resolution
Concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court72 8 and in
the new Rules of Court adopted on April 14, 1978 which came
into force on July 1, 1978.729 The Statute and the U.N. Charter
authorize and establish the organization, general principles and
regulations of the Court.7 30 A nation may receive Court approval
to deviate from the Rules of the Court, but not from any require731
ments set forth in the Statute.
All countries which are parties to the Statute may seek redress
in the International Court of Justice. Only nations, however, may
be parties to litigation; thus, an individual who or a corporation
which has a dispute with a nation must persuade its own government to represent its interests.73 2 Members of the U.N. are automatically parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; a nonmember state may become a party to the Statute upon
recommendation of the Security Council.7 33 No state may be a
party in litigation before the ICJ without first consenting in a
preliminary agreement that the ICJ will have jurisdiction in present or future litigation. This agreement is necessary to establish

law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and]
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
727.

T.

ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPO-

13-14 (1983).
728. Reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 207
(Rosenne ed. 1974) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
729. ELIAS, supra note 727, at 13. The old rules are reprinted in DOCUMENTS,

RARY PROBLEMS

supra note 728, at 91.
730. Both are reprinted in DOCUMENTS,supra note 728, at 59 and 1 respec-

tively. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 7, para. 1, arts. 92-93.
731. :ELIAN, supra note 724, at 60.
732. Daly, Can One Court Reach Around the World, 8 UPDATE
Statute, supra note 720, art. 34, para. 1.
733. ELIAN, supra note 724, at 45. U.N. CHARTER, art. 93.

2,

4 (1984).
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ICJ competency.7 34 Moreover, a party to the Statute may consent
to compulsory jurisdiction under the following Optional Clause,
under which a party recognizes
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of treaties;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation; and
to be made for the
d. the nature or extent of the reparation
35
breach of an international obligation.
Twenty-five states have agreed to compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court under the Optional Clause.7 3 6 Compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court may also be accepted through a preliminary declaration73 7 granting jurisdiction. Both parties to a suit must have submitted such preliminary declarations. Furthermore, provisions in
treaties and conventions can also confer jurisdiction on the ICJ
for settlement of disputes. 7 38 Most nations, including the United
States and the Soviet Union, have not agreed to compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause. 38
Under the Connally Amendment of 1946, the United States refuses to submit to ICJ jurisdiction if the United States decides the
dispute is "essentially domestic or where the United States deems
that the dispute arises under a multinational treaty."7 40 According to Article 3 of the statute, however, if a party does not appear,
the ICJ can determine for itself if it has jurisdiction and proceed

734. ELIAN, supra note 724, at 53.
735. Statute, supra note 720, art. 36, para. 2.
736. Daly, supra note 732, at 4.
737. ELIAN, supra note 724, at 54. As of July 31, 1969, the following submitted such declarations: England, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Switzerland, Denmark, the Philippines, Finland, France, Gambia, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Luxemburg,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Holland,
Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, United Arab Republic, the Dominican Republic,
Salvador, Somalia, United States, Sudan, Sweden, Swaziland, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, the Cian Kai-she government of Taiwan. Forty-five states have submitted declarations; none of these are socialist nations.
738. ELIAS, supra note 727, at 42.
739. Daly, supra note 732, at 4.
740. Id.
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with the case. 41
The U.N. General Assembly or any specialized U.N. agency can
request an advisory opinion of the ICJ as to whether the U.N. or
one of its agencies acted lawfully. Individuals cannot make such
requests. Very few advisory opinions on the legality of U.N. actions have been sought. 4
Because jurisdiction is voluntary, compelling respondents to
appear in the ICJ is difficult. For example, on April 8, 1984, the
United States withdrew its consent to the Court's jurisdiction
over any dispute concerning Central America arising during the
44
next two years;743 Nicaragua's appeal to the ICJ for damages
because one of its ships hit a mine planted by the United States
Central Intelligence Agency provoked the withdrawal. Although
the United States did not appear, the Court ordered the United
States to "immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking, or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports,
'74 5
and, in particular, the laying of mines.
Moreover, the ICJ has not been used to settle international disputes to the extent originally expected. From 1945 to 1980 the
ICJ issued only thirty judgments in cases in which both parties
argued before the Court.7 46 The Court has issued only seventeen
advisory opinions and forty-four substantive orders.74 7
Even when parties do appear and utilize the Court, the enforceability of the judgment rendered is questionable. If a state accepts the Court's jurisdiction over it in a case, it must comply
with the Court's decision.746 If the state does not perform as obli-

741. Statute, supra note 720, art. 53.
742.

5

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (Dolzer ed. 1985).

743. Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the United States Attempted Withdrawal
from the Jurisdictionof the World Court in the Proceedings Initiatedby Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 295, 295 (1985). See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984 at Al,
col. 2.
744. Hassan, supra note 743, at 295.
745. Id. at 299. See N.Y. Times, May 11, 1984 at Al, col. 5. See also Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. & U.S.) 1984 I.C.J.
4, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 468, 472-74 (1984). In the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis, the United States appealed to the ICJ and Iran did not appear. Daly, supra note 732, at 6.
746. Daly, supra note 732, at 6. All 30 cases involved either "(1) Jurisdiction
over person, (2) jurisdiction over property, (3) treaties, or (4) responsibilities
(liability) for acts." Id.

747. Id.
748. ELIAS, supra note 727, at 68. See U.N.

CHARTER, art.

94.
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gated under the decision, the other party may request that the
Security Counci 49 make recommendations or decide upon measures to effectuate the judgment. 50 Unfortunately, the sanctions
of the Council, if made, will never be enforced because the United
Nations does not have the police power necessary to execute its
decisions.
Under the jurisdiction of the Court are all cases referred by the
parties and "all matters specially provided for in the charter 7 of
51
the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.

Thus, disputes over relief agreements between donor and recipient states who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court
and who are parties to the Statute may be brought before the
ICJ. Most likely, however, the states will not agree to jurisdiction
or will not comply with the judgment. Therefore, the ICJ does not
provide an adequate means of dispute resolution.
2. Domestic Courts
Complaints against nongovernmental organizations can be
brought before the courts of the state "where the acts are to be
executed"7 52 or before the courts of the recipient state.753 Com-

plaints against government organizations may also be brought in
domestic courts, if the organization's actions are sufficiently private; government organizations, however, can claim that their actions are official and not subject to the jurisdiction of national
courts. If so, then the complaint may only be brought in the judicial organ of the organization itself or in an arbitration
754
proceeding.
The laws of some countries permit a party to bring suit against
foreign sovereigns. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) governs actions against foreign sovereigns. 55 If the defendant meets the definition of a foreign state
749. ELIAS, supra note 727, at 70. "The Security Council is not obliged to
take measures for the execution of the decisions rendered by the Court." Id.
750. Id. at 68-69.
751. Statute, supra note 720, art. 36, para. 1.
752. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (Dolzer ed. 1985).
753. Id.
754. Id. at 146.
755. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2) (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611
(1985)). For a detailed discussion of FSIA, see generally 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. (Winter 1986).

19861

DISASTER RELIEF

and one of the Act's exceptions to immunity is applicable to the
defendant, the federal district courts have subject-matter juris56
diction over the action.7
The Act "codifies the doctrine of 'restrictive immunity,' which
recognizes immunity only for those acts that are public in character and sets forth criteria to distinguish public from private
acts. ''1 57 So under this doctrine, an act sufficiently commercial
75 8
may be viewed as private and not immune from suit. Most
courts treat immunity as a defense, and the burden of pleading
and proving immunity is on the defendant state.7 59 Waiver by a
state of its immunity may be explicit or implied.7 60 Failure to
raise the immunity issue at an early stage in pleading constitutes
an implied waiver.7 61 Under the Act, the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it possesses subject-matter jurisdiction and proper service has been made. 8 2
Only if sovereign immunity is not established and the country's
statutory requirements are met may a party sue a sovereign in a
United States court under the FSIA. But each country's provisions permitting suit against sovereigns are complicated and the
requirements may be difficult to meet. For example, in nations

756. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976) includes in its definition of foreign state
the political subdivisions of foreign states and agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states. Section 1603(a) defines agency or instrumentality as any entity
which is a separate legal person, an organ of a foreign state, or whose major
ownership interest is held by a foreign state, and is not otherwise a citizen of the
United States or created under the laws of some third country. 28 U.S.C. §§
1604-1605 (1976) list general exceptions to jurisdictional immunity which include: (1) waiver of immunity either explicitly or impliedly; (2) "action . . .
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
state"; (3) "rights in property taken in violation of international law"; (4) "rights
in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift"; and (5) other
actions "in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death."
757. Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A ProceduralCompass, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 385-86 (1982). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1982).
758. Kane, supra note 757, at 385-86 & n.4.
759. Id. at 415.
760. Id. at 417. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
761. Kane, supra note 757, at 417.
762. Id. at 386. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608 and 1330 (b) (1982). Separate provisions exist for service of foreign states and of agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (1982). "Personal jurisdiction requires
sufficient contacts of the defendant with the forum to assure fairness to a nonresident defending away from home." Kane, supra note 757, at 402.
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which have adopted the restrictive immunity principle, donated
aid may be considered a public act of the government and thus
subject to immunity, but loans, treaties and international sales of
relief materials may be sufficiently commercial to exempt a country or its agent from immunity. Thus, suit in a domestic court
under an act exempting sovereigns from immunity may not be a
viable method of dispute resolution.
C. Arbitration Arenas for Dispute Resolution
Although the International Court of Justice has interpreted
fewer treaties in recent years, arbitration of treaty disputes has
increased.70 3 Two types of international arbitration exist: (1) "Ad-

ministered" or "institutional arbitration", examples include established organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the London
Court of Arbitration; and (2) "Ad hoc arbitration," in which the
parties consent
to arbitration and the method of appointing
64
7

arbitrators.

Numerous advantages to institutional arbitration exist. For example, a permanent Secretariat registers the request for arbitration as well as communications between the parties. A set of procedural rules exists. The costs are predictable.7 6 5 Contracting

parties may subject their disputes to institutional arbitration by
specifying a particular administration in the contract or treaty.
To utilize ad hoc arbitration, the parties must include in their
contract an agreement that disputes, as well as the means of appointing arbitrators, will be submitted to arbitration. 6 Yet such
clauses are often inadequate. Thus, in order to facilitate the decision to utilize arbitration, the United Nations Commission on In763. Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral
Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 171, 176, n.19 (1983) (citing post-1970 treaties that
refer disputes to the International Court of Justice for Arbitration). "Although
...less than 20 post-1970 multilateral agreements referr[ed] disputes to the
International Court of Justice, more than 60 such agreements (and many bilateral agreements) refer disputes concerning their interpretation and application

to arbitration." Id. at 176 n.19.
764. Salter, International Commercial Arbitration: The Why, How and
Where, 88 Com. L.J. 381, 381 (1983).
765. Golsong, A Guide to ProceduralIssues in InternationalArbitration, 18
INT'L LAW. 633, 636 (1984).
766. Rhodes & Sloan, The Pitfalls of InternationalCommercial Arbitration,
17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 22 (1984).
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ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1976 adopted a set of arbitration rules for ad hoc use, which may be incorporated into
77
contracts. 1
Although sovereign immunity is a defense in judicial dispute
resolution, it is not a defense in arbitration. A state which consents to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator cannot avoid jurisdiction
by claiming sovereign immunity.7 Although the state is bound
contractually to comply with the arbitrator's award, the enforceability of compliance is always questionable.7 6 9
Arbitration involving a foreign state or agency of the state as a
party suggests special problems. 77 0 The state's capacity to agree
to an arbitration must be determined by the law of the state con767. Id. Contracts and treaties should address the essential elements of an
effective arbitration which include:
(1) Scope of arbitration clause:
(a) Broad: any and all disputes arising out of or relating to this
agreement;
(b) Narrow: only specific disputes.
(2) The number of arbitrators and method of their selection, with participation in the process reserved for the parties.
(3) Qualifications of arbitrators (technical, legal, business) and whether
they may act as amiables compositeurs or ex aequo et bono.
(4) Languages for arbitrators; documents, submissions, proceedings: if possible designate only one language to keep costs down.
(5) The location for arbitration, considering applicable local arbitration
law, availability of qualified local counsel, availability of secretarial or administrative staff including interpreters, and costs including transportation and housing.
(6) Form of the award: reasoned or not, by majority or unanimity (provisions for lack of unanimity), availability of dissenting opinions.
(7) Possibility of consent to immediate entry of judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction and a waiver of any or all rights to appeal in any
national court system. Id. at 44-45.
For a good discussion of the elements of an effective arbitration clause, see de
Vries, InternationalCommerical Arbitration:A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TULANE L. REv. 42, 64-79 (1982). See also Golsong, A Guide to
Procedural Issues in International Arbitration, 18 INT'L LAW. 633 passim
(1984); Park, Arbitration of International Contract Disputes, 39 Bus. LAW.
1783, 1785-89 (1984).
768. Cremades, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. CoM. L. 526, 532 (1983).
769. Id.
770. See generally Batiffol, Arbitration Clauses Concluded Between French
Government-Owned Enterprises and Foreign Private Parties, 7 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968); Cogan, Are Government Bodies Bound by Arbitration
Agreements?, 22 ARB. J. 151 (1967).
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cerned, the law of the forum in which the state is sued, and the
international conventions to which the state is a party.7 ' National laws differ, and not all states are free to arbitrate.
The advantages of domestic arbitration - finality, efficiency,
economy, and informality - do not apply to international arbitration.7 72 States often dispute the validity of the arbitration clause

or the qualifications of arbitrators."7 3 Furthermore, initial arbitration may not produce a final result. After the hearing and award a
party may appeal on grounds of fraud, mistake, error of law, or
even lack of fairness." 4 Delays in commencing and completing the

process increase due to distance, communication, and language
problems. International arbitration exceeds the expense of domestic arbitration because administration and arbitrators' fees
are higher; moreover, costs to the parties escalate because additional counsel, interpreters, translators, and transportation to the
site of arbitration are necessary. Finally, unfamiliar foreign procedural systems complicate the procedure. 75
Nonetheless, because of the unavailability of the ICJ to individuals and organizations as well as the difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over nations, 77 6 and because of the possibility of immunity

from litigation in domestic courts, arbitration may be the most
viable alternative for those seeking resolution of a dispute over an
aid agreement.77 7 The three main bodies for institutional arbitra771.
In some Western countries, such as Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom, there is no limitation on arbitrability of government
contracts. In other Western countries, government contracts are not arbitrable in the absence of a specific statute or treaty. Such is the case in
Belgium, France (domestic contracts), and Germany, as well as contracts
entered into by the federal government of the United States. In France, by
decisions of the highest court, disputes related to international commercial
contracts between the French state or state-owned enterprises and foreign
private parties are arbitrable.
de Vries, supra note 767, at 58.
772. See id. at 61.
773. Id. at 61 n.83.
774. Id.
775. Id. at 61.
776. See supra notes 754-61 and accompanying text.
777. Some regions have created their own arbitral systems. For example, the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) has centers in Kuala
Lumpar and Cairo. Wall, The Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee and
International Commercial Arbitration, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 324, 324 (1979).
The AALCC adopted UNCITRAL rules. Id. at 330.
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tion are UNCITRAL, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
1. United Nations Commission on International Trade
The United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) formulates arbitration rules for use in international and
ad hoc commercial arbitration.Vs The UNCITRAL Arbitration
RuleS71 9 were endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1976780

and have achieved international acceptance. They were followed
in 1980 by the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules.7 8 ' UNCITRAL
consists of the Rules only, not an arbitral body. Parties choose
the UNCITRAL rules by designating in their contract that the
rules govern. Institutional arbitrators often apply UNCITRAL
rules.17 2 These rules are subject to mandatory provisions of applicable arbitration law. 83
Under UNCITRAL Rules parties choose the language, select
the site, 8 4 and stipulate the substantive law to be applied in arbitration. If the parties have not chosen the substantive law, the
arbitration tribunal determines the applicable law according to
the conflict of law principles it deems appropriate.8 5
2.

The American Arbitration Association

Founded in 1926 as a nonprofit public service organization, the
American Arbitration Association, unlike the UNCITRAL, con778. Broches, A Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration? A
ProgressReport on the Work Undertaken Within the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 79, 79 (1984).
779. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at
34-50, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
780. G.A. Res. 31/98, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 182, UN Doc. A/31/39
(1976).
781. UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 3338, U.N. Doc. A/35/17 (1980).
782. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 23. See also Suy, Achievements of
the United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 139
(1981). "The AAA has announced that it is prepared to administer arbitration
under UNCITRAL rules and has recently published administrative rules for this
purpose." Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 23.
783. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 23 & n.10.
784. de Vries, supra note 767, at 71.
785. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 41.
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sists of an arbitral body. 76 AAA selects arbitrators from a National Panel of Arbitrators comprised of approximately 50,000 individuals in the United States. The AAA neither employs nor
pays arbitrators; either they are unpaid or are paid by the parties. 7817 The AAA cases consist primarily of monetary damage

cases in which domestic tortious conduct or commercial contracts
are in dispute. 788 The total number of international commercial

cases handled by the AAA is proportionally small to other types
of cases.7

19

Though utilizing the AAA is expensive, the cost of ar-

bitration in the AAA is less than the cost of litigation in United
7 0
States courts.

0

The AAA rules give the parties the most control over the arbitrator selection process. After the Association selects a group of
arbitrators, each party may eliminate unacceptable arbitrators
from that group; the parties then rank in order of preference
those names remaining on the list.7

1

The AAA chooses the arbi-

trators from the remaining names according to those rankings 2
Because the Association rules do not contain provisions to determine applicable law, arbitrators will either apply the substantive
law of the nation in which the arbitral tribunal is located or determine the law by utilizing that country's conflict of law rules.7 93
The AAA also selects the location of arbitration if the parties do
79 5
not.7 94 The AAA allows parties to choose the language.

786. Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Cpmparative
Analysis of Case Processing Time, DispositionMode, and Cost in the American

Arbitration Association and the Courts, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 6, 8 (1983).
787. Id.
788. Id.
789. de Vries, supra note 767, at 45.
790. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 786, at 18. "The AAA cost provisions
are set out in rules 48 through 52. The schedule by which administrative costs
are calculated begins with a minimum of $200, or three percent of a claim between $1 and $40,000, and goes to a maximum of $1800 plus one-quarter percent
of any amount over $160,000. In claims over $5,000,000, the AAA has the power

to set an 'appropriate fee.'" Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 32 (footnote
omitted).
791. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 30-31. Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, Rule 13, reprinted in G. WILNER,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at appendix VII, 43, 44 (1984) [hereinafter
AAA Commercial Arb. Rules].
792. Rhodes & Sloan, supra note 766, at 30-31.
793. Id. at 41-42.
794. de Vries, supra note 767, at 68. AAA Commerical Arb. Rules, supra
note 791, Rule 11 at appendix VIII, 43.
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3. The International Chamber of Commerce
Some of the most important international commercial disputes
have been heard in the Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.).9 s The function of the Court is to
settle international business disputes by arbitration.97 This mandate would appear to include relief treaties between governments
and organizations, because such agreements are ultimately business transactions.
The headquarters of the I.C.C. Court of Arbitration is in Paris,
but the court organizes and supervises arbitral proceedings all
over the world. Unless chosen by the parties, 9 8 the Court of the
I.C.C. selects the location of arbitration.79 9 The Court will choose
a third country, taking care to balance geographically the respective positions of the parties.800 The worldwide reach of the I.C.C.
accommodates the settlement of relief agreement disputes occurring throughout the world.
Article 2(1) of the I.C.C. Arbitration Rules apparently permits
the parties to select and appoint arbitrators. Nonetheless, the
795.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PROCEDURES, SUPPLEMENTARY PRO-

CEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984).

para. 6, reprinted in G.

796. Between 1923 and 1984, 5,000 cases were filed with I.C.C_ Court of Arbitration of which 2,978 were filed between 1923 and July 1976. The average number of cases between 1981 and 1983 was 268. Derains, InternationalChamber of
Commerce Arbitration, 5 PACE L. REV. 591 (1985).
The I.C.C. has national committees in fifty-seven countries. The composition of the I.C.C. Court of Arbitration reflects this internationalism.. By
the end of 1984, it was composed of a French chairman, Mr. Michel
Gaudet, five vice-chairmen (from India, Lebanon, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United States), a U.S. Secretary General, and members from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. Id. at 594-95.
797. Id.. at 593 (citing the Rules for the I.C.C. Court of Arbitration, Pub. No.
291, art. 1(1) (1980)).
798. The parties chose the place of arbitration themselves in 67% of the
cases. Derains, supra note 796, at 595.
799. de Vries, supra at note 767, at 68 (citing I.C.C. Rules, art. 12).
800. Derains, supra note 796, at 595. "In 1983, I.C.C. arbitration proceedings
took place in 81 different countries: 85% in Western Europe, 7.5% in North
America, and the remaining 7.5% in other parts of the world." Id.
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Court will appoint or confirm the appointments of arbitrators if

the parties have not.80 1 The Court of Arbitration steps in if the
parties have made no provisions to appoint arbitrators and always
supervises the
application of the rules by the appointed
2
80

arbitrators.

I.C.C. Arbitration Rules empower the arbitrator to determine
the validity of his jurisdiction and the applicability of substantive
law, and to consider the merits of various languages for the proceeding. If an agreement to arbitrate in the I.C.C. exists, the arbitrator, not the Court, determines jurisdiction. 80 3 To determine
substantive law, the I.C.C. follows the Geneva Convention of
1961,804 which permits the parties to determine the law that the
arbitrator shall apply to merits of the dispute. If the parties have
failed to indicate the applicable law, the arbitrator may then utilize the conflict of law rules which he considers appropriate to determine the applicable law. 05 These provisions are similar to article 33(1) of -the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; yet, unlike
UNCITRAL Rules, I.C.C. Arbitration Rules allow the arbitrator
to select the language in which the proceeding will be
conducted. 00
Legal recourse based on aid agreements is even more difficult to
attain because most aid agencies claim certain privileges and immunities which, if accepted, render their actions untouchable.
Most international aid organizations include in their constitutions
a brief general outline of privileges and immunities.07 Further
detailed privileges and immunities are set forth in specific treaties
and agreements. 08 Substantial similarities exist in the provisions
801. I.C.C. Arbitration Rules, art. 2(1), reprinted in G. WILmNR, DOMKE ON
ARBITRATION (1984) [hereinafter I.CC. Arbitration Rules].
802. Derains, supra note 796, at 596.

COMMERCIAL

803.

The "arbitrator's right to rule on his own jurisdiction ...

was recog-

nized by article 8(3) of the I.C.C. Arbitration Rules, leaving State courts only an
a posteriori right of control." Id. at 598.
804. Id. at 601. See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 7.
805. I.C.C. Arbitration Rules, supra note 801, at art. 13(3). "In all cases the

arbitrator shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the relevant
trade usages." Id., art. 13(5).
806. Id., art. 15(3). In choosing the language, the arbitrator must consider
"all the relevant circumstances and in particular ... the language of the con-

tract." Id.
807. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (Dolzer ed. 1985).

808. Id. at 154.
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of the various treaties and agreements.
International immunities include the capacity to contract, to
possess real and personal property, and an exemption from legal
process, unless immunity is waived. 0 9 Authorities of the host
state are generally precluded from entering the organization's
premises and conducting searches and seizures. Organizations are
usually exempt from taxes and customs duties on transactions or
property and from prohibitions on the importing and exporting of
items.810 Furthermore, government representatives of international organizations are treated as diplomats."' Persons employed
by international organizations usually are immune from legal process within the host state, exempt from taxation, and free to
12
8

travel.

An example of privileges and immunities provisions which may
apply to aid activities is the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the U.N. 13 The Convention empowers the U.N. to contract and to institute legal proceedings, 14 while exempting U.N.
property815 and the representatives of U.N.816 members from legal
process. Also contained in the Convention are provisions for the
settlement of contracts, disputes of a private law character to
which the U.N. is a party, disputes in which U.N. officials raise
the defense of immunity; the Convention directs that all disputes
arising from application or interpretation of the convention are to
8 17
be referred to the ICJ.

A second U.N. immunities convention s

applies specifically to

809. Id. at 155.
810. Id. at 156.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 156-58. These immunities should apply equally to high officials,
staff members, local hires, international hires, nationals of the Host State and
any other employee. Id. at 157.
813. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
814. Id., art. I, § 1, 1 U.N.T.S. 16.
815. Immunity of U.N. property may be waived. Id., art. II, § 2, 1 U.N.T.S.
16, 18.
816. Under article IV, section 11(a), 1 U.N.T.S. 20, representatives of U.N.
members are immune from personal arrest or detention. Words spoken or written and all acts done by representatives of U.N. members are subject to immunity under article IV, section 12, in discharge of their duties. Similar provisions
are made for experts in article IV, section 22, 1 U.N.T.S. 26.
817. See id., art. VIII, 1 U.N.T.S. 30, 32.
818. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agen-
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the FAO, WHO, and other U.N.-related agencies.8 19 This convention empowers these agencies to institute legal proceedings8 20 and
exempts their property and assets from all legal proceedings.8 2 '
The Agency provides for resolution of disputes arising from contracts and immunity.8 2 2 Unless the parties have agreed upon some
other form of settlement, such disputes shall be referred to the
ICJ.823 If the dispute is between an agency and a member, then
24
the parties must seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ.

Due to the immunity granted by the above conventions, a cause
of action probably does not exist against U.N. agencies and U.N.related organizations. The ICJ may provide a forum in which to
settle disputes of a private law nature wherein immune officials
may be parties. But once again, all the problems of nonappearing
respondents and voluntary jurisdiction render such dispute resolution methods impotent. While the conventions define the legal
status of relief personnel, no adequate remedy for damages resulting from problems in relief agreements exists. Most international
immunities agreements provide for some means of dispute resolution: either an ICJ advisory opinion or, more commonly, arbitration. Almost no immunities cases have been litigated in the ICJ or
through arbitration, but the option exists.8 25 Other types of disputes involving third parties in private law contract or tort disputes are not covered by formal immunity provisions. 26 Such disputes are usually resolved in arbitration. Otherwise, insurance is
provided. 27

cies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 262.
819. These agencies are related to the U.N. under articles 57 and 63 of the
U.N. Charter. Id., art. I, § 1(j), 33 U.N.T.S. 264.
820. Id., art. II, § 3, 33 U.N.T.S. 266.
821. Id., art. III, § 4, 33 U.N.T.S. 266. Immunity of such property and assets
may be waived. Id.
822. Id., art. IX, § 31, 33 U.N.T.S. 280.
823. Id., art. IX, § 32, 33 U.N.T.S. 282.
824. Id. The FAO specifically is addressed in Annex II, 33 U.N.T.S. 292; the
WHO is addresed in Annex VII, 33 U.N.T.S. 300.
825.

5

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

158 (Dolzer ed. 1985).

826. Id.
827. Id. at 159. If a party is insured, the insurance company will litigate the
case.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

According to the USDA, thirty-six countries currently are incapable of maintaining adequate food supplies. 28 Many of these
countries are suffering from a so-called "food crisis":

29

a food cri-

sis country experiences a declining rate of per capita food production, diets at unacceptable nutritional levels and significant international debt problems. 30 Small African countries comprise
eighty percent of the world's food crisis countries, while the remainder of such countries are located in Asia and Latin
America.s 31 With such large domestic stocks of agricultural commodities 8s 2 and growing reports of world famine,833 many observers feel the United States should increase the amount of food aid
it donates. The President's Task Force on International Private
Enterprise suggested in its "action brief' that the amount of relief provided through the Public Law 480 program should be at
least doubled. 34 The USDA estimates that the CCC has in its
stockpiles twice the amount of food necessary to meet the fiscal
year 1985 food needs of the drought stricken areas of SubSaharan Africa and Central America.8 35
The House of Representatives Select Committee on Hunger
concluded that the factor most limiting expansion of United
States food assistance was funding.8 3 Although the United States
currently has surpluses of agricultural commodities, and although
the United States agricultural industry apparently has not
828. These shortages result from inadequate growth in domestic food pro-

duction and a lack of currency with which to pay for imports. HousE
REPORT,

SPECIAL

supra note 22, at 3. These countries, listed according to severity of the

problem include: Guinea, Lesotho, Gambia, Syria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Yemen
Arab Republic, Mali, Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Kenya,.
Zambia, Benin, Peru, Liberia, Botswana, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Morocco, Cameroon, Burma, Ghana, Tanzania, Togo, Chad, Mauritania, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau,
Guatemala, Congo, Nepal, Niger, Uruguay, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. Id.

829. Id. at 4.
830. Id. Between 1974 and 1983 food crisis countries have had a 700% increase in their debt holdings.
831. Id. at 5. Sixty percent of food crisis countries have per capita incomes of
less than $500, and 75% have per capita incomes of less than $1000. Id.
832. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 84.
833. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
834. International Trade and Development, supra note 449, at 23.
835.

Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 69.

836. HousE

SPECIAL REPORT,

supra note 22, at iv.
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reached its maximum production potential, 8 37 financing is re-

quired to donate these surpluses. 38 Consumption barriers also
prevent the expansion of food aid.8 39 Much of the CCC stockpile

is composed of dairy products, to which many Africans have an
intolerance. 40 Political considerations also limit the amount of
United States surpluses which can be given to the poor. 41 The

United States must be careful to avoid violating international
agreements by "dumping" surplus commodities, causing economic
disruption of the recipient's food market. 42
The successful implementation of United States donative food
aid legislation requires a decision to extricate this massive effort
from the political context. When the attempt to feed the starving
assumes priority over political considerations and becomes a fundamental humanitarian concern, the question becomes how food
aid is to be delivered, not if, when, why, or to whom it should be
given. Though the question of the method of delivering aid is still
massive and complex, it seems simple when the desired goal is
clearly and unanimously in focus. Yet in the end, a greater
amount of assistance, more efficiently executed operations, and
even less politically motivated aid will not alone accomplish the
objective of feeding the disaster-stricken persons on this earth.
The governments of those facing starvation must also utilize developmental assistance to teach their people to begin feeding
themselves.
Peggy F. Brandenburg
Susan N. Burgess
Scott N. Greenspun
Sharon Marie Janarek
Patrick M. Thomas
Linda L. Kotis, editor

837. See Bale & Southworth, World Agricultural Trade and Food Security:
Emerging Patterns and Policy Directions, 1 WiS. INT'L L.J. 30 (1982). The
United States has 127 million acres of farmable land which are currently uncultivated. This land, if farmed, codd increase crop production by 30%. Id.
838. HousE SPEcIAL REPORT, supra note 22, at iii, iv.
839. Food Aid and the Role of the PVOs, supra note 4, at 65.

840. Id.
841. Id.
842. See id.

1986]

DISASTER RELIEF

APPENDIX A
P.L. 480-Title 1/III Program Flowchart
Request from
Foreign
Government

USDA Develops
Program Prposal

Interagency Food Aid Subcommittee
Review and Approval. AID, USDA,
STATE, TREASURY, COMMERCE,
0MB, NSCI

Agreement
Negotiations by
U.S. Embassy
Staff and Foreign
Government

Signed
Agreement
Between U.S.
and Foreign
Government

Foreign Country
Purchases
Commodities
through

Agency Objectives:

USDA
Market
Development
Surplus Disposal

Commercial
Markets
STATE
Foreign Policy

COMMERCE
Trade

TREASURY

NSC
National Security

Financial Review

SOURCE
USDA 1984.

Economic
Development
Humanitarian

Commodities
Shipped

OMB
Budgetary

Overview

Reprinted in International Trade and Development: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalDevelopment Institutions
and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1985).
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APPENDIX B
Title II Program Development and
Implementation
Program Sponsor
Request
- Voluntary agencies
- World Food Program
- Recipient country

Washington Review
- AID
- USDA
- OMB

Approval Notification
Sponsor Implementing Agent
- PVO
- Headquarters and
recipient country
- WFP
- Rome and recipient
country

r

Interagency Food Aid
Subcommittee Approval
- AID
- Treasury
- USDA - Commerce
- OMB - NSC
- State

Commodity Procurement
USDA

- Country - Recipient country

Commodity Shipment Booking
Sponsor Implementing Agent
- PVO
- Private booking agent
- USDA and private
- WFP
booking agent
- Country - USDA

Direct Distribution of Commodities to
Individual Recipients
- PVO
- Country

Agency Responsibility:

ICommodity

Arrival in Country
supervised by:
-

PVO

-

WFP
Country

-

Compliance Reporting to AID
(commodity use and number of
recipients)
- PVO
- WFP
- Country

Primary program responsibility rests
with AID. Operational responsibilities
for Title II activities are carried out by
three types of program sponsors: private
voluntary agencies (PVOs); intergovernmental organizations, primarily the
UN/FAO World Food Program (WFP);
and recipient governments (Country).

Reprinted in International Trade and Development: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalDevelopment Institutions
and Finance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1985).

